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Source: https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/feed/

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<title>Webinar – Financialisation, human rights and the Bretton Woods Institutions: An introduction for civil society organisations</title>
<link>https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/financialisation-human-rights-and-the-bretton-woods-institutions-an-introduction-for-civil-society-organisations-2/</link>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Isabel Alvarez]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Fri, 12 Apr 2024 08:33:31 +0000</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/?p=49962</guid>
<description><![CDATA[On 11 April 2024 the Bretton Woods Project hosted a webinar to present its new report Financialisation, human rights and the Bretton Woods Institutions: An introduction for civil society organisations, followed by a discussion with CSOs and academics
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/financialisation-human-rights-and-the-bretton-woods-institutions-an-introduction-for-civil-society-organisations-2/">Webinar – Financialisation, human rights and the Bretton Woods Institutions: An introduction for civil society organisations</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[On 11 April 2024 the Bretton Woods Project hosted a webinar to present its new report <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/financialisation-human-rights-and-the-bretton-woods-institutions-an-introduction-for-civil-society-organisations/">Financialisation, human rights and the Bretton Woods Institutions: An introduction for civil society organisations</a>, followed by a discussion with CSOs and academics, including Francisco Cantamutto (Universidad Nacional del Sur, Argentina), Bruno Bonizzi (University of Hertfordshire), Luisa Abbott Galvao (Friends of the Earth), and Karina Kato (Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil).
Watch the webinar:
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<script src="https://player.vimeo.com/api/player.js"></script>
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/financialisation-human-rights-and-the-bretton-woods-institutions-an-introduction-for-civil-society-organisations-2/">Webinar – Financialisation, human rights and the Bretton Woods Institutions: An introduction for civil society organisations</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
]]></content:encoded>
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<title>Spring Meetings 2024 Preamble: Bretton Woods Institutions continue to sleepwalk through crises as 80th anniversary of Bretton Woods Conference approaches</title>
<link>https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/spring-meetings-2024-preamble-bretton-woods-institutions-continue-to-sleepwalk-through-crises-as-80th-anniversary-of-bretton-woods-conference-approaches/</link>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jon Sward]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2024 09:05:30 +0000</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/?p=49912</guid>
<description><![CDATA[At a time when transformative changes on governance and development financing are required, the World Bank and IMF have instead opted for a slimmed down Spring Meetings schedule.
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/spring-meetings-2024-preamble-bretton-woods-institutions-continue-to-sleepwalk-through-crises-as-80th-anniversary-of-bretton-woods-conference-approaches/">Spring Meetings 2024 Preamble: Bretton Woods Institutions continue to sleepwalk through crises as 80th anniversary of Bretton Woods Conference approaches</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[As the World Bank and IMF approach the Spring Meetings in Washington DC from 15-20 April, it’s difficult to escape the conclusion that – despite endless talk of reforming the international financial architecture since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic – the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) and their wealthy country shareholders have largely failed to rise to the challenge, much to the chagrin of Global South countries and civil society. As we approach the 80th <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/archive/history/exhibits/Bretton-Woods-and-the-Birth-of-the-World-Bank">anniversary</a> of the Bretton Woods Conference in July, the BWIs’ governance structures – which were forged in the aftermath of WWII – remain largely unreformed.
The World Bank’s internal reform process in 2023 ended with a whimper, begetting potentially contradictory metaphors (an Evolution Roadmap that yielded an Evolution…Playbook?), minor tweaks to the Bank’s mission and vision, and precious little additional concessional financing – ignoring longstanding concerns regarding inequitable governance structures that favour wealthy shareholders (see Dispatch <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/10/marrakech-annual-meetings-wrap-up-2023-bretton-woods-institutions-wilt-in-the-desert-as-pragmatism-fails-to-resolve-urgent-crises/">Annuals 2023;</a> Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/07/civil-society-calls-for-world-bank-to-reroute-evolution-roadmap-away-from-cascade/">Summer 2023</a>).
Meanwhile, the IMF’s 16th review of quotas, which concluded in December 2023, <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/03/civil-society-calls-for-an-end-to-the-gentlemans-agreement-and-a-merit-based-open-and-transparent-md-selection-process/">failed</a> to deliver on the long-delayed redistribution of IMF quotas needed to reflect the increased importance of emerging market countries in driving global growth. In the end, it agreed an equi-proportional increase that further entrenches the IMF’s flawed quota formula, where the US retains a de facto veto over key governance decisions (see Inside the Institutions, <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2020/04/imf-and-world-bank-decision-making-and-governance-2/">IMF and World Bank decision making and governance</a>). This raises the stakes for the 17th review, which shareholders have committed to complete by mid-2025.
This lack of progress has taken place even as multiple crises, including increased conflict, climate change, a growing Global South debt crisis, political instability and geopolitical fragmentation, threaten to further erode trust in multilateralism. In this context, the BWIs seem to have few answers other than to keep trying to entice private capital into development and climate finance efforts – a strategy that has had limited success since the launch of the Bank’s Cascade approach in 2017 (Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2017/07/development-rescue-finance-banks-cascade-approach/">Summer 2017</a>).
With EU countries signalling support for a second term for IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva, whose current term ends in September (see Observer <a href="http://tinyurl.com/MDCampaign2024">Spring 2024</a>), the long-standing “gentleman’s agreement” – which has seen every head of the IMF be a European and every World Bank President be a US citizen since the BWIs’ inception – looks set to continue (see Inside the Institutions, <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/07/what-is-the-gentlemans-agreement/">What is the ‘gentleman’s agreement’?</a>).
The failure of recent reform efforts to address longstanding governance failings was not lost on the Group of 77 developing countries, which noted in the <a href="https://www.g77.org/doc/3southsummit_outcome.htm#:~:text=We%2C%20the%20Heads%20of%20State,to%20continue%20to%20act%20in">outcome document</a> of the Third South Summit, held in Kampala, Uganda, in late January: “We note with great concern that the international financial architecture has not kept pace with a changing global landscape and has failed to deliver the financing or stability needed to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, and call for urgent reform of the international financial architecture,…and to broaden and strengthen the voice, participation, and representation of developing countries in international economic decision-making.”
<h2>Whither a ‘better’ Bank?</h2>
The World Bank is likely to command much of the limelight at the Spring Meetings. Having officially assumed his post in June 2023, this is Ajay Banga’s first Spring Meetings as Bank President. With Banga’s vision for a “bigger and better Bank” unveiled at the 2023 Annual Meetings in Morocco last October (see Dispatch <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/10/marrakech-annual-meetings-wrap-up-2023-bretton-woods-institutions-wilt-in-the-desert-as-pragmatism-fails-to-resolve-urgent-crises/">Annuals 2023</a>), this Spring Meetings feels critical for decision making. Despite the slimmed down agenda – the rationale for which remains unexplained – discussions of significant importance to States and populations of the Global South will take place, including on a substantial 21st replenishment for the International Development Association (IDA21), the Bank’s low-income country arm, operationalising the Evolution Roadmap, and outlining what is really meant by bigger and better Bank.
Developments in recent months have brought fresh concerns for civil society about the current direction of travel. Financing for struggling countries is urgently needed, and so the IDA21 policy package, which will be discussed in DC and fully developed over the summer, will be watched eagerly. IDA is arguably the most critical opportunity for the Bank to put financing behind its thematic strategies, as noted by the Bank itself in a November 2023 mid-term <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/ida20-mid-term-review">review</a> of IDA20, which asserted that “policy commitments are effective in continuing to mainstream key priorities.” However, this replenishment has been framed as “SimplifIDA” by Banga himself: An opportunity to remove what he deems unnecessary <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/event/fireside-chat-world-bank-president-ajay-banga">rules and processes</a> to create – in theory – a more effective and efficient Bank, in addition to his hopes for it to be the largest replenishment “of all time” (see Observer <a href="http://tinyurl.com/IDA21Replenishment">Spring 2024</a>). Despite this optimistic call to action, many donor countries have already signalled cuts to overseas development assistance, putting this goal in jeopardy.
SimplifIDA is indicative of how, in practice, hard-won gains on critical thematic areas, including gender and disability inclusion, already seem to be disappearing into a muddle of rejigged buzzwords like ‘lenses’ and ‘pillars’, which risk watering down the response to critical issues. The deprioritisation of issues from ‘special themes’ to ‘lenses’ with few or no policy commitments could directly result in reduced funding for such issues in the Bank’s poorest borrowing countries, and less attention on thematic strategies. Following more than a yearlong consultation process and extensive engagement with civil society, the Bank’s much awaited <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099013107142345483/pdf/SECBOS04cf7b650208a5e08b784c0db6a4.pdf">2024-30 Gender Strategy</a> is slowing before it crosses the line for official release. While civil society await details of implementation plans, the potential loss of gender as an IDA21 ‘special theme’ could signify the start of a worrying side-effect of Banga’s simplifying exercise, whereby strategies collect dust rather than encouraging concrete WBG commitments.
The roll-out of the World Bank’s Evolution Roadmap is also due to begin at the Spring Meetings, which has also failed to meet reform expectations (see Observer <a href="http://tinyurl.com/BiggervsBetter">Spring 2024</a>). Thus far, the Bank’s ‘private finance-first’ approach to development has been front and centre of the Roadmap, in addition to balance sheet optimisation. Indeed, new research from the Bretton Woods Project shows that this is a continuation of the Bank’s existing approach, including comprehensive ‘green conditionality’ in the energy sectors of many countries between 2018-2023, to promote a private-led energy transition, which could deepen profit extraction from the Global South to North, while passing costs on to consumers (see Report, <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/gambling-with-the-planets-future-world-bank-development-policy-finance-green-conditionality-and-the-push-for-a-private-led-energy-transition/">Gambling with the planet’s future?</a>).
In civil society spaces, including <a href="https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/e447d6d16dc28a2cc7a4617d7023e9b1-0360012024/original/CSPF-Schedule.pdf">Civil Society Policy Forum</a> (CSPF) panels, the Bank is likely to face questions over several problematic issues. The key arguments of a forthcoming book by economist Matthew Greenslade, Beyond the World Bank: The Fight for Universal Social Protection in the Global South, will be presented, as part of the wider fight to see the World Bank meet its <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialprotectionandjobs/publication/charting-a-course-towards-universal-social-protection-resilience-equity-and-opportunity-for-all">commitment</a> to support universal social protection, and move away from <a href="https://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/publications/hit-and-miss-an-assessment-of-targeting-effectiveness-in-social-protection/">controversial</a> targeted and means-tested forms of social protection (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/beyond-the-world-bank-the-fight-for-universal-social-protection-in-the-global-south/">Spring 2024</a>). This is part of a wider movement across civil society to see the Bank invert its private sector bias and instead support public services and uphold human rights across its operations (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/07/civil-society-calls-for-world-bank-to-reroute-evolution-roadmap-away-from-cascade/">Summer 2023</a>). On Friday, 19 April, a wide constituency of civil society organisations will join protests outside the venue, calling into question the BWIs’ approach amidst multiple ongoing crises.
Speaking of human rights, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank’s private finance arm, will surely expect more heat from civil society during the meetings, amidst yet more scandal relating to the Bridge International Academies case, Oxfam’s revealing 2023 Sick Development <a href="https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/sick-development-how-rich-country-government-and-world-bank-funding-to-for-prof-621529/">report</a>, and recent evidence of human rights abuses within IFC-funded private hospitals in India (see Observer <a href="http://tinyurl.com/IFCApolloHospitals">Spring 2024</a>).
<h2>Georgieva evokes ghost of Keynes, but Fund has long-since departed from his vision</h2>
In a <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/03/08/sp031424-kings-college-cambridge-kristalina-georgieva">speech</a> at King’s College, Cambridge, on 12 March, Georgieva was invited to reflect on the John Maynard Keynes essay, Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren. Georgieva pointed out that Keynes, a noted King’s alumnus and often-lauded UK representative at the Bretton Woods Conference, had successfully predicted an eight-fold increase in living standards, driven by capital accumulation, but had been overly optimistic about the benefits of global growth being shared equitably. Georgieva argued that in order to avoid the onset of a new ‘Age of Anger’ amid rising global challenges, a new multilateralism was needed, which was more representative, and more results oriented. She noted, “In a world of abundant capital accumulation and accelerating technological change, prospects for my grandchildren will hinge on whether we can allocate capital to where it is needed most and will make the biggest positive impact.”
Yet, Georgieva’s speech was strangely blind to the power dynamics that underlie such capital allocation – and indeed that are behind the IMF’s stalled quota review redistribution and the continuation of the “gentleman’s agreement”, which will ensure her likely re-appointment. Revered economist Angus Deaton noted in a reflective March <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2024/03/Symposium-Rethinking-Economics-Angus-Deaton">piece</a> in the Fund-published Finance and Development that the tendency to overlook power dynamics is a malaise common in the economics discipline more broadly – and is among the issues that require urgent attention, as has also been underlined in the UN Secretary General’s New Agenda for Peace (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/12/un-secretary-general-new-agenda-for-peace-calls-for-urgent-financial-architecture-and-policy-reform/">Winter 2023</a>).
Georgieva rather optimistically argued at King’s College that, “For African countries, the key is to attract long-term investors and ensure stable trade flows….This means promoting better growth: from improving the business environment, to raising more revenue, and weeding out inefficient spending.” However, this approach largely re-treads the policy paradigm the BWIs have promoted since the 1980s, which has notably failed to achieve economic transformation in LMICs.
Although Georgieva failed to mention it in her Cambridge speech, Keynes’s proposal for an International Clearing Union at the IMF that – as Jamie Martin noted in his 2022 <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674976542">book</a> The Meddlers – “would automatically provide credits to deficit countries to keep their balance of payments in equilibrium”, was ultimately rejected. Instead, Martin pointed out that US- and Wall Street-backed arguments for “inquisitorial powers” at the IMF won the day at the Bretton Woods Conference, making access to financing conditional rather than automatic, and setting the stage for the paternalistic influence of the Fund in countries’ domestic affairs over the following eight decades. As has been well-documented by civil society, the IMF continues to promote austerity in many countries (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/12/world-bank-and-imf-promoting-private-finance-and-fiscal-consolidation-despite-mounting-evidence-of-harmful-impacts/">Winter 2023</a>) – contradicting the key tenant of <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2014/09/basics.htm">Keynesian economics</a>: That in times of economic downturn, the state must step up its spending in order to increase aggregate demand.
<h2>Bypassing the BWIs: Alternate fora for reform</h2>
The lack of meaningful reform being offered by either of the Bretton Woods Institutions seems stark in comparison to ongoing conversations in other spaces. The historic Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation was passed through the UN General Assembly in November 2023 (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/12/civil-society-urges-governments-to-agree-on-a-un-tax-body-as-a-high-priority-matter/">Winter 2023</a>), and is now in negotiation following years of advocacy and input from civil society, which many <a href="https://www.eurodad.org/un_reaches_global_consensus_on_the_road_ahead_towards_a_tax_convention">hope</a> could be a step towards filling fiscal gaps left by international tax dodging and unequal systems (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/04/against-regressive-taxes-and-austerity-imf-and-world-bank-must-pivot-tax-policies-to-support-a-just-and-green-transition/">Spring 2023</a>). The monumentally significant UN Tax Convention highlights how plausible resource mobilisation from sources other than private financers could be.
The upcoming UN Summit for the Future, happening in September, potentially opens a door for urgent reform initiatives. <a href="https://www.un.org/en/summit-of-the-future">Hailed</a> as an “opportunity to enhance cooperation on critical challenges and address gaps in global governance, reaffirm existing commitments including to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)”, it’s yet to be determined how tangible outputs from the upcoming session will be for transformative measures. Elsewhere, Brazil’s 2024 G20 presidency offers space for reform of multilateralism amidst ongoing conflict and crisis, with Brazil <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/22/brazil-urges-united-nations-reform-g20">noting</a> its intention to put UN and wider international financial architecture reform on the agenda this year. Such processes will put pressure on the BWIs to put their money where their mouth is on structural reform.
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/spring-meetings-2024-preamble-bretton-woods-institutions-continue-to-sleepwalk-through-crises-as-80th-anniversary-of-bretton-woods-conference-approaches/">Spring Meetings 2024 Preamble: Bretton Woods Institutions continue to sleepwalk through crises as 80th anniversary of Bretton Woods Conference approaches</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
]]></content:encoded>
<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">49912</post-id> </item>
<item>
<title>Undemocratic gentleman’s agreement will further challenge next IMF managing director</title>
<link>https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/undemocratic-gentlemans-agreement-will-further-challenge-next-imf-managing-director/</link>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mihaela Siritanu]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2024 20:50:44 +0000</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/?p=49470</guid>
<description><![CDATA[EU countries’ backing of Kristalina Georgieva for a second term as IMF Managing Director will likely set in motion the next steps towards her reappointment, representing another lost opportunity to reform IMF governance.
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/undemocratic-gentlemans-agreement-will-further-challenge-next-imf-managing-director/">Undemocratic gentleman’s agreement will further challenge next IMF managing director</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[In September, the term of the current IMF Managing Director (MD) Kristalina Georgieva will expire. On March 14th, the IMF board launched the formal process for appointing a new MD, with nominations open for three weeks and closing in early April, ahead of the IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings. While French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire and Ireland’s Paschal Donohoe, who leads the Eurogroup of eurozone finance ministers, were both rumoured to have considered a run, no formal candidacies have been put forward so far.
The race seems pretty much tied up as European Union finance ministers already <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-backs-kristalina-georgieva-for-second-imf-term/">endorsed</a> Kristalina Georgieva for a second term in early March. Civil society organisations <a href="https://imfboss.com/2024/03/12/for-immediate-release-civil-society-condemns-the-continuation-of-the-undemocratic-gentlemans-agreement-as-european-countries-back-kristalina-georgieva-for-another-term-at-the-helm-of-the-imf/">rejected</a> this move, which proves yet again that the “gentleman’s agreement”, an unwritten agreement that has ensured for 80 years that the IMF managing director has been a European and the World Bank president a US national, is alive and well (see Inside the Institutions,<a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/07/what-is-the-gentlemans-agreement/#:~:text=The%20so%2Dcalled%20gentleman%27s%20agreement,president%20is%20a%20US%20national."> What is the ‘gentleman’s agreement’?</a>). This means, in practice, that no other candidates – particularly from the Global South – are likely to emerge, as Georgieva seems on track to get backing of majority shareholders of the IMF, meaning the doors are already shut before the process even begins (see Inside the Institutions, <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2020/04/imf-and-world-bank-decision-making-and-governance-2/">IMF and World Bank decision-making and governance</a>).
Global civil society and countries from the Global South have long <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/its-time-to-end-the-gentlemans-agreement-an-open-letter-to-the-imf/">called</a> for an end to this illegitimate, neo-colonial agreement and for a more democratic appointment process. This should ensure the selection of the next managing director is undertaken in accordance with a merit-based, open and transparent process, underpinned by criteria involving a demonstrated commitment to international human rights, feminist principles, green and equitable development, as well as candidate engagement with civil society to outline IMF priorities and publicly available shareholder votes.
<h2>Lack of governance reform will result in increased pressure for the IMF</h2>
Assuming she is re-appointed, Georgieva’s next term will likely be even more difficult than her first. Her first term was marked by numerous crises, from the unequal Covid-19 pandemic recovery and the economic and social spillovers from conflicts in Ukraine and Palestine, to the dramatic increase in capital costs and worsening debt crisis for low- and middle-income countries. These crises further exacerbated existing global challenges such as climate change, rising inequality, and the related increase in social and political instability as well as fragmentation of the multilateral order (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2022/07/a-new-bretton-woods-for-whom-civil-society-calls-for-democratisation-of-global-governance/">Summer 2022</a>).
Her efforts to tackle these overlapping systemic crises – including a historic Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) allocation in 2021, the launch of a new Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RST; see Observer<a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2022/04/new-imf-resilience-and-sustainability-trust-rst-how-to-make-it-work-for-the-global-south/"> Spring 2022</a>), and securing critical financial support for countries like Ukraine and Argentina – were seen as key achievements. However, the Fund continues to be dictated to a large extent by geopolitical factors related to its unequal governance, with the MD often left to walk a fine line trying to manage increasingly contested shareholder interests. The allocation of SDRs (see Briefing, <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/10/reconceptualising-special-drawing-rights-as-a-tool-for-development-finance/">Reconceptualising Special Drawing Rights as a tool for development finance</a>) was determined by US domestic politics rather than global needs and, due to the IMF’s anachronistic quota system, was unequally <a href="https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/47856/1/S2200199_en.pdf">distributed</a> based on the relative size of countries’ IMF shareholding. Similarly, while the RST provides concessional finance, in order to acces it, countries must have other loan programmes with the IMF and accept austerity policies (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2022/12/unbalanced-financial-stimulus-followed-by-fiscal-austerity-when-will-the-imf-learn-from-its-mistakes/">Winter 2022</a>), combined with questionable <a href="https://imfboss.com/2024/03/19/the-policy-trilemma-in-store-for-the-next-imf-managing-director/">green conditionality</a> from the RST itself, limiting their fiscal and policy space to address their vulnerability to climate change in the first place (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/civil-society-raises-concerns-about-resilience-and-sustainability-trusts-green-conditionality-as-fund-conducts-interim-review/">Spring 2024</a>).
Amid these difficult economic conditions, and a particularly volatile global peace and security landscape, Georgieva as leader of the Fund will face increased pressure from states in the Global South to reform the global economic architecture to tackle a world mired in systemic crises. In the <a href="https://dppa.un.org/en/a-new-agenda-for-peace#:~:text=On%2020%20July%202023%2C%20Secretary,for%20a%20world%20in%20transition.">New Agenda for Peace</a>, the UN Secretary General expressed concerns about the security implications of a fragmented geopolitical landscape. The internalisation of geopolitics in the international financial system through the continuation of the ‘gentleman’s agreement’ creates further tensions in the multilateral system. A product of this unspoken agreement, Georgieva will continue to be perceived as the instrument of western control of the Fund, particularly as the IMF has a <a href="https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2020/11/IMF-Austerity-Since-the-Global-Financial-Crisis-WP.pdf">history</a> of applying different rules for countries friendly with western governments. More recently this was seen when shareholders supported a change in the Exceptional Access Policy to allow more funding to Ukraine, while <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/09/17/pakistan-ukraine-arms-imf/">conditioning</a> Pakistan’s most recent IMF bailout on an arms deal with Ukraine. Regardless of her expertise and efforts, Georgieva’s new mandate does not represent the change needed but rather more of the status quo, affecting her ability to be an effective leader in tackling existing crises, thus contributing precisely to the dynamics outlined in the UN’s Agenda for Peace.
A new civil society <a href="https://imfboss.com/2024/03/27/csos-call-for-an-end-to-the-the-gentlemans-agreement-and-a-merit-based-open-and-transparent-selection-process-for-the-next-imf-managing-director/">letter</a> sent to the IMF board on 26 March called on the next IMF managing director to prioritise policies and systems that are gender transformative, equitable, environmentally sustainable, and consistent with international human rights norms. The letter notes the MD’s objectives for the next mandate should include: A new SDR allocation to help meet urgent financing needs for developing countries in ways that do not create additional debt burdens and undue policy conditionality; promotion of progressive taxation; support for sustainable debt resolution instead of austerity conditionality; reform of the IMF’s quota formula to accurately reflect the changes in the global economy; and commitment to establish a human rights policy with ex ante and ex post impact assessment of all IMF’s policies and programmes.
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/undemocratic-gentlemans-agreement-will-further-challenge-next-imf-managing-director/">Undemocratic gentleman’s agreement will further challenge next IMF managing director</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
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<title>Better ways to reduce the pain of debt crises for developing countries?</title>
<link>https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/better-ways-to-reduce-the-pain-of-debt-crises-for-developing-countries/</link>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Luiz Vieira]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2024 20:47:18 +0000</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/?p=49630</guid>
<description><![CDATA[Amid challenging global conditions, proposals to address liquidity issues must be urgently matched by a reformed, development-focused international financial architecture.
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/better-ways-to-reduce-the-pain-of-debt-crises-for-developing-countries/">Better ways to reduce the pain of debt crises for developing countries?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[High interest rates and reduced access to global capital markets have made it harder for many developing countries to service and roll over significant portions of their maturing external debt, limiting their ability to make necessary investments to advance the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and address climate change (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/12/new-data-show-global-south-is-in-worst-debt-crisis-ever-with-another-lost-decade-looming/">Winter 2023</a>, <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/10/debt-sustainability-assessment-reform-essential-to-address-retrogression-of-international-human-rights-and-crisis-of-development/">Autumn 2023</a>). With a debt servicing crunch facing developing countries between now and 2026, there is a need for urgent intervention.
A recent <a href="https://findevlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/FDL_A_Bridge_to_Climate_Action_final.pdf">study</a> by the Finance for Development Lab (FDL) suggests that many of these countries face an illiquidity rather than an insolvency problem and advocates a response that incorporates preemptive debt reprofiling combined with scaled up international investment support to begin funding the green transition. But beyond the liquidity problem we also need to face a long-overdue, and more fundamental, reform of the international financial architecture and sovereign debt system.
The low global growth environment, higher debt costs and geopolitical conflicts already undermine developing countries’ efforts to advance their development agendas and begin to take on the climate challenge. However, in our search for things that can be done now, we must ensure that even partial solutions are consistent with our longer-term vision of a reformed, development-focused international financial system (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/04/the-global-financial-architecture-and-the-international-debt-crisis-an-urgent-call-for-reform/">Spring 2023</a>).
When it comes to sovereign debt, the dividing line between illiquidity and insolvency depends largely on the “pain” that a country is willing to endure to avoid default (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/12/new-book-addresses-shortcomings-of-traditional-approaches-to-debt-and-economics/">Winter 2023</a>). And since the costs of default under the current international financial architecture are high, so are the “pain thresholds”. Faced with complex, protracted, and ineffective debt workout processes (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2021/12/debt-crisis-what-next-as-imf-and-g20-initiatives-set-to-expire/">Winter 2021</a>, <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2020/12/g20-debt-proposal-continues-to-favour-creditors/">Winter 2020</a>), countries are, instead, making the impossible choice to privilege debt servicing over investments in the SDGs. The FDL’s proposal to link liquidity relief with an International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme may not solve the problem given the time taken to negotiate and implement such arrangements (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/sri-lankas-continued-debt-crisis-highlights-urgent-need-for-wider-reform/">Spring 2024</a>). The proposal has two key questions to answer: Will it be enough? and, will it deliver relief in time? Unless these questions can be more definitively answered, the process might only serve to worsen the situation of citizens down the line.
Private credit providers’ share of developing country debt increased significantly between 2010 and 2021 – they doubled for low-income countries (LICs) to 13 per cent and are now the dominant source of funding for lower-middle income countries (LMICs) – see figure V.1 from the <a href="https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tdr2023_en.pdf">Trade and Development Report</a> 2023. By the end of 2023, they accounted for almost a quarter of the external exposure of the 36 <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/PRGT">Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust</a>-eligible countries currently listed by the IMF as highly indebted or in debt distress. This is only slightly less than the exposure of those countries to bilateral creditors and serves to emphasise that without private sector participation, any developing country debt workout process is doomed to be too little and ineffective. In an environment where debts are being serviced, there is little incentive for the private sector to take seriously attempts to reprofile the debt of the country participating in the debt restructuring. Even if the private sector is persuaded to join, as the G20 Common Framework has shown, lack of comparability of treatment for different types of lenders creates prolonged and unproductive negotiations between different creditor groups with high costs to the country concerned. Much more needs to be put in place to secure the rapid restructuring of debt to limit long-term damage to the borrower.
Another way the sovereign liquidity problems of the kind identified by FDL could be addressed would be with a better-functioning global financial safety net. There are several improvements that could be made to the existing system, including the effective rechanneling of (more) unused Special Drawing Rights (see Briefing, <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/10/reconceptualising-special-drawing-rights-as-a-tool-for-development-finance/">Reconceptualising Special Drawing Rights as a tool for development finance</a>); revised IMF quota limits that replace the existing skewed and outdated ones and help to recapitalize the IMF (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2022/12/imf-quota-review-putting-climate-at-the-core-of-imf-governance/">Winter 2022</a>); the abolition of tiered interest rates on the IMF’s Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) to support climate-related projects (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/civil-society-raises-concerns-about-resilience-and-sustainability-trusts-green-conditionality-as-fund-conducts-interim-review/">Spring 2024</a>), and the elimination of IMF <a href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/s41301-022-00340-5.pdf">surcharges</a>. The latter are a penalty charge that are expected to impose costs of $2.1 billion on 17 developing countries in 2024 alone (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2022/10/quota-reform-needed-at-imf-in-order-to-address-21st-century-challenges/">Autumn 2022</a>, <a href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/s41301-022-00340-5.pdf">Spring 2022</a>).
These improvements could be adopted relatively quickly and with limited cost. Additionally, the IMF and World Bank should lead the way to the universal adoption of contingency clauses in new debt agreements that provide safeguards in the event of climate catastrophes, natural disasters, and other crises, increasing resilience of developing countries to external shocks. Then we will have made progress in adopting a more development-focused global financial system.
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/better-ways-to-reduce-the-pain-of-debt-crises-for-developing-countries/">Better ways to reduce the pain of debt crises for developing countries?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
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<title>IDA21: Moving beyond a focus on ‘historic’ replenishment</title>
<link>https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/moving-beyond-a-focus-on-historic-replenishment/</link>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Luiz Vieira]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2024 20:46:46 +0000</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/?p=49584</guid>
<description><![CDATA[Calls for a ‘historic’ IDA21 replenishment risk diverting attention from the policy framework necessary for IDA to support countries to break their dependence on development finance and undertake the ecologically sustainable and just economic transformation long sought by their populations.
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/moving-beyond-a-focus-on-historic-replenishment/">IDA21: Moving beyond a focus on ‘historic’ replenishment</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[This year will see the 21st replenishment of the World Bank Group’s International Development Association (IDA) – the Bank’s arm that provides concessional and grant finance to low-income countries (LICs). In December, at the time of the IDA mid-term <a href="https://ida.worldbank.org/en/replenishments/ida20-replenishment/ida20-mid-term-review-event">review</a> meeting in Zanzibar, Tanzania, World Bank President Ajay Banga <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2023/12/06/ajay-banga-remarks-international-development-association-ida-midterm-review">argued</a> that the institution’s shareholders must make “the next replenishment of IDA the largest of all time.”
Significantly, IDA21 takes place in the context of a polycrisis – including debt, inequality and climate crises – with manifestations that have severely impacted the capacity of many LICs to fund social services, fight climate change and meet their international human rights obligations. Indeed, the context is more dramatic than it was in 2021, the year of the <a href="https://ida.worldbank.org/en/replenishments/ida20-replenishment">previous replenishment</a>. Banga’s call comes at a <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/blog/idas-new-fundraising-campaign-early-test-world-bank-president-banga">difficult time</a>, in which IDA’s principal donors have stressed fiscal constraints, along with the need to increase defence spending, and with some significant IDA donors such as the US and UK facing general elections this year.
The lack of appetite for additional overseas development assistance commitments by key donors is evident in the WBG’s controversial <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/statement/2023/01/13/world-bank-group-statement-on-evolution-roadmap">Evolution Roadmap</a> (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/opportunity-lost-world-banks-roadmap-fails-to-chart-path-to-better-development-outcomes/">Spring 2024</a>), which has been so far focused on balance sheet optimisation and financial innovations via further expansion of the ‘private finance-first’ approach to development (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/07/civil-society-calls-for-world-bank-to-reroute-evolution-roadmap-away-from-cascade/">Summer 2023</a>, <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2017/07/development-rescue-finance-banks-cascade-approach/">Summer 2017</a>). At a time in which IDA-eligible countries face mounting financing needs to respond to the polycrisis, they have been virtually <a href="https://findevlab.org/closing-the-spigots-the-rise-and-collapse-of-bond-markets-for-developing-countries/">shut off</a> even from extremely expensive capital markets. This dynamic makes access to concessional and grant lending through IDA ever more important and certainly justifies a significant increase in IDA resources. IDA must remain an essential financing source.
Yet, as is the case with the Roadmap, a focus on a ‘historic’ IDA21 replenishment risks obscuring the essential emphasis on the policy framework that IDA21 must have to actually deliver much-needed socio-economic transformation of countries in the Global South as articulated in the 1974 UN General Assembly <a href="https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2775/download">resolution</a> on the establishment of a <a href="https://progressive.international/blueprint/8c805bd2-d3c7-4f8b-bb81-e45e81e689d4-possible-history-a-newer-international-economic-order/en">New International Economic Order</a>. Unfortunately, it is difficult to argue that IDA has succeeded in making that vision a reality. As a July 2023 <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/publication/ambitious-ida-decade-crisis">report</a> from US-based Center for Global Development (CDG) stressed, “of the 81 countries that were part of [IDA] in 1996 only 17 have graduated.”
As with the Roadmap, a central question remains: ‘More money for what?’ While the need for more concessional resources is undeniable, a call for a development and rights-based focused policy framework that allows IDA to serve countries and peoples most in need of concessional public finance remains essential. For instance, the issue of jobs and economic transformation (JET) – a <a href="https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/e345cdafed9fc8af8e5d96e7aefcd937-0410012022/original/IDA20-Special-Theme-Jobs-and-Economic-Transformation-06-22-2022.pdf">Special Theme</a> of IDA20 – is central to all countries, but even more so to IDA countries, many of which are fragile and conflict affected. Revamped Results Management System (RMS) indicators should provide clear evidence of additionality through sustainable, decent and quality job creation. Any JET RMS must also develop a robust methodology to assess the degree to which Bank policies and programmes support economic transformation – e.g. decreases in commodity dependence, increases in economic diversification, and support for technological innovation and domestic technological production. Economic growth and private sector finance leverage performance are inadequate indicators of positive development impact.
<h2>IDA support to private sector operations in the spotlight</h2>
In 2017, IDA allocated $2.5 billion for a <a href="https://ida.worldbank.org/en/financing/ida-private-sector-window">Private Sector Window</a> (PSW) dedicated to subsidising private sector projects financed by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) the Bank’s private sector arm, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the World Bank’s risk insurance arm. In the context of IDA20, civil society <a href="https://www.eurodad.org/private_sector_window_ida20_development_impact">questioned</a> the continued support of this window, given the risk of diverting scarce concessional finance, in the absence of robust evidence of its development additionality. Notably, and relevant to the focus on the need for a historic replenishment, this broke with previous practice, as IFC was in the past a contributor to IDA resources.
A <a href="https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/evaluations/focused-assessment-international-development-associations-private-sector-window">report</a> by the Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) in early 2024 appeared to show improved disbursements of the PSW in IDA20 and has since been used by its supporters. However, the report, as is the case with the Bank more broadly, conflates contributions to ‘market development’ with development outcomes, namely, improved human development and economic transformation. Even by PSW’s own measures, CDG’s <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/blog/has-ida-psw-increased-ifc-investments-ida-countries">Charles Kenny</a> identified three key shortcomings exposed by the report: (i) It has been very slow in utilising its IDA resources; (ii) it hasn’t stopped a slide in overall IFC commitments in the world’s poorest and most fragile countries; and (iii) IFC’s projects in those countries are performing worse than ever – in the first half of the 2010s, over half of IFC projects in IDA countries were rated ‘satisfactory’, while now it is only 36 per cent. Yet, the IEG presents an overall supportive tone on the PSW, missing an opportunity to demand a rethink of this IDA window and to question the relevance of the variables used to determine whether project results are satisfactory.
IDA21 offers a platform to discuss the development model that the Bank will promote in LICs. This includes how the Bank will build resilient, national public finance infrastructure and high quality universal public services. Yet, this debate will take place only if the Bank’s management and shareholders, alongside the wide range of stakeholders that advocate for an IDA replenishment, go beyond the size of its financial envelope. As the lacklustre IDA graduation and economic performance data make plain, additional IDA grant and concessional recourses, as important as they may be, are insufficient. IDA21 must contain a strong and measurable focus on evidence-based policies that support IDA countries to break the cycle of dependency on development finance, and to undertake ecologically sustainable and just economic transformations long sought by the populations and states of the Global South.
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/moving-beyond-a-focus-on-historic-replenishment/">IDA21: Moving beyond a focus on ‘historic’ replenishment</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
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<title>The World Bank and climate finance: Success story or a new era of green ‘structural adjustment’?</title>
<link>https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/the-world-bank-and-climate-finance-success-story-or-a-new-era-of-green-structural-adjustment/</link>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alizée Le-Lannou]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2024 20:45:33 +0000</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/?p=49443</guid>
<description><![CDATA[This Inside the Institutions analyses the World Bank's climate finance, examining its impact on low- and middle-income countries' climate objectives. 
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/the-world-bank-and-climate-finance-success-story-or-a-new-era-of-green-structural-adjustment/">The World Bank and climate finance: Success story or a new era of green ‘structural adjustment’?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[According to its own reporting and standards, the World Bank is the biggest provider of multilateral climate finance. According to the Bank’s internal reporting, it <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2023/10/10/climate-finance-update">provided</a> $38.6 billion in climate finance in fiscal year 2023, marking a 22 per cent increase from fiscal year 2022. The figure below shows the WBG’s reported climate finance in recent years across its four main arms: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the Bank’s middle-income arm; the International Development Association (IDA), the Bank’s low-income arm; the International Finance Corporation (IFC); the Bank’s private sector arm; and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) the Bank’s project insurance arm.
<img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-49451 size-large" src="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.05.13-1024x546.png" alt="" width="1024" height="546" srcset="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.05.13-1024x546.png 1024w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.05.13-300x160.png 300w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.05.13-150x80.png 150w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.05.13-768x410.png 768w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.05.13-1536x819.png 1536w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.05.13.png 2048w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.05.13-351x187.png 351w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.05.13-554x296.png 554w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.05.13-166x89.png 166w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.05.13-125x67.png 125w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.05.13-236x126.png 236w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" />
Figure 1: Overview of climate finance lending from the Bank (Bretton Woods Project’s adaptation of World Bank reporting)
This upward trajectory seems set to continue, with the Bank now <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/12/01/world-bank-group-doubles-down-on-financial-ambition-to-drive-climate-action-and-build-resilience">aiming</a> for 45 per cent of its annual financing to be classified as climate finance by fiscal year 2025.
<h2 style="font-weight: 400;">Inflated figures? Lack of transparency around WBG climate finance accounting</h2>
WBG climate finance reporting is guided by the multinational development banks (MDBs) Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking, <a href="https://www.miga.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/2020-Joint-MDB-report-on-climate-finance_Report_final-web.pdf">detailed</a> in Appendix C of the 2020 Joint Report on MDB Climate Finance. These principles state that merely acknowledging climate change impacts is insufficient; projects must also give project-specific evidence of efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions or contribute to adaptation efforts. While the Bank provides project-level data on the proportion of projects it classifies as climate finance for its direct lending arms (i.e. IBRD and IDA), it fails to disclose details of which components of the projects are counted as climate finance. For IFC and MIGA, even less information is disclosed about which projects are climate-tagged.
Civil society has raised concerns about the accuracy and transparency of the Bank’s climate finance reporting. Oxfam’s 2022 <a href="https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/unaccountable-accounting-the-world-banks-unreliable-climate-finance-reporting-621424/">investigation</a> into the World Bank’s fiscal year 2020 climate finance reporting for IBRD and IDA using the MDBs’ methodology revealed inconsistencies, suggesting that the Bank could have inflated its climate finance by up to 40 per cent (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2022/10/world-banks-failure-to-disclose-details-of-climate-finance-accounting-opens-its-claim-to-be-leading-green-financier-to-scrutiny/">Autumn 2022</a>). This is not an isolated case; many other civil society organisations unearthed similar issues elsewhere: CARE Denmark and CARE Netherlands in 2021 <a href="https://careclimatechange.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/CARE_Climate-Adaptation-Finance_Fact-or-Fiction-1.pdf">found</a> an over-reporting of $832 million in 16 World Bank projects assessed for climate adaptation finance between 2013-2017 (Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2021/03/civil-society-research-finds-world-bank-over-reported-adaptation-finance/">Spring 2021</a>); the Centre for Global Development’s <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/publication/what-counts-climate-preliminary-evidence-world-banks-climate-portfolio">analysis</a> of over 2,500 World Bank projects tagged for climate mitigation or adaptation between 2000 and 2022 saw numerous projects unrelated to climate change; and the Bank Information Center, which obtained 51 climate finance accounting documents from the World Bank in April 2022, <a href="https://bankinformationcenter.org/en-us/update/what-do-the-51-climate-finance-documents-released-by/">highlighted</a> inconsistencies between methodology and practice in calculating climate co-benefits, suggesting potential over-reporting. This is problematic, as MDBs climate finance attributed to developed countries’ capital contributions <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/e20d2bc7-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/e20d2bc7-en">count</a> towards the $100 billion climate finance goal.
<h2 style="font-weight: 400;">Can loan-based climate finance deliver climate justice?</h2>
According to the principles outlined in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), climate finance should adhere to the “principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”, <a href="https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf">stated</a> in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. This principle underscores the need for global climate justice, recognising that cumulative greenhouse gas emissions primarily stem from countries in the Global North, and that the impacts of climate change disproportionately burden nations in the Global South.
Yet, the climate finance provided by the Bank and its MDB peers to lower-income countries is primarily loan-based, according to their own <a href="https://www.eib.org/attachments/lucalli/20230128_mdbs_joint_report_2022_en.pdf">reporting</a> (see Figure 2).
<img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-49455 size-large" src="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.11.37-1024x735.png" alt="" width="1024" height="735" srcset="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.11.37-1024x735.png 1024w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.11.37-300x215.png 300w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.11.37-150x108.png 150w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.11.37-768x552.png 768w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.11.37-1536x1103.png 1536w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.11.37-351x252.png 351w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.11.37-554x398.png 554w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.11.37-166x119.png 166w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.11.37-125x90.png 125w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.11.37-236x169.png 236w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Screenshot-2024-03-15-at-16.11.37.png 1568w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" />
Figure 2: MDB climate finance by type of instrument in low- and middle-income economies, 2022 in USD $ million (Bretton Woods Project’s adaptation of MDBs’ reporting)
MDBs’ climate finance, though offering better terms than private lenders, still burdens many Global South borrowers with significant debt. This debt, tied to interest rates, compounds existing financial strains. <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/dsalist.pdf">According</a> to the IMF, half of low-income countries are either in or at high risk of debt distress. This means many borrowing countries are unable to sufficiently meet the needs of their people or of climate action, as budgets are taken up by debt repayments. In African countries, over half of government revenues (53.4 per cent) are <a href="https://www.development-finance.org/files/Debt_Service_Watch_Briefing_Final_Word_EN_0910.pdf#page=3">allocated</a> to debt service, as of 2023.
Low- and middle-income countries, and global civil society, have been vocal in the UNFCCC process on the need for climate finance to be grant-based and reparative, addressing past and ongoing injustices. Ahead of UNFCCC’s COP 28 in 2023, 221 global civil society groups from 55 countries sent an <a href="https://gcap.global/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Letter-on-transformative-public-finance-at-COP28.pdf">open letter</a> urging world leaders to transform international public finance, advocating for transparent and unconditional climate finance grants. Linked to this call, the Asian Peoples’ Movement on Debt and Development (APMDD) and 51 member organisations urgently <a href="https://taxjustice.net/2020/10/02/raising-the-voices-of-communities-from-asia/">called</a> for the immediate, unconditional cancellation of public debt for all countries in need. These demands align with principles of climate justice, aiming to break the neo-colonial cycle that stifles development in Global South countries, leaving them indebted and reliant on the Global North.
<h2 style="font-weight: 400;">WBG climate finance – a handmaiden of green structural adjustment?</h2>
Concerted calls have been made to address the climate crisis in recent years, which was one of the rationales for the Bank’s <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099845101112322078/pdf/SECBOS0f51975e0e809b7605d7b690ebd20.pdf">Evolution Roadmap process</a> and the <a href="https://pmo.gov.bb/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/The-2022-Bridgetown-Initiative.pdf">Bridgetown Initiative</a>. However, despite these efforts, calls for the substantial transfer of non-debt creating resources from Global North to South to address what grassroots organisations have <a href="https://apmdd.org/statement-ahead-of-g20-finance-ministers-and-central-bankers-meeting-2024/">called</a> the Global North’s ‘climate debt’ remain largely unheeded. In addition to the challenges posed by loan-based funding, developing countries must increasingly face ‘green’ conditionalities tied to many of the loans they receive.
Green conditionalities align with what Prof. Daniela Gabor<a href="https://taxjustice.net/2020/05/28/the-wall-street-climate-consensus/"> labels</a> the ‘Wall Street (Climate) Consensus’ (WSCC). In effect, the WSCC transforms developing nations into de-risking agents for private capital, with international financial institutions helping facilitate this process. This is a great opportunity for finance – and poses great dangers to the wider public and to a just green transformation (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/10/world-banks-reliance-on-private-capital-to-finance-green-transition-in-low-and-middle-income-countries-risks-falling-flat/">Autumn 2023</a>, <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2021/07/world-banks-new-climate-change-action-plan-fails-to-deliver-much-needed-transformative-agenda/">Summer 2021</a>; Briefing, <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/07/civil-society-calls-for-rethink-of-world-banks-evolution-roadmap-as-part-of-wider-reforms-to-highly-unequal-global-financial-architecture/">Civil Society calls for rethink of World Bank’s ‘evolution roadmap’ as part of wider reforms to highly unequal global financial architecture</a>). Drawing on case studies of projects in South Africa and Zambia, Belgium-based CSO Eurodad <a href="https://www.eurodad.org/blended_finance_for_climate_action_good_value_for_money">revealed</a> in February how this approach entails governments assuming extensive risks to attract profit-driven investors, resulting in higher public debt and destructive community impacts.
And yet, the WSCC remains the main approach the Bank advocates for in its loan conditionalities. A <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/gambling-with-the-planets-future-world-bank-development-policy-finance-green-conditionality-and-the-push-for-a-private-led-energy-transition/">new review</a> conducted by the Bretton Woods Project of the Bank’s development policy financing energy sector-related conditionalities between 2018 and 2023 (see Background, <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2021/03/what-is-world-bank-development-policy-financing/%22%20/t%20%22_blank">What is World Bank Development Policy Financing?</a>) revealed that the Bank consistently promotes “Washington Consensus” style policy reforms in the energy sector, prioritising unbundling and private sector participation.
The Bank’s private-led approach to climate action argues that the Global North does not have adequate financing for grant-based financing for climate action in the Global South. However, this is based on flawed assumptions, ignoring Northern countries massive spending in other areas. As Lula da Silva, president of Brazil, <a href="https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/follow-the-government/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-during-the-brics-business-forum-in-johannesburg-south-africa">argued</a> “We cannot accept a green neocolonialism that imposes trade barriers and discriminatory measures under the pretext of protecting the environment.”
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/the-world-bank-and-climate-finance-success-story-or-a-new-era-of-green-structural-adjustment/">The World Bank and climate finance: Success story or a new era of green ‘structural adjustment’?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
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<title>Sri Lanka’s continued debt crisis highlights urgent need for wider reform</title>
<link>https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/sri-lankas-continued-debt-crisis-highlights-urgent-need-for-wider-reform/</link>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Luiz Vieira]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2024 20:45:31 +0000</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/?p=49471</guid>
<description><![CDATA[Sri Lanka’s inability to avoid its 17th IMF programme, and its catastrophic human rights consequences, adds to evidence of IMF and international system's failure to adequately respond to the worsening debt crisis and urgent need for debt cancellation and systemic reform.
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/sri-lankas-continued-debt-crisis-highlights-urgent-need-for-wider-reform/">Sri Lanka’s continued debt crisis highlights urgent need for wider reform</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[As the international community struggles to respond to multiple pressing crises, including what Development Finance International’s <a href="https://www.development-finance.org/files/Debt_Service_Watch_Briefing_Final_Word_EN_0910.pdf">research</a> has found to be the “worst ever global debt crisis”, the case of Sri Lanka presents a cautionary tale about the costs of the inability of the IMF, the G20 <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2021/12/02/blog120221the-g20-common-framework-for-debt-treatments-must-be-stepped-up">Common Framework</a> (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2020/12/g20-debt-proposal-continues-to-favour-creditors/">Winter 2020</a>) and the wider international system to prevent and respond to the devastating human rights, social and political consequences of unsustainable debt.
After becoming the first country in the Asia Pacific region to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-19/sri-lanka-enters-default-and-warns-inflation-may-surge-to-40">default</a> on its debt in 2022, in March 2023 Sri Lanka entered its 17th IMF <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/03/20/pr2379-imf-executive-board-approves-under-the-new-eff-arrangement-for-sri-lanka">programme</a> with $2.9 billion in finance. In March, over 60 trade unions, civil society organisations and social movements sent a <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/CSOs-TUs-reject-cosmetic-consultations-by-IMF-SL-2024.pdf">letter</a> to the IMF team visiting the country for the Second Review of the ongoing Extended Fund Facility (EFF) agreement highlighting numerous concerns and making several demands, including the abolition of surcharges, and a “transparent and democratic decision-making process regarding reforms, by providing relevant information…used to prepare the Debt Sustainability Assessment.”
As a December 2023 Political Economy Research Institute <a href="https://peri.umass.edu/publication/item/1776-paying-with-austerity-the-debt-crisis-and-restructuring-in-sri-lanka">working paper</a> made clear, the dominant explanations provided by international financial institutions, and some scholars, have failed to adequately acknowledge the long-term and structural consequences of the liberalising policy conditions contained in the previous 16 IMF programmes, which created a growing dependence on expensive and fickle <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/the-real-cause-of-sri-lankas-debt-trap/">capital market finance</a>, for example. In addition to drawing attention to the enduring negative impacts of IMF-imposed neoliberal policies, the paper focuses on another pressing contemporary issue: The inadequacy of the IMF’s Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA). The Sri Lankan DSA reflects a well-documented trend toward overly optimistic growth projections, which burdens the population with significant human rights consequences to ensure creditors are paid (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2022/10/imf-debt-sustainability-analysis-in-times-of-compounding-crises-still-unfit-for-purpose/">Winter 2022</a>, <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2020/10/over-optimistic-imf-forecasts-risk-dire-consequences-for-covid-19-response/">Winter 2020</a>).
The Sri Lankan case provides yet more evidence, if any were needed, of the urgent need for the IMF to heed calls from the former UN <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/a71305-integrating-human-rights-debt-policies-and-debt-sustainability">Independent Expert</a> on foreign debt and human rights, and global <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/IEDebt/Int-debt-architecture-reform/Civil-Society-FfD-group-input-IDAreform-EN.pdf">civil society</a> to integrate states’ human rights obligations into DSAs.
<h2>Escaping technocratic discussions to address immediate human needs</h2>
Worryingly, as noted by University of Jaffna’s Dr Ahilan Kadirgamar in a March <a href="https://www.dailymirror.lk/worldnews/opinion/Debt-Restructuring-and-Hidden-Agendas/172-277268">article</a> in the online newspaper Daily Mirror, “The hegemonic narrative today is going through change; the insolvency crisis (inability to repay debt) is now being constructed as a liquidity crisis (lack of short-term funds to make debt payments). It is claimed that if there is sufficient sloshing of funds including new loans to such debt-ridden countries, then debt restructuring will not be necessary.” This can be seen, for example, in the Financing for Development Lab’s January <a href="https://findevlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/FDL_A_Bridge_to_Climate_Action_final.pdf">proposal</a> titled, “A bridge to climate action: A tripartite deal for times of illiquidity” (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/better-ways-to-reduce-the-pain-of-debt-crises-for-developing-countries/">Spring 2024</a>).
The question of Sri Lanka’s path to debt sustainability takes place within the wider context of the IMF’s continued unwillingness to accept that the current global debt situation must be categorised as a systemic crisis, requiring real efforts toward comprehensive resolutions, including <a href="https://debtjustice.org.uk/news/yanis-varoufakis-thomas-picketty-vanessa-nakate-and-leading-experts-call-for-debt-cancellation-at-cop28">debt cancellation</a> and the establishment of an independent UN-based debt restructure mechanism (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2022/10/monetary-power-and-sovereign-debt-crises-the-renewed-case-for-a-sovereign-debt-restructuring-mechanism/">Winter 2022</a>). As research collaborators of the Institute for Political Economy, Dr Thiruni Kelegama of Oxford University and Melanie Gunathilaka of Climate Action Now Sri Lanka stress, the current system ensures that “repayment is always viewed through the lens of economic necessity and this exacerbates human rights violations…. Debt obligations over human rights concerns and climate justice perpetuate cycles of poverty, violence and inequality.”
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/sri-lankas-continued-debt-crisis-highlights-urgent-need-for-wider-reform/">Sri Lanka’s continued debt crisis highlights urgent need for wider reform</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
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<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">49471</post-id> </item>
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<title>Beyond the World Bank: The fight for universal social protection in the Global South</title>
<link>https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/beyond-the-world-bank-the-fight-for-universal-social-protection-in-the-global-south/</link>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amy McShane]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2024 20:44:40 +0000</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/?p=49678</guid>
<description><![CDATA[The World Bank Group promotes a model of social protection via poverty-targeted programmes that are error-strewn and can cause social unease, and set back progress towards universal social protection.
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/beyond-the-world-bank-the-fight-for-universal-social-protection-in-the-global-south/">Beyond the World Bank: The fight for universal social protection in the Global South</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[See fully formatted version <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/WBG-Social-protection-Mathew-Greenslade-FINAL-web.pdf">here</a>.
<hr />
<a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/WBG-Social-protection-Mathew-Greenslade-FINAL-web.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignright wp-image-49728 size-medium" src="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/WBG-Social-protection-Mathew-Greenslade-cover-212x300.png" alt="" width="212" height="300" srcset="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/WBG-Social-protection-Mathew-Greenslade-cover-212x300.png 212w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/WBG-Social-protection-Mathew-Greenslade-cover-106x150.png 106w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/WBG-Social-protection-Mathew-Greenslade-cover-351x497.png 351w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/WBG-Social-protection-Mathew-Greenslade-cover-554x784.png 554w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/WBG-Social-protection-Mathew-Greenslade-cover-166x235.png 166w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/WBG-Social-protection-Mathew-Greenslade-cover-125x177.png 125w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/WBG-Social-protection-Mathew-Greenslade-cover-236x334.png 236w, https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/WBG-Social-protection-Mathew-Greenslade-cover.png 667w" sizes="(max-width: 212px) 100vw, 212px" /></a>We all want practical solutions to rising global challenges. Universal social protection, a benefit system everyone has access to – also known as universal social security – is one of them. The World Bank is publicly <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialprotectionandjobs/publication/charting-a-course-towards-universal-social-protection-resilience-equity-and-opportunity-for-all">committed</a> to universal social protection, arguing it protects people when they are vulnerable or experiencing crises – including climate-related events and pandemics – and helps build economies and a ‘just transition’ to low-carbon growth.
The United Nations calls social protection a <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf">human right</a>, yet <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal1">more than half</a> of the world’s population does not have access to it. Governments in the Global South are working to fill this gap, and support from the Global North is being led by the World Bank, which provides technical advice and resources. Currently, the Bank has a portfolio of almost $29.5 billion in <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/84ba2380-624c-553a-b929-2882e72c7468">social protection financing</a>, covering an estimated 880 million people. But there is a problem. Notwithstanding its public commitment, for the part of social protection that is government-financed, as opposed to contributory, the World Bank promotes poverty-targeted social protection programmes, which have high targeting errors, may cause social unease and can set back the development of universal social protection systems for years.
<h2>The multiple costs of poverty-targeted social protection</h2>
There is a logic to poverty targeting, to give scarce government resources to those that need them most. But this is in practice difficult to do, especially when the documentation of incomes is limited, as it often is in developing countries. The World Bank has promoted a way around this – proxy means testing – which uses observable household information, such as the material a dwelling is made from, to estimate whether it is in poverty. It started in Augusto Pinochet’s Chile around 1980 and is now used in at least 60 countries.
But proxy means testing comes with costs. One is high targeting errors which have been a running debate between the World Bank and its critics. Stephen Kidd, CEO of <a href="https://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/">Development Pathways</a>, co-authored a <a href="https://sohs.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/targeting-poorest.pdf">paper</a> in 2011 with Emily Wylde setting out estimates that around half of the intended target group for social protection schemes using proxy means testing in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Rwanda and Sri Lanka were excluded by programme design, sometimes less, sometimes a lot more. So, if you were within the target group of ‘the poor’, you had an even chance of not being selected for support. You might as well flip a coin. UK government <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/204382/Guidance-value-for-money-social-transfers-25Mar2013.pdf">guidance</a> published in 2013 explained the high errors, by saying proxy means tests “are inevitably somewhat blunt instruments, particularly in poor countries where differences in income, assets and other household characteristics are very small, making it difficult to identify which households are above or below an eligibility cut-off point.” The guidance also pointed to some consequences of the high errors: “perceptions of [proxy mean tests] among non-beneficiaries in Mexico, Nicaragua, Indonesia and Lebanon led to tensions, unrest and even conflict.”
The World Bank published a <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/747591468125685125/pdf/930590REVISED00SPL0Technical0Note06.pdf">paper</a> in 2014 and a <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/869311468009642720/pdf/Safety-nets-in-Africa-effective-mechanisms-to-reach-the-poor-and-most-vulnerable.pdf">book</a> in 2015 asserting proxy means testing “can accurately and cost-effectively target the chronic poor.” Two more papers from Stephen Kidd and colleagues, in <a href="https://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Exclusion-by-design-An-assessment-of-the-effectiveness-of-the-proxy-means-test-poverty-targeting-mechanism-1-1.pdf">2017</a> and <a href="https://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/publications/hit-and-miss-an-assessment-of-targeting-effectiveness-in-social-protection/">2020</a>, reported high targeting errors, in the second paper arising from both programme design and implementation.
Meanwhile, a new voice engaged in the debate. Martin Ravallion, then head of research at the World Bank, met Stephen Kidd in 2012 and discussed proxy means testing. After leaving the World Bank, in a <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.30.1.77">paper</a> in the 2016 Journal of Economic Perspectives he said it had turned poverty-targeting into a ‘fetish’. At the same time Ravallion wrote a <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0304387818305819?via%3Dihub">paper</a> with Caitlin Brown and Dominique Van de Walle, later published in the 2018 Journal of Development Economics, which estimated targeting errors for nine African countries. It concluded that universal programmes – where benefits go to groups in the population such as children, the elderly or persons with disabilities, regardless of income – may well be better than those using proxy means testing, even for poverty-targeted programmes’ primary objective, reducing poverty. Why? Because of high targeting errors; the relatively high costs of administering proxy means tests; the lack of transparency in terms of who is and is not eligible; and the potential to undermine political support for programmes. But the World Bank’s encouragement of proxy means testing continued, and even scaled up, through the <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/4ce2b154-af0b-5ccf-a30f-2c65567051a9/content">promotion</a> of social registries, which allow poverty targeting across a range of programmes, not just one. Social registries are now in more than 50 countries, most using proxy means testing. In 2021, Stephen Kidd, Diloa Athias and Idil Mohamud responded with a critique entitled <a href="https://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Social-registries-a-short-history-of-abject-failure-June-1.pdf">Social registries: A short history of abject failure</a>.
In 2022, the World Bank published a 539-page tome, <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/a6b0063a-4805-5542-89a9-f6da877b5e37">Revisiting targeting in social assistance: A new look at old dilemmas</a>, apparently aimed at settling arguments about targeting approaches. These include proxy means testing and community-based targeting, where community members have a say and which is often used in combination with proxy means testing, but which is vulnerable to <a href="https://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/blog/three-reasons-community-based-targeting-threat-to-social-stability/">corruption</a>. The book argued all targeting options should be considered, because every country is different. It referenced the papers that Kidd co-authored and conceded proxy means testing is “difficult for people to understand”, adding it has “inbuilt statistical error”, and that universal schemes are “possibly pragmatic” in some circumstances. But it reverted to type saying, “To reduce poverty, it is usually more cost-effective to ensure that a greater share of benefits accrue to the poor than to expand coverage broadly.” Proxy means testing is described as “imperfect but realistic”.
<h2>Borrowing governments show a different way</h2>
The World Bank’s promotion of poverty targeting and proxy means testing has been opposed by a global coalition of highly motivated people and institutions. This includes the International Labour Organization (ILO), others in the United Nations and a wide range of academics, activists and civil society organisations. A <a href="https://academic.oup.com/policy-press-scholarship-online/book/17267">campaign</a> led by the ILO, including Michael Cichon and Isabel Ortiz among others, encouraged the World Bank’s public <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/statement/wcms_378989.pdf">commitment</a> to universal social protection. The <a href="https://www.socialprotectionfloorscoalition.org/">Global Coalition for Social Protection Floors</a> and more recently the <a href="https://www.socialprotectionfloorscoalition.org/2023/10/global-demand-for-universal-social-security/">Campaign for the Right to Social Security</a> are also in the fight. This article is based on a book I am writing about one of these highly motivated people: Stephen Kidd – an ex-missionary who cut his teeth fighting for indigenous land rights in Latin America – who learned much on universality from economist <a href="https://gbr01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.lse.ac.uk%2Finternational-development%2Fpeople%2Fthandika-mkandawire&data=05%7C02%7Cialvarez%40brettonwoodsproject.org%7C1df1c43873ba46de529808dc4cba7041%7C579c32a2f2be4c01a42cabd0b6169618%7C0%7C0%7C638469610838425642%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=%2BWEWuUViyYFB4Fal5zww7m3ZQpSGUohiP8EmHNEEzNo%3D&reserved=0">Thandika Mkandawire</a>, and who has been at the forefront of the fight for two decades.
The fight is important, but what matters most, of course, is what governments do themselves. New <a href="https://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/publications/taking-stock-of-progress-a-compilation-of-universal-social-security-schemes-in-low-and-middle-income-countries/">research</a> shows 52 low- and middle-income countries have introduced 88 tax-financed schemes, including child benefits, pensions and disability benefits which are universal, or near-universal where they are complementing contributory programmes. And it is not just wealthier countries. For example, Nepal introduced universal schemes when it was a low-income country. In fact, <a href="https://www.developmentpathways.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Affordable-and-feasible-pathway-to-universal-social-security.pdf">evidence</a> suggests there is little relationship between income level and spending on social protection in low- and middle-income countries – it is a political choice. These schemes have mostly been implemented without the support of donors, and even in the face of World Bank opposition, for example in Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Thailand and Zanzibar.
There are governments that have not chosen universal programmes of course – often encouraged by donors – and a combination of poverty-targeted and universal schemes is common, as it is in the Global North. But Kidd and his collaborators do not argue that all programmes should be universal. What they object to is the World Bank pre-judging the issue. Not least because poverty-targeted programmes often create a ‘missing middle’, stuck between them and contributory programmes at the high-income end of the scale, which are restricted by high and persistent labour market informality. Hence the need for universal schemes, which may draw broader political support and so be more sustainable.
<h2>Why does the World Bank do it?</h2>
The World Bank promotes poverty targeting and proxy means testing for several reasons. Firstly, it is a bank that arranges loans. <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.30.1.77">Ravallion</a> has said, “The pressure to lend influences the Bank’s ability to deliver objective policy advice to client countries.” Loans are given for established approaches like poverty-targeted social protection schemes, and sometimes conditions on using proxy means testing are attached to loan disbursements, such as in <a href="https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/488131593396075008/jordan-emergency-cash-transfer-covid-19-response-project">Jordan</a>. These are agreed with governments, but governments need the money.
Secondly, the World Bank, with other donors, uses an overly technical approach to supporting governments, likely stemming from the highly academic background of its staff, and from their need to retain control. Marion Ouma from the Nordic Africa Institute in Sweden and Professor Jimi Adesina from the University of South Africa <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0261018318817482">describe</a> this need to keep control in Kenya, where the depoliticisation of the social protection policy agenda by donors “weakens democratic processes, compromises ownership and limits popular discussions on policies.” It also weakens the connection between spending and revenue raising, which is core to the government-citizen social contract.
Thirdly, a short-term ‘results agenda’ exists within the World Bank and other donors, which can conflict with long-term national development. This stems from a need to show impacts within 3-5 year donor programme timeframes; from the World Bank’s unenviable <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-are">remit</a> to ‘end extreme poverty’; and from the need to achieve the <a href="https://sdgs.un.org/goals">Sustainable Development Goals</a> by 2030. The upshot can be hard-pressed government officials grappling with over-complicated poverty-targeted schemes instead of relatively simple universal programmes government systems can deliver at scale, and a perhaps years long delay in developing universal social protection.
Fourthly, there is a lack of lesson learning. Ravallion <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.30.1.77">argues</a> that what is needed is “a quite fundamental change in the [World] Bank’s culture…reoriented from lending to learning.” Too often the World Bank uses evidence selectively to make its case, instead of keeping an open mind. This is ironic given its ambition to be a <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/309981617140869469/pdf/Realizing-the-World-Bank-Group-s-Knowledge-Potential-for-Effective-Development-Solutions-A-Strategic-Framework.pdf">Knowledge Bank</a>. And it is not just proxy means testing: There are similar issues in the promotion of conditional cash transfers – benefits in exchange for behaviours such as children attending school – and workfare – poverty-targeted social protection given in exchange for manual work.
Why do major World Bank shareholders such as the US, Japan, the UK, Germany and France not insist on a different approach? Leaving aside ideology and geopolitical relationships, funding countries have a complicated and interdependent relationship with the World Bank: They need to show results from aid spending too, which are often delivered through World Bank programmes. They – we – are all implicated. It is also hard for other World Bank member countries to step into the breach given skewed <a href="https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2020-07-18/secretary-generals-nelson-mandela-lecture-%E2%80%9Ctackling-the-inequality-pandemic-new-social-contract-for-new-era%E2%80%9D-delivered">voting power</a> within the World Bank.
<h2>All is not lost</h2>
All is not lost, however. The World Bank has also done good things on social protection. It has advocated for growth in spending for many years, significantly increasing its own funding commitments. It has supported important elements of system building such as better public financial management and digital payment systems. More recently it has <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/14680181221121442">recognised</a> both the importance of human rights and the stigma associated with programmes for ‘the poor’, and it has begun to support the delivery of some universal schemes, for example in Kosovo, Nepal and Sudan.
But pressure on the World Bank must continue now until a tipping point is reached in its approach to social protection. The Bretton Woods Project and others have <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/11/an-evolution-roadmap-responsive-to-development-crises-towards-an-external-evaluation-of-the-world-banks-cascade/">called</a> for an independent evaluation of the World Bank’s strategic direction, set out in its recent ‘<a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099845101112322078/pdf/SECBOS0f51975e0e809b7605d7b690ebd20.pdf">roadmap</a>’ for reform. The World Bank and other donors should also remind themselves of the Paris Declaration, which more than 100 countries signed up to in 2005. Its principles include ownership – meaning low- and middle-income countries set their own strategies – and alignment – meaning donors get behind those strategies. This can be challenging where systems of accountability and democracy are still under development. But it will, in the end, be the difference between supporting the brief blossoming of a donor-funded programme and real, lasting change.
There is an urgency to this. Not only does more than half of the world’s population not have access to social protection, but geopolitical, socioeconomic and climatic risks have been added to ongoing poverty and food insecurity, all of which lands hardest on women and children. <a href="https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099800007112236655/pdf/P17658505ca3820930a254018e229a30bf8.pdf">Lessons</a> from the response to Covid-19, “the largest scale-up in history”, are that relatively simple social protection programmes that are large and quickly scalable, such as the universal pension in Bolivia and near-universal child benefit in Mongolia, respond best to big shocks. Furthermore, <a href="https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---soc_sec/documents/publication/wcms_669790.pdf">evidence</a> from the ILO states “today’s developing countries have a similar level of GDP per capita to high-income countries when they established their social security systems”. So, as well as urgency there is opportunity.
<hr />
Matthew Greenslade is an economist who has worked on the value for money and financing of social protection systems for over twenty years. He has worked with the UK government, in the Department of Work and Pensions and DFID, including in the Nepal and Uganda country offices. Most recently he has been supporting governments in East Africa as an associate consultant with Development Pathways. Matthew’s book, Beyond the World Bank: The Fight for Universal Social Protection in the Global South, on which this article is based, will be published by Bloomsbury later this year.
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/beyond-the-world-bank-the-fight-for-universal-social-protection-in-the-global-south/">Beyond the World Bank: The fight for universal social protection in the Global South</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
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<title>Another day, another IFC scandal</title>
<link>https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/another-day-another-ifc-scandal/</link>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amy McShane]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2024 20:44:01 +0000</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/?p=49507</guid>
<description><![CDATA[A Telegraph exposé unveils how a private hospital group in India which received £120 million in IFC investment since 2005 was running an illegal organ trading scheme, adding to a growing number of IFC-funded scandals.
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/another-day-another-ifc-scandal/">Another day, another IFC scandal</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank’s private sector arm, seems unable to escape scandal these days. A December 2023 exposé published by the newspaper The Telegraph detailed how an Indian multi-billion-dollar private hospital group, Apollo, which has received £120 million in IFC investment since 2005, has allegedly been running a ‘cash for kidneys’ programme facilitating illicit organ trade between Myanmar and India.
<a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/science-and-disease/kidney-organ-trafficking-scandal-private-healthcare-india-myanmar/">According</a> to The Telegraph, in 2017 the IFC reported that funds to Apollo were being used for provision of hospital services for “low-income patients” in India, and at the time of The Telegraph’s writing in December 2023, £51 million was still invested in Apollo. The article noted that, while an IFC spokesperson had condemned the findings and stated that IFC would not support such practices in its investments, it was yet to respond to civil society calls for an immediate and independent investigation.
This most recent exposure of harmful human rights breaches within IFC-funded projects sits at the top of a growing pile of similar cases. The now infamous Bridge International Academies <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/10/17/world-bank-whistleblower-bridge-international/">scandal</a> (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/12/a-proposal-for-ajay-no-evolution-without-remedy/">Winter 2023</a>) included child sex abuse in a chain of for-profit schools in Kenya, from which the IFC exited in 2022 without providing remedy (although, as of January 2024, the Bank’s board <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/world-banks-banga-denies-ifc-cover-up-abuse-involving-kenya-school-investment-2024-02-06/">met</a> to discuss a management ‘action plan’ for remedy). More recently, a June 2023 <a href="https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/sick-development-how-rich-country-government-and-world-bank-funding-to-for-prof-621529/">report</a> by Oxfam International found that the IFC was amongst a group of development finance institutions that funded expensive, for-profit private hospitals that deny service to, bankrupt, or even detain patients who cannot pay, and that the IFC lacks transparency in its investments and has been involved in questionable flows of taxpayer money into tax havens (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/12/a-proposal-for-ajay-no-evolution-without-remedy/">Winter 2023</a>).
Marco Angelo, of Netherlands-based WEMOS, commented on the case, “These scandals should prompt us to reflect on how appropriate it is to use development finance for private hospitals. <a href="https://www.wemos.org/en/improving-healthcare-but-for-whom/">Most hospitals</a> where the IFC invests are catered to privately insured patients. This means that these hospitals often concentrate scarce health system resources – such as health workers – to the service of the rich, with harmful consequences for both cost and availability of services for everyone else. It is an issue of health justice that goes beyond the single scandal.”
The fact that these cases concern the Bank’s private sector arm brings into question the legitimacy of the private sector as development actors, which the Bank is pushing further in the context of its Evolution Roadmap. Especially given plans for a ‘bigger bank’ (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/opportunity-lost-world-banks-roadmap-fails-to-chart-path-to-better-development-outcomes/">Spring 2024</a>), the erosion of independence of the CAO amidst <a href="https://theintercept.com/2023/10/17/world-bank-whistleblower-bridge-international/">alleged</a> retaliation against whistle-blowers risks the Bank setting a concerning precedent when hard evidence of human rights abuses is exposed (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/12/world-bank-and-imf-promoting-private-finance-and-fiscal-consolidation-despite-mounting-evidence-of-harmful-impacts/">Winter 2023</a>).
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/another-day-another-ifc-scandal/">Another day, another IFC scandal</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
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<title>Indonesia JETP’s promotion of renewable energy privatisation opposed by unions and civil society</title>
<link>https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/indonesia-jetps-promotion-of-private-ownership-of-renewable-energy-creates-opposition-from-unions-and-civil-society/</link>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alizée Le-Lannou]]></dc:creator>
<pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2024 20:43:35 +0000</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/?p=49461</guid>
<description><![CDATA[Indonesia’s Just Energy Transition Partnership bears the clear handprint of the World Bank’s private-sector led approach to power sectors in the Global South, creating opposition from unions and civil society.
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/indonesia-jetps-promotion-of-private-ownership-of-renewable-energy-creates-opposition-from-unions-and-civil-society/">Indonesia JETP’s promotion of renewable energy privatisation opposed by unions and civil society</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
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<content:encoded><![CDATA[In 2022, Indonesia began implementing its Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), aiming to mobilise $20 billion over three-to-five years. Half of the funding is <a href="https://www.undp.org/indonesia/projects/indonesia-just-energy-transition-partnership-jetp">expected</a> to come from the International Partners Group, co-led by the US and Japan, and the other half as contributions from international financial institutions. In return, Indonesia committed to accelerate the retirement of coal plants and advance renewable energy sources to achieve net-zero by 2050.
The World Bank is involved in the JETP, with the UK <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-indonesia-development-partnership-summary/uk-indonesia-development-partnership-summary-july-2023#:~:text=The%20JETP%20mobilises%20%2420%20billion,of%20power%20generation%20by%202030.">offering</a> a sovereign guarantee to enable the Bank to provide an additional US$1 billion in financing to Indonesia. Even in the absence of direct financing for the JETP, the influence of the World Bank is apparent in the <a href="https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P172439">conditions</a> tied to a 2021 loan. These conditions mandated that Indonesia’s state-owned energy company, Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN), divest ownership of renewable energy-generating facilities upon the expiration of relevant power purchase agreements. This influence is also reflected in the 2023 <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/publication/indonesia-country-climate-and-development-report">Country Climate and Development Report,</a> which <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/energy/publication/rethinking-power-sector-reform">envisages</a> the World Bank’s private sector-led approach in the power sector since the 1990s, aiming to unbundle existing state-owned power monopolies to increase private sector involvement. This follows a similar case in South Africa, where the policy reforms undertaken as a part of the JETP led to the ‘unbundling’ of Eskom, South Africa’s state-owned energy utility, to create a more privatised, market-based electricity sector (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2022/12/world-bank-and-imf-influence-casts-shadow-over-south-africas-just-energy-transition-partnership/">Winter 2022</a>).
In the case of Indonesia, the JETP is designed to accelerate the growth of for-profit independent power producers (IPPs), with PLN primarily becoming a buyer of electricity from privately-owned generators. As the Trade Unions for Energy Democracy <a href="https://www.tuedglobal.org/bulletins/indonesia-tued-supports-unions-in-constitutional-court-battle-to-stop-jetp-energy-privatisation">argue</a>, “electricity will no longer be seen as a public good generated for human development and nation-building; rather, electricity will become a commodity that PLN is legally obligated to purchase from private companies.”
This privatised model raises concerns regarding both achieving Indonesia’s green transformation and ensuring a just transition for workers (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/07/civil-society-calls-for-world-bank-to-reroute-evolution-roadmap-away-from-cascade/">Summer 2023</a>). In effect, this model relies on using limited public financing to attract private investment for the transition, with the Bank and other multilateral development banks playing a supporting role in these initiatives. However, this model has been falling short: Private capital <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/d49f8109-01ea-4ca3-ac0d-15df8cfdfc70">has not</a> materialised in Indonesia and South Africa. And this is only the tip of the iceberg: There is substantial evidence to <a href="https://www.eurodad.org/what_lies_beneath">show</a> that citizens themselves are bearing the costs associated with guaranteeing private sector returns (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/07/civil-society-calls-for-world-bank-to-reroute-evolution-roadmap-away-from-cascade/">Summer 2023</a>).
The JETP’s <a href="https://jetp-id.org/cipp">investment plan</a> also revealed that only $1.3 billion out of an estimated $95.9 billion projected for 2023-2030 is allocated for early coal retirement and phaseout, as private investors prioritise more profitable ventures. Moreover, the plan <a href="https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-s-just-energy-transition-partnership-glass-half-full">fails</a> to address the closure of <a href="https://re-course.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Tread-lightly-1.pdf">captive coal</a> power plants, creating emissions loopholes (see Observer <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2023/12/coal-not-yet-not-confined-to-the-old-days-by-world-bank-group/"> Winter 2023</a>).
The failings of the Bank’s private sector model, combined with the urgency of the climate crisis, have led civil society, academics, and trade unions to advocate for alternative models. As Andri Prasetiyo, Senior Researcher on Climate Policy and Finance of Senik Centre Asia argues, “The push for privatisation, influenced by international financial institutions such as the World Bank, must be swiftly reversed, as it will only perpetuate a system that puts profit before people, jeopardising not only equitable development but also environmental sustainability and social justice.”
The post <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2024/04/indonesia-jetps-promotion-of-private-ownership-of-renewable-energy-creates-opposition-from-unions-and-civil-society/">Indonesia JETP’s promotion of renewable energy privatisation opposed by unions and civil society</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org">Bretton Woods Project</a>.
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