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  23. <title>Public Opinion Surveys Show Recent Gains for China’s Soft Power</title>
  24. <link>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/09/public-opinion-surveys-show-recent-gains-for-chinas-soft-power/</link>
  26. <dc:creator><![CDATA[Arthur Kaufman]]></dc:creator>
  27. <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2025 01:02:09 +0000</pubDate>
  28. <category><![CDATA[China & the World]]></category>
  29. <category><![CDATA[Level 2 Article]]></category>
  30. <category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
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  48. <category><![CDATA[soft power]]></category>
  49. <category><![CDATA[South Africa]]></category>
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  54. <guid isPermaLink="false">https://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=704664</guid>
  55.  
  56. <description><![CDATA[Several public opinion surveys published over the last few months paint a picture of China’s role in the world from the perspective of both Chinese and international respondents. These build on previous surveys from the past year that show how despite polarized views, global attitudes towards China have improved at the expense of the U.S., [&#8230;]]]></description>
  57. <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Several <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/public-opinion/">public opinion</a> surveys published over the last few months paint a picture of China’s role in the world from the perspective of both Chinese and international respondents. These build on previous surveys from the past year that show how despite <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2024/12/global-public-opinion-polls-show-polarized-views-of-china/">polarized views</a>, global attitudes towards China have <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/06/polls-show-global-attitudes-towards-china-improve-at-expense-of-u-s/">improved at the expense of the U.S.</a>, especially <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2024/04/attitudes-in-global-south-tilt-towards-china-at-expense-of-u-s/">in the Global South</a>. (Meanwhile, polls showing dissatisfaction <em>within</em> China have been <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2024/02/guangzhou-public-opinion-poll-showing-record-dissatisfaction-is-deleted-from-wechat/">censored online</a>.) </p>
  58. <p>One notable survey published this month by Dina Smeltz, Craig Kafura, Yawei Liu, Nick Zeller, and Sam Dong at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs tracked <a href="https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/survey-chinese-public-opinion-international-affairs"><strong>Chinese people’s confidence in China and their desire for their country to play a global leadership role</strong></a>. Conducted between April 25 and June 16, the survey found that a “key difference between Chinese views of Beijing’s role in the world compared to American views of Washington’s role is that China’s public support is widespread across all demographic groups, while the public in the United States is much more fragmented, especially by partisan affiliation.” Here is a summary of the main findings: </p>
  59. <blockquote>
  60. <p>Nine in 10 Chinese support their country&#8217;s active participation in world affairs (90%).</p>
  61. <p>Part of this enthusiasm stems from a sense that China is a leading power in the world: Large majorities say their country is in at least a somewhat strong position in the world (97%) and expect it to get at least somewhat stronger in the next five years (95%).</p>
  62. <p>Seven in 10 Chinese respondents say China has a unique character that makes it the greatest country in the world (69%) versus three in 10 who say China is no greater than any other country (30%).</p>
  63. <p>While a plurality prefer China play a shared leadership role in the world (48%), four in 10 say it should take a dominant one (41%). One in 10 feel China should play no leadership role (11%). [<a href="https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/survey-chinese-public-opinion-international-affairs"><strong>Source</strong></a>]
  64. </p></blockquote>
  65. <p>On a related topic, last week Haifeng Huang of Ohio State University shared an updated academic paper analyzing the Chinese public’s overconfidence in their country. Huang conducted studies during and after the COVID-19 pandemic and concluded that the Chinese public “widely and significantly <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3971231">overestimates China&#8217;s global reputation and soft power</a>,” adding that “informing Chinese citizens of actual international public opinion of China substantially corrects their factual perceptions of the country&#8217;s global reputation.”</p>
  66. <p>Outside of China, surveys show mixed results about public opinion on China. Andrew Chubb at the Asia Society Policy Institute published a report last week on this topic, using 25 years of aggregated global public opinion survey data across 159 countries. With this historical, long-term lens, the report’s key findings highlighted <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/not-so-neatly-divided-global-public-opinion-china"><strong>China&#8217;s challenges of winning over a global audience</strong></a>: </p>
  67. <blockquote>
  68. <p>An expanding databank of surveys shows that favorability toward China has seen a steady, secular decline over the past quarter-century.</p>
  69. <p>However, weighting surveys according to population demonstrates important nuances. The long-term decline in China’s image appears to have been driven by rising negativity more than falling positivity. This pattern suggests that, rather than losing friends, China has been struggling to win over citizens with undecided or neutral views.</p>
  70. <p>[&#8230;] The largest and tightest cluster of negative opinion on China is not in America but in Europe, posing serious economic and political challenges as China responds to the Trump administration’s tariff and technology policies. [<a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/not-so-neatly-divided-global-public-opinion-china"><strong>Source</strong></a>]
  71. </p></blockquote>
  72. <p>However, over a more recent time period, China has been making steady gains. The U.S.-based center-left think tank Third Way published a poll last month showing a <a href="https://www.thirdway.org/memo/shifting-into-high-gear-americas-changing-attitudes-toward-competition-with-china-and-clean-energy">change in Americans’ attitudes towards China from 2023 to 2025 in favor of more cooperation</a>. The report stated that “52% of respondents to the 2025 survey chose cooperation over combat vs 32% in 2023,” and “the share of Americans who describe China as an enemy has declined by 7 points” while “the share seeing China as an ally or trade partner has increased by 8 points.” In July, the Pew Research Center published another survey which found that <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/07/15/international-views-of-china-turn-slightly-more-positive/"><strong>international views of China have turned slightly more positive</strong></a> in various regions of the world, often at the expense of the U.S.:</p>
  73. <blockquote>
  74. <p>Views of China have become more favorable since 2024 in 15 of 25 countries surveyed. This includes double-digit increases in places like Canada and France (+13 points) as well as Italy and South Africa (+10).</p>
  75. <p>[&#8230;] In most countries, younger people have more favorable opinions of China than older people. </p>
  76. <p>[&#8230;] While majorities in most countries surveyed have little or no confidence in Xi to do the right thing regarding world affairs, confidence in him has increased since last year in 16 of the 25 countries surveyed.</p>
  77. <p>[&#8230;] In every country surveyed in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, China is one of the top three most-mentioned allies.</p>
  78. <p>[&#8230;] South Africans today are significantly more likely to name China than the U.S. as their country’s most important ally. (45% vs. 28%). But in 2019, the U.S. was the most common response, followed by China. </p>
  79. <p>The trend in Indonesia is similar. In 2019, Indonesians were more than twice as likely to name the U.S. than China as their country’s top ally (16% vs. 6%). But today, more name China than the U.S. [<a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/07/15/international-views-of-china-turn-slightly-more-positive/"><strong>Source</strong></a>]
  80. </p></blockquote>
  81. <p>To the extent that these surveys demonstrate a slight improvement in global public opinion towards China at the expense of the U.S., this reflects natural changes in public perceptions regarding how each country has acted on the international stage. However, the perception of their performances is mediated through information environments which can sometimes be deliberately distorted by state actors for political purposes. Alex Yu-Ting Lin published an academic article last month showing that Chinese information campaigns that attempt to delegitimize the U.S. tend to <a href="https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/69/3/sqaf056/8244128?login=false">reduce the respondents’ assessment of U.S. status in the world</a>. (Both the U.S. and Chinese governments have <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/09/ai-assists-chinese-external-propaganda/">leveraged AI to target overseas audiences in global influence operations</a> against each other.)</p>
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  86. </item>
  87. <item>
  88. <title>Translation: International Students in China Complain, “Quark AI Has Forgotten Us!”</title>
  89. <link>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/09/translation-international-students-in-china-complain-quark-ai-has-forgotten-us/</link>
  91. <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cindy Carter]]></dc:creator>
  92. <pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2025 23:44:06 +0000</pubDate>
  93. <category><![CDATA[CDT Highlights]]></category>
  94. <category><![CDATA[China & the World]]></category>
  95. <category><![CDATA[Level 2 Article]]></category>
  96. <category><![CDATA[Sci-Tech]]></category>
  97. <category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
  98. <category><![CDATA[Translation]]></category>
  99. <category><![CDATA[academic resources]]></category>
  100. <category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
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  102. <category><![CDATA[educational exchange]]></category>
  103. <category><![CDATA[foreign perception]]></category>
  104. <category><![CDATA[foreign students of Chinese]]></category>
  105. <category><![CDATA[foreigners in China]]></category>
  106. <category><![CDATA[higher education]]></category>
  107. <category><![CDATA[inequality]]></category>
  108. <category><![CDATA[netizens]]></category>
  109. <category><![CDATA[online public opinion]]></category>
  110. <category><![CDATA[overseas students]]></category>
  111. <category><![CDATA[social inequality]]></category>
  112. <category><![CDATA[social media]]></category>
  113. <category><![CDATA[students]]></category>
  114. <category><![CDATA[universities]]></category>
  115. <category><![CDATA[university students]]></category>
  116. <guid isPermaLink="false">https://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=704665</guid>
  117.  
  118. <description><![CDATA[Some international students in China have taken to social media platform RedNote (Xiaohongshu) to complain about being excluded from obtaining free educational accounts for Quark AI, an LLM tool widely used by their Chinese university classmates. Using the hashtag #WeStudyInChina, these students have also set up an online “message wall” to lobby for inclusion in [&#8230;]]]></description>
  119. <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Some international students in China have taken to social media platform RedNote (Xiaohongshu) to complain about being excluded from obtaining free educational accounts for <a href="https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-trends/article/3302723/alibabas-killer-app-quark-draws-positive-reviews-china-ai-agent-race-heats">Quark AI</a>, an LLM tool widely used by their Chinese university classmates. Using the hashtag #WeStudyInChina, these students have also set up an online “message wall” to lobby for inclusion in the popular AI tool.</p>
  120. <p>Chinese online reactions to the students’ pleas ranged from sympathy to amusement, Schadenfreude to national pride. Some commenters highlighted the perceived privileges enjoyed by exchange students in China, while others pointed to the clamor for Quark AI as a sign that Chinese AI tools have finally become cutting edge. Others noted the similarities between these recent “Quark AI refugees” and the millions of so-called “<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/01/censorship-creeps-up-on-tiktok-refugees-fleeing-to-chinese-app-xiaohongshu/">TikTok refugees</a>” who <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/01/words-of-the-week-xiaohongshu-balance-sheet-comparisons-%E5%B0%8F%E7%BA%A2%E4%B9%A6%E5%AF%B9%E8%B4%A6-xiaohongshu-duizhang/">joined RedNote earlier this year</a> when <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/01/netizen-voices-on-tiktok-refugees-we-all-know-this-isnt-going-to-end-well-so-lets-enjoy-this-global-village-moment-while-we-can/">a U.S. ban on TikTok seemed imminent</a>. (After U.S.-China bilateral trade talks in Spain this weekend, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said that <a href="https://apnews.com/article/trump-tiktok-china-b2621f7554d4a45eef83d05b4b958034">the two nations had reached a framework deal</a> to divest TikTok’s ownership from Chinese parent company Bytedance.)</p>
  121. <p>In a recent WeChat article titled “<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/721128.html"><strong>As International Students in China Are Reduced to &#8216;Quark AI Refugees,&#8217; Should We Gloat, or Feel Proud?</strong></a>” blogger Xiang Dongliang discusses various aspects of the controversy, including China’s educational subsidies for foreign students, on-campus segregation of Chinese and international students, and the rise of xenophobic attitudes in Chinese society. In the end, Xiang suggests that neither smug nationalism nor petty Schadenfreude is an appropriate reaction to the travails of exchange students in China:</p>
  122. <blockquote>
  123. <p>I came across this particularly interesting trending topic: &quot;Quark AI has forgotten us!&quot;</p>
  124. <div id="attachment_704666" style="width: 1090px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-704666" src="http://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-one.png" alt="ALT: Three side-by-side social media posts show (at left) a close-up image of a redheaded young man with a hand over his mouth, looking distressed; (at center) a collage of the same young man and some of the Kardashians crying; and (at right) the same man with his eyes closed and fingers to his temples, along with some supplicating emojis (praying hands, a face with the eyes brimming with tears) and the Quark logo." width="1080" height="722" class="size-full wp-image-704666" srcset="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-one.png 1080w, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-one-300x201.png 300w, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-one-1024x685.png 1024w, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-one-768x513.png 768w" sizes="(max-width: 1080px) 100vw, 1080px" /></p>
  125. <p id="caption-attachment-704666" class="wp-caption-text">Humorously tearful posts from RedNote account Leo说中文 (“Leo speaks Chinese”) feature the hashtags #QuarkHasForgottenUs and #WeStudyInChina. The Chinese text at bottom right reads: “Can British people living in China get it, too?! Harry from the U.K. also wants to try a Quark AI membership. My Chinese friends say it&#8217;s great! And the scanning feature would be really useful!”</p>
  126. </div>
  127. <div id="attachment_704667" style="width: 1090px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img decoding="async" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-704667" src="http://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-two.jpeg" alt="Two side-by-side screenshots show (at right) a blurred photo of a young woman with dark hair and a black long-sleeved shirt, and (below that) Chinese and French text, punctuated with heart- and crying-face emojis, asking for equal access to Quark AI." width="1080" height="1036" class="size-full wp-image-704667" srcset="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-two.jpeg 1080w, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-two-300x288.jpeg 300w, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-two-1024x982.jpeg 1024w, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-two-768x737.jpeg 768w" sizes="(max-width: 1080px) 100vw, 1080px" /></p>
  128. <p id="caption-attachment-704667" class="wp-caption-text">A post in Chinese and French includes the following plea: “Quark, how can you treat me like this? My Chinese classmates can get free membership through the ‘Education Plan,’ but I can&#8217;t, because I don&#8217;t have a CHSI (China Higher Education Student Information Network) account. We take the same classes, the same tests, and even grouse about the same homework! Please show some love to us international students, too.”</p>
  129. </div>
  130. <p>A group of foreign students studying in China posted complaints on RedNote (Xiaohongshu), saying that Quark AI, which Chinese university students use, discriminates against international students. All Chinese university students qualify for free Quark “SVIP” membership, but international students attending the same universities can only stand by helplessly as they are “left behind” by Quark.</p>
  131. <div id="attachment_704668" style="width: 976px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img decoding="async" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-704668" src="http://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-three.jpeg" alt="A social media post from RedNote features a cartoon meme (at top) of the back of Squidward’s head (captioned: “me”) as he looks forlornly out of a window with horizontal blinds. Outside the window, SpongeBob and Patrick Star raise their hands in the air as they frolic happily, above the caption “Chinese people with Quark AI memberships.” Below the meme is a line of Chinese text that reads “Who can understand the plight of exchange students?” followed by four lines of Arabic text providing more detail about the student’s need for Quark AI in the coming academic semester in Shanghai." width="966" height="954" class="size-full wp-image-704668" srcset="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-three.jpeg 966w, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-three-300x296.jpeg 300w, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-three-768x758.jpeg 768w" sizes="(max-width: 966px) 100vw, 966px" /></p>
  132. <p id="caption-attachment-704668" class="wp-caption-text">A post in Chinese and Arabic features a Sponge Bob Squarepants meme (Left: “Me” / Right: “Chinese people with Quark AI memberships”) and the Chinese phrase “Who can understand the plight of exchange students?” The Arabic text at bottom describes the student’s excitement about returning to Shanghai for the new semester and meeting new classmates and new challenges, but mentions that only Chinese students qualify for free Quark AI access under the “Education Plan.”</p>
  133. </div>
  134. <div id="attachment_704669" style="width: 711px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img decoding="async" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-704669" src="http://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-four.jpeg" alt="A social media post shows a young woman with blond hair and a black short-sleeved t-shirt speaking to the camera, with a bilingual Chinese and English caption that reads, “while i’m left out.”" width="701" height="1080" class="size-full wp-image-704669" srcset="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-four.jpeg 701w, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-four-195x300.jpeg 195w, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-four-665x1024.jpeg 665w" sizes="(max-width: 701px) 100vw, 701px" /></p>
  135. <p id="caption-attachment-704669" class="wp-caption-text">Another international student bemoans being “left out” of Quark AI access.</p>
  136. </div>
  137. <p>Some of these exchange students even created a dedicated online message wall, as is habitual on the overseas internet. Called &quot;We Study in China,&quot; the website allows international students in China to voice their concerns and appeal to Quark AI for equal treatment and access to membership benefits.</p>
  138. <div id="attachment_704670" style="width: 1090px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img decoding="async" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-704670" src="http://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-five-message-wall.jpeg" alt="" width="1080" height="757" class="size-full wp-image-704670" srcset="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-five-message-wall.jpeg 1080w, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-five-message-wall-300x210.jpeg 300w, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-five-message-wall-1024x718.jpeg 1024w, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-five-message-wall-768x538.jpeg 768w" sizes="(max-width: 1080px) 100vw, 1080px" /></p>
  139. <p id="caption-attachment-704670" class="wp-caption-text">A screenshot of the “We Study in China” message wall explains its mission of lobbying Quark AI to expand free membership access to international students studying in China, and invites students to leave comments or share the website URL with others.</p>
  140. </div>
  141. <p>This scenario is reminiscent of the &quot;TikTok refugees&quot; who flocked to RedNote when TikTok was [in danger of being] shut down in the U.S. Both cases involved foreigners who wanted to use Chinese internet services but were unable to do so.</p>
  142. <p>This may seem a minor matter, but it has extraordinary significance. It’s the first time that I can recall the international student community in China ever collectively speaking out in this way.</p>
  143. <p>At the spectacle of foreign students extolling the virtues of Chinese AI tools and even &quot;begging” for access to them, Chinese netizens responded with delight, filling [social-media] comment sections with expressions of national pride and Schadenfreude.</p>
  144. <p>This should come as no surprise. Chinese society has long harbored resentment over the preferential treatment afforded to international students. Now that we are seeing international students being disadvantaged and discriminated against, is it any wonder that some people are exulting, taking the opportunity to vent their frustrations?</p>
  145. <div id="attachment_704671" style="width: 821px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img decoding="async" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-704671" src="http://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-six-Guancha.jpeg" alt="" width="811" height="1080" class="size-full wp-image-704671" srcset="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-six-Guancha.jpeg 811w, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-six-Guancha-225x300.jpeg 225w, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-six-Guancha-769x1024.jpeg 769w, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/QuarkAI-six-Guancha-768x1023.jpeg 768w" sizes="(max-width: 811px) 100vw, 811px" /></p>
  146. <p id="caption-attachment-704671" class="wp-caption-text">A portion of a commentary from the nationalistically inclined online media outlet Guancha.<br />Top: While this outcry by international students may look like a “protest,” it&#8217;s more like a chorus of inadvertent recognition: China&#8217;s AI apps and services have gotten so good that foreigners are turning green with envy!<br />Bottom: Guancha headline: “Why are foreign students up in arms about Quark AI? Because what’s ‘premium tier’ overseas is just ‘standard issue’ in China.”</p>
  147. </div>
  148. <p>Guancha, which represents this type of thinking, published a triumphalist op-ed that gleefully proclaimed: &quot;What’s ‘premium tier’ overseas is just ‘standard issue’ in China.”</p>
  149. <p>Yes, China&#8217;s AI has indeed made progress, and [domestic] AI tools are performing quite well in various applications and daily-life scenarios. After all, the “application layer” has always been the Chinese internet’s strong suit.</p>
  150. <p>However, the fact that Quark AI excluded international students from its membership giveaway reveals, yet again, a longstanding problem in Chinese society: enormous sums of money are being spent to attract and train international students, but rarely does this investment achieve any concrete results.</p>
  151. <p>Statistics show that as of 2025, there were over 500,000 international students in China.</p>
  152. <p>Many people are under the impression that African students make up the largest proportion of exchange students in China, but in fact, a larger proportion are from other Asian countries such as Pakistan (understandable), South Korea (whose academic competition is even fiercer than China&#8217;s), and Thailand (many of whom are ethnic Chinese). When I was an undergraduate, there were several Vietnamese students at my college, but they didn’t stand out much due to their appearance.</p>
  153. <p>Despite the many hundreds of thousands of international students in China, as a group, they exhibit very little “presence” in Chinese society. Even when they occasionally make the news due to a negative incident, their voices are rarely heard—it&#8217;s mostly Chinese netizens arguing among themselves.</p>
  154. <p>On one hand, Chinese universities actively promote a kind of “soft segregation” by providing separate dorms, cafeterias, and even special classes exclusively for international students. As such, there isn&#8217;t much on-campus interaction between international and Chinese students. On the other hand, because international students have few opportunities to remain in China and work after graduation, they lack the motivation to fully integrate into Chinese society: they&#8217;re preoccupied with getting their degrees and moving on.</p>
  155. <p>The results are counterproductive: while China has long provided generous subsidies to support and train exchange students, the paucity of cultural exchange and social integration means that China is neither importing overseas talent nor exporting cultural influence (once those students return to their home countries after completing their studies).</p>
  156. <p>Given these missed opportunities on both ends, isn’t our investment just going to waste?</p>
  157. <p>And while Quark AI&#8217;s exclusion of international students from the benefits of free membership might appear to be a decision by a single company, it reflects the collective mentality of our entire society.</p>
  158. <p>Of course, this represents but a miniscule slice of the day-to-day existence of international students in China. The only reason it became a trending topic is because it offers such a dramatic study in contrasts.</p>
  159. <p>The question truly worthy of our attention is this: What attitude should Chinese society adopt toward international students and other foreigners who come to China?</p>
  160. <p>A decade ago, Chinese society&#8217;s attitude toward foreigners was predominantly respectful and friendly. Today, that attitude has shifted to a combination of “looking up to” and “looking down on” foreigners. Disrespect and contempt seem to be in the ascendant, and hostile rhetoric has become commonplace. None of these, in short, are healthy attitudes.</p>
  161. <p>When overseas users first began flocking to RedNote, the Chinese public’s concerns about an “influx of foreigners” was on full display. But now, how many of those overseas accounts are even still on RedNote?</p>
  162. <p>Returning to this article&#8217;s title, the surface phenomenon is that Quark AI “forgot” about international students, but the underlying essence is that Chinese society has never viewed international students or foreigners as equals.</p>
  163. <p>My constructive suggestion is not to look up to them, nor to look down on them, either.</p>
  164. <p>Until we can view foreigners as equals and accept international students into our schools and society with an open and egalitarian mindset, we will not be truly composed or confident. [<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/721128.html"><strong>Chinese</strong></a>]
  165. </p></blockquote>
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  170. </item>
  171. <item>
  172. <title>Photo: 中国重庆市长寿区菩提街道市场监督管理所, by 荧_Lumine</title>
  173. <link>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/09/photo-%e4%b8%ad%e5%9b%bd%e9%87%8d%e5%ba%86%e5%b8%82%e9%95%bf%e5%af%bf%e5%8c%ba%e8%8f%a9%e6%8f%90%e8%a1%97%e9%81%93%e5%b8%82%e5%9c%ba%e7%9b%91%e7%9d%a3%e7%ae%a1%e7%90%86%e6%89%80-by-%e8%8d%a7_lumine/</link>
  175. <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cindy Carter]]></dc:creator>
  176. <pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2025 06:08:51 +0000</pubDate>
  177. <category><![CDATA[Main Photo]]></category>
  178. <guid isPermaLink="false">https://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=704661</guid>
  179.  
  180. <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
  181. <content:encoded><![CDATA[<div id="attachment_704662" style="width: 610px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img decoding="async" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-704662" src="http://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/中国重庆市长寿区菩提街道市场监督管理所-by-荧_Lumine-e1758002753997.jpg" alt="On the pavement outside of a subdistrict “market supervision” office in Chongqing, Sichuan Province, someone has arranged hundreds of small gifts, snacks, beverages, and various items. A banner placed on the ground in front of these items announces that it is a “ring toss” game with prizes, which passersby can enter by paying 10 yuan for twelve chances to win." width="600" height="445" class="size-full wp-image-704662" /></p>
  182. <p id="caption-attachment-704662" class="wp-caption-text">中国重庆市长寿区菩提街道市场监督管理所, by <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/luminemains/54582943300">荧_Lumine (CC BY 2.0)</a></p>
  183. </div>
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  188. </item>
  189. <item>
  190. <title>China Reacts to Nepal Protest Movement</title>
  191. <link>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/09/china-reacts-to-nepal-protest-movement/</link>
  193. <dc:creator><![CDATA[Arthur Kaufman]]></dc:creator>
  194. <pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2025 23:21:07 +0000</pubDate>
  195. <category><![CDATA[China & the World]]></category>
  196. <category><![CDATA[Economy]]></category>
  197. <category><![CDATA[Law]]></category>
  198. <category><![CDATA[Level 2 Article]]></category>
  199. <category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
  200. <category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
  201. <category><![CDATA[angry youth]]></category>
  202. <category><![CDATA[apps]]></category>
  203. <category><![CDATA[bangladesh]]></category>
  204. <category><![CDATA[color revolution]]></category>
  205. <category><![CDATA[Global South]]></category>
  206. <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
  207. <category><![CDATA[indonesia]]></category>
  208. <category><![CDATA[mass protests]]></category>
  209. <category><![CDATA[nepal]]></category>
  210. <category><![CDATA[political instability]]></category>
  211. <category><![CDATA[political violence]]></category>
  212. <category><![CDATA[protest suppression]]></category>
  213. <category><![CDATA[regional diplomacy]]></category>
  214. <category><![CDATA[regional security]]></category>
  215. <category><![CDATA[revolution]]></category>
  216. <category><![CDATA[social media]]></category>
  217. <category><![CDATA[social media censorship]]></category>
  218. <category><![CDATA[social unrest]]></category>
  219. <category><![CDATA[Southeast Asia]]></category>
  220. <category><![CDATA[student protests]]></category>
  221. <category><![CDATA[WeChat]]></category>
  222. <category><![CDATA[youth]]></category>
  223. <guid isPermaLink="false">https://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=704652</guid>
  224.  
  225. <description><![CDATA[The “Gen Z” protest movement that toppled Nepal’s government last week has sent shockwaves around the region. Fueled by longstanding grievances over government corruption and social inequality, Nepalese youth took to the streets on Monday, September 8 to protest a government ban on 26 social media apps (including WhatsApp, Signal, Instagram, Facebook, YouTube, X, LinkedIn, [&#8230;]]]></description>
  226. <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/10/world/asia/nepal-gen-z-protests.html">“Gen Z” protest movement</a> that toppled Nepal’s government last week has sent shockwaves around the region. Fueled by <a href="https://globalvoices.org/2025/09/09/gen-z-stands-up-to-expose-corruption-in-nepal/">longstanding grievances over government corruption</a> and social inequality, Nepalese youth took to the streets on Monday, September 8 to protest a government <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/new-updates/nepal-bans-26-social-media-platforms-full-list-from-facebook-instagram-whatsapp-to-youtube/articleshow/123766916.cms?from=mdr">ban on 26 social media apps</a> (including WhatsApp, Signal, Instagram, Facebook, YouTube, X, LinkedIn, Reddit, WeChat, and others). Amid escalating clashes, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/nineteen-killed-nepal-gen-z-protest-over-social-media-ban-corruption-2025-09-08/">security forces shot and killed 19 protesters</a>. Mass outrage ensued. By Tuesday, numerous government buildings had been set ablaze and the prime minister and four other ministers had resigned. </p>
  227. <p>On Chinese social media, prominent nationalist accounts argued that the U.S. was behind the protests, while others <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/721104.html">pushed back against these claims</a>. One WeChat article, later censored, described <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/721101.html">the source of youth discontent</a>: “The protests are no longer simply a fight for ‘internet freedom,’ but a deeper generational awakening. Young people are not satisfied with merely restoring social media, but are demanding transparency, accountability, and real political reform.” Another article, published by “Global Citizen Jin Jianguo” on Baidu’s Baijiahao platform, dismissed claims that the unrest was a “color revolution” incited by foreign forces. The author argued instead that <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/721133.html"><strong>resistance is instinctive and a natural product of social injustice</strong></a>:</p>
  228. <blockquote>
  229. <p>Conversely, if we subscribe to the &quot;color revolution” narrative, history becomes untenable. [It implies that] the Wuchang Uprising, the Xinhai Revolution, the May Fourth Movement, and even the national independence movement that swept the globe after World War II were nothing more than upheavals fomented by “foreign forces.” No longer is world history a story of war, politics, economics, or culture, but a litany of incitement.</p>
  230. <p>An overview of mass movements, both in China and abroad, reveals that all have their own internal logic. While sometimes influenced by external ideas and forces, all spring from an accumulation of discontent and damaged interests. This is true in the U.K., Poland, the Arab world, and even Nepal.</p>
  231. <p>In other words, you can&#8217;t just chalk up mass movements in Asian countries to incitement, while claiming that similar movements in Western countries represent &quot;the People&#8217;s choice.&quot; Are all Asians puppets, while only Westerners are considered intelligent citizens?</p>
  232. <p>Admit it: people will always be willing to fight for their own interests. It’s basic human instinct, and doesn’t require anyone to “incite” them—unless of course, they don’t consider themselves human. [<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/721133.html"><strong>Chinese</strong></a>]
  233. </p></blockquote>
  234. <blockquote class="twitter-tweet">
  235. <p lang="en" dir="ltr">Saw Chinese netizen comment under Nepal protest coverage: <br />水能载舟，亦能覆舟 <br />literally, ‘water can carry the boat, but also overturn it.’ <br />The people overturned yesterday; may we carry forward a boat of trust and renewal today/tomorrow.</p>
  236. <p>&mdash; Aneka (奥妮卡） (@anekarebeccaraj) <a href="https://twitter.com/anekarebeccaraj/status/1965701034975863181?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">September 10, 2025</a></p></blockquote>
  237. <p>In banning numerous foreign social media apps, the Nepalese government had attempted to use a censorship playbook commonly associated with China. Analysts said the plan <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/09/world/asia/nepal-protests-social-media-ban-censorship.html">backfired due to overreach</a>. Compared to populous countries such as India and China, Nepal had less political and commercial leverage to force compliance by foreign social media companies. Moreover, in a country with 20 percent unemployment and almost a third of its GDP coming from remittances abroad, many feared the bans would cut off workers from their families and hurt tourism. Ironically, with numerous government institutions literally burned down, the country debated and chose its future leaders <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/15/more-egalitarian-how-nepals-gen-z-used-gaming-app-discord-to-pick-pm">in Discord channels</a>. </p>
  238. <p>This dramatic turn of events reflects a nightmare scenario for leaders in Beijing, who have made government control over online discourse a foundation of their regime security. Charlie Campbell at TIME Magazine described <a href="https://time.com/7315858/nepal-protests-social-media-ban-authoritarian-censorship-internet-freedom-analysis/"><strong>what authoritarians in China and elsewhere may have learned about censorship from Nepal’s protests</strong></a>:</p>
  239. <blockquote>
  240. <p>The banning of 26 social-media platforms including Facebook, YouTube, and X was officially due to the companies’ failure to register and submit to government oversight, though protesters attributed the move as an attempt to block the crescendo of online complaints from young people furious at the luxurious lifestyles enjoyed by children of the political elite, so-called “nepo kids.”</p>
  241. <p>[&#8230;] “The government in Nepal was trying to use those new social-media regulations to prevent the very thing that happened,” says Michael Kugelman, a D.C.-based South Asia analyst. “So it completely backfired.”</p>
  242. <p>[&#8230;] “Beijing officials must be looking on their Kathmandu counterparts with pity and glee, counting their lucky stars that mainland Chinese netizens can’t even miss what Nepalese have fought so hard to get back,” says Sean King, senior vice president focusing on Asia for consulting firm Park Strategies.</p>
  243. <p>[&#8230;] At the least, the hope is that the nation’s political class learns to heed criticism rather than just silence it. Unfortunately, the reverse lesson for authoritarian states—and those aspirationally so—is the existential risk of relinquishing control, because not only can you never put the genie back in the bottle, but trying to often just fuels the fire. [<a href="https://time.com/7315858/nepal-protests-social-media-ban-authoritarian-censorship-internet-freedom-analysis/"><strong>Source</strong></a>]
  244. </p></blockquote>
  245. <p>In reaction to the protests, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian “expressed hope that all parties in Nepal can properly address domestic issues, and <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202509/1343150.shtml">restore social order and national stability as soon as possible</a>,” as reported by the Global Times. On Sunday, China’s foreign ministry then <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3325620/nepals-political-turmoil-not-expected-have-major-impact-relations-china?module=top_story&amp;pgtype=homepage">congratulated Nepal&#8217;s new interim leader</a>, former chief justice Sushila Karki. This tumultuous transition also could become geopolitically challenging for China, as the outgoing Nepalese Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli was widely seen as leaning towards Beijing, and analysts argued that his fall could serve as both a <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/11/why-does-nepals-crisis-matter-to-south-asia-and-the-world">setback for Beijing</a> and a potential opening for New Delhi. Just days before the protests, Oli attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit and <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/09/xi-flexes-diplomatic-and-military-muscle-at-wwii-parade/">military parade</a> in China, and held talks with Xi Jinping. China and Nepal also began <a href="https://kathmandupost.com/national/2025/09/07/joint-nepal-china-military-drill-begins-in-kathmandu">joint military drills</a> that weekend. Zhao Ziwen at the South China Morning Post compiled other reactions from Chinese analysts about the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3325088/beijing-weighs-risks-social-unrest-rocks-strategic-partner-nepal"><strong>broader impact of the protests for China and the region</strong></a>:</p>
  246. <blockquote>
  247. <p>Liu Zongyi, a senior fellow and director of the Centre for South Asia Studies at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, said the unrest could affect the belt and road plan but activity may pick up later.</p>
  248. <p>“During periods of turmoil, there will certainly be an impact on the Belt and Road Initiative. However, after the turmoil, if their development and prosperity issues cannot be resolved, only China’s Belt and Road Initiative can help them address problems such as having enough to eat and living better lives,” Liu said.</p>
  249. <p>[&#8230;] Zhang Jiadong, director of the South Asian Studies Centre at Fudan University, said the social unrest in Nepal was part of the new internal order in South Asia, where “public awakening, economic difficulties and the rise of social media have collectively driven political changes in the region”, adding that he urged Beijing to “pay attention”.</p>
  250. <p>[&#8230;] “Beijing, just like any other government in the world, will need to have regular reality checks on the ground, find ways to meet people’s expectations and defuse public dissatisfaction as early as possible and fight corruption as harshly as possible. It can just look around to see what will happen if you fail to address people’s needs,” [said Alfred Wu, an associate professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore]. [<a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3325088/beijing-weighs-risks-social-unrest-rocks-strategic-partner-nepal"><strong>Source</strong></a>]  </p>
  251. </blockquote>
  252. <p>These geopolitical calculations have become familiar for China following political upheaval elsewhere in the region over recent months. Last August, under similar circumstances, a student-led protest movement <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2024/08/china-warily-observes-bangladesh-political-transition/">toppled the government of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina</a>, who then fled to India. One month later, the Marxist leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake won Sri Lanka’s presidential election, with many analysts predicting he would <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2024/09/sri-lankas-new-president-navigates-relations-with-china-india/">strengthen relations with China</a>. And over the past two weeks, Indonesia has been engulfed in its own nationwide anti-government protests over corruption, inequality, and police brutality. The unrest forced President Prabowo Subianto to cancel his SCO trip, although <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3324169/indonesias-prabowo-attends-chinas-military-parade-protests-rage-home">he did travel to Beijing</a> for the military parade, where Xi reaffirmed his support for Prabowo’s governance. The visit <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/opinion/as-protests-rage-prabowo-s-china-visit-sends-mixed-signals-to-indonesians">sent mixed signals</a> to Indonesians. Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat and Yeta Purnama wrote an article on Thursday for the Australian Institute of International Affairs <a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/china-and-the-wave-of-protests-in-indonesia/"><strong>unpacking Prabowo’s decision to travel to China amid the unrest</strong></a>:</p>
  253. <blockquote>
  254. <p>For many Indonesians, Prabowo’s appearance in Beijing risks undercutting his credibility at home. He had pledged to stay in Indonesia during the protests, even suggesting he would forgo international engagements out of solidarity with a population demanding fairness and accountability. By attending the parade anyway — even if briefly — he exposed himself to criticism that he is prioritising foreign optics over domestic grievances. That perception could fuel further anger among protesters who already see the political elite as disconnected.</p>
  255. <p>Conversely, for China, Prabowo’s attendance offered reassurance. Although he skipped the SCO summit, his physical presence at the parade alongside other world leaders signalled that Jakarta still values its ties with Beijing. It also demonstrated Indonesia’s willingness to remain engaged with China, despite turbulence at home.</p>
  256. <p>[&#8230;] How China interprets the protests is also noteworthy. Some Chinese and Russian outlets hinted at the possibility of “foreign interference,” echoing narratives often applied to unrest elsewhere. Indonesian analysts, however, have been clear that these protests are rooted in local grievances — inequality, corruption, and the death of a delivery driver run over by a police vehicle — rather than geopolitical scheming. [<a href="https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/china-and-the-wave-of-protests-in-indonesia/"><strong>Source</strong></a>]
  257. </p></blockquote>
  258. <p><em>Additional translation by Cindy Carter.</em></p>
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  263. </item>
  264. <item>
  265. <title>Interview: Jessica Batke and Laura Edelson on China’s “Locknet”</title>
  266. <link>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/09/interview-jessica-batke-and-laura-edelson-on-chinas-locknet/</link>
  268. <dc:creator><![CDATA[Samuel Wade]]></dc:creator>
  269. <pubDate>Thu, 11 Sep 2025 21:23:33 +0000</pubDate>
  270. <category><![CDATA[CDT Highlights]]></category>
  271. <category><![CDATA[China & the World]]></category>
  272. <category><![CDATA[Economy]]></category>
  273. <category><![CDATA[Information Revolution]]></category>
  274. <category><![CDATA[Level 2 Article]]></category>
  275. <category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
  276. <category><![CDATA[Sci-Tech]]></category>
  277. <category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
  278. <category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
  279. <category><![CDATA[censorship]]></category>
  280. <category><![CDATA[Google]]></category>
  281. <category><![CDATA[Great Firewall]]></category>
  282. <category><![CDATA[Internet censorship]]></category>
  283. <category><![CDATA[interview]]></category>
  284. <category><![CDATA[James Fallows]]></category>
  285. <category><![CDATA[online censorship]]></category>
  286. <category><![CDATA[Tiananmen massacre]]></category>
  287. <category><![CDATA[WeChat]]></category>
  288. <guid isPermaLink="false">https://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=704644</guid>
  289.  
  290. <description><![CDATA[In June, ChinaFile published a new report, &#34;The Locknet: How China Controls Its Internet and Why It Matters&#34;—the product of 18 months’ work by Jessica Batke, ChinaFile&#8217;s senior editor for investigations, and Laura Edelson, assistant professor of computer science at Northeastern University. The report gives a concise but thorough overview of China&#8217;s online censorship system, [&#8230;]]]></description>
  291. <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In June, ChinaFile published a new report, &quot;<a href="https://locknet.chinafile.com/the-locknet/intro/">The Locknet: How China Controls Its Internet and Why It Matters</a>&quot;—the product of 18 months’ work by Jessica Batke, ChinaFile&#8217;s senior editor for investigations, and Laura Edelson, assistant professor of computer science at Northeastern University. The report gives a concise but thorough overview of China&#8217;s online censorship system, including the motivations behind it and the mechanisms by which it is implemented. It expands on the familiar image of the &quot;Great Firewall&quot; as a perimeter barrier, adopting a broader hydrological metaphor:</p>
  292. <blockquote>
  293. <p>The censorship system’s complexity belies the idea that it is merely a wall. The “Great Firewall” suggests an attempt at impermeability, a hard, static barrier running along the border keeping invading information at bay. But the metaphor fails to capture the scale and dynamism of the system as a whole. Beijing doesn’t just stand sentry over its digital borders, it monitors and censors information flows within the country as well. Moreover, the censorship system was never designed to be impermeable. Instead, it uses the most efficient means possible to minimize the quantity of “dangerous” information available to Chinese citizens online. Impermeability is expensive, and not all that much better, from a practical perspective, than simply filtering out the majority of unwanted content.</p>
  294. <p>In practice, online censorship in China functions more like a massive water management system: an amalgamation of canals and locks that regulates what flows, through which particular channels, and at what times. It adjusts to natural rises and drops in volume, though it can be overwhelmed during a flood. Even when the sluices close, it’s not perfectly impermeable; ripples can always slosh over the edge. This can happen in both directions: a gush can surge in from the outside or what was meant to stay in can leak out.</p>
  295. <p>Just as a system of locks and sluices surrounding a man-made lake can regulate the lake’s water level while tides or rivers flow in and out, so China’s online censorship system can ensure the information circulating through the country’s digital spillways mostly conforms to Beijing’s changing whims. The result is a national intranet that links up with the global internet but manages internal information flows according to its own rules. The result is what we have dubbed “the Locknet.” [<a href="https://locknet.chinafile.com/the-locknet/intro/"><strong>Source</strong></a>]
  296. </p></blockquote>
  297. <p>The report offers several different levels of detail, beginning with <a href="https://locknet.chinafile.com/how-to/">an overall roadmap</a>, an <a href="https://locknet.chinafile.com/additional-materials/executive-summary/">executive summary</a>, and <a href="https://locknet.chinafile.com/the-locknet/intro/">an introductory essay</a> that conveys the report&#8217;s main themes. For those wanting more, additional sections focus on <a href="https://locknet.chinafile.com/the-locknet/part-1/">the Locknet&#8217;s physical context</a>, its <a href="https://locknet.chinafile.com/the-locknet/part-2/">implementation by corporate platforms</a> and <a href="https://locknet.chinafile.com/the-locknet/part-3/">government entities</a>, <a href="https://locknet.chinafile.com/the-locknet/part-4/">efforts to circumvent it</a>, its <a href="https://locknet.chinafile.com/the-locknet/part-5/">growing international influence</a>, and <a href="https://locknet.chinafile.com/the-locknet/part-6/">its future development</a>. Still greater depth can be found in <a href="https://locknet.chinafile.com/additional-materials/glossary/">a technical glossary</a> (also integrated into the main text) and a series of essays introducing <a href="https://locknet.chinafile.com/additional-materials/the-mechanics-of-online-censorship/internet-101/">technical aspects of the internet itself</a>, <a href="https://locknet.chinafile.com/additional-materials/the-mechanics-of-online-censorship/censorship-how-china-disrupts-the-network/">Chinese authorities&#8217; methods of censoring it</a>, and <a href="https://locknet.chinafile.com/additional-materials/the-mechanics-of-online-censorship/blocking-circumvention-technologies/">their measures to combat circumvention attempts</a>. Another section by Edelson <a href="https://locknet.chinafile.com/additional-materials/notes-on-china/">explains aspects of the Chinese context that she found particularly notable</a> as a newcomer to Chinese politics and governance. While this section will help readers less familiar with China make sense of the report, it may also offer seasoned observers insight into their own assumptions about others&#8217; background knowledge of the country.</p>
  298. <p>Batke and Edelson agreed to discuss the report and the thinking behind it, including how they approached making such a broad and tangled topic accessible to a cross-disciplinary range of audiences. The transcript below has been extensively condensed and restructured; a fuller text will be available soon.</p>
  299. <p><strong>CDT: How did the project come about?</strong></p>
  300. <p><strong>Jessica Batke:</strong> ChinaFile got approached. Essentially, the Open Technology Fund was aware that current understandings of how the censorship system in China worked needed a little bit of a refresh. They were looking for someone to do that, and somehow, they got pushed in our direction.</p>
  301. <p>The touchstone that I kept going back to was this 2008 article in The Atlantic by James Fallows called <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/03/the-connection-has-been-reset/306650/">The Connection Has Been Reset</a>. It&#8217;s wonderful, just wonderful. But that was the only thing I knew of that tried to explain the technical workings of the censorship system to a lay audience. And that was part of the brief [for this project]: this needed to be a technical review of how the system worked, but it had to be understandable to regular people; and [Fallows’ article] was in 2008, and it was four pages long—it&#8217;s like we&#8217;re in a different universe. </p>
  302. <p>So I was very excited to take this on, and my first thought was, &quot;I can&#8217;t do this by myself, because I don&#8217;t know anything about computer science.&quot; And number two, I really wanted to find someone that had no China background at all. That was really important to me, and that really got validated. If I only had one good idea in my entire life, it was that one.</p>
  303. <p>[…] <strong>Laura Edelson:</strong> I think about this a lot, because almost all my research is at the border of computer science and something else. I think it is surprisingly rare to have two people from different disciplines participating as equal partners in a piece of work. And what that meant is that we didn&#8217;t have to subsume one to the other, and we really were able to generate, I think, novel insights. </p>
  304. <p><strong>JB:</strong> The thing that was so awesome for me was that nothing was taken for granted. Laura came in and was like, &quot;if I was building this system from first principles, what are my first principles, and then what does that mean for the technical design of this system?&quot; And so you&#8217;re engineering it mentally from the ground up, rather than working backwards, and I think that that made all the difference.</p>
  305. <p><strong>LE:</strong> The flip side of that, too: one of the things that is so difficult as a technical person, trying to explain technical systems to lay people, is that so many of the reference materials out there assume a fairly high level of knowledge. They assume that you are in a bachelor&#8217;s computer science program. We don&#8217;t always have to explain the inner workings of things to a wider audience, and when we had to explain things to each other, it really helped us look at things with fresh eyes.</p>
  306. <p>[…] <strong>JB:</strong> I actually felt like Laura had a much harder job, because with the things that she was learning, a lot of times there isn&#8217;t one right answer, right? The things that I was learning were things like, &quot;This is what a data packet is, and these are the two mechanisms by which they are sent.&quot; There is an answer. Sometimes it was poorly written or hard to find, but there is an answer. And that just isn&#8217;t the case for a lot of stuff to do with China.</p>
  307. <p>[…] <strong>LE:</strong> Can I maybe talk a little bit about what I think are opportunities for the future?</p>
  308. <p><strong>CDT: Please do.</strong></p>
  309. <p><strong>LE:</strong> We need to be able to talk between communities about where opportunities lie, and what might be fruitful lines of research, productive things that we should be building, given knowledge of both technically speaking, how the internet works and also the broader China context. We need to be able to have that conversation back and forth. So as a matter of strategy, if we think about the weaknesses of a state actor, the primary one that I see is just that they&#8217;re slow. They&#8217;re big slow bureaucracies. </p>
  310. <p>When I think about building circumvention tools, I think we need a bit of a strategic shift. Instead of making monolith technologies that are really robust and really technically sound, but are single points of failure that a state actor can devote a lot of resources to taking down, we should be investing in smaller, frankly shorter-lived bits of technology that might only stay up for 18 months. That&#8217;s okay, if we make enough of them, if we change how we invest in new projects so that we&#8217;re making a lot of small bets, rather than one big bet. I think as a strategy that will be more robust against a state-actor adversary. </p>
  311. <p>Something that is really an emergent property of the circumvention ecosystem is the rise of, effectively, circumvention-as-service providers [&quot;airports&quot;], where there&#8217;s some guy and you pay him some amount of money per month, and he gives you a box or a hotspot. What it&#8217;s using, the specific technology stack, might be changing every month, but that doesn&#8217;t matter to you, because that guy is dealing with it. What we should be doing is building a range of tools that can enable those circumvention-provider middlemen to have a range of options, to be nimble, and they&#8217;re going to provide the final-mile delivery of customer support and the technical heavy lifting of switching whatever you need to be switching that month to adapt.</p>
  312. <p><strong>JB:</strong> The other thing that I&#8217;ll say about opportunities for the future: some of them have to do with the fact that the Locknet is not staying just within China, that it&#8217;s affecting the global internet and us too. One of the other things that we talked about was increasing transparency for users [outside China]. So for example, we talked about RedNote. It might be helpful for people who download RedNote here in the U.S. to see: &quot;This app is subject to censorship according to Beijing&#8217;s rules.&quot; That basic level of transparency might be helpful for people, because I don&#8217;t know that everybody fully understands that. </p>
  313. <p>Another thing we talked about is making sure people are aware of and sending people to internet standards meetings, because a lot of what&#8217;s happening there is going to have a huge impact on how the internet systems of tomorrow function at a technical level, and what it will allow in terms of governments&#8217; ability to surveil or censor if they so choose. A lot of the ways in which bad things could happen are simply because folks who have an interest in maintaining privacy built into those systems are not organizing and making sure that there are people at every single meeting, every single time.</p>
  314. <p>[…] <strong>LE:</strong> I think this really gets to the point that people like to think about their technical systems as just technical systems that don&#8217;t have human values baked in, but they absolutely do. You know, the reason that the internet works for you is because you share the values of the people who made the internet. The internet <em>didn&#8217;t</em> work for China&#8217;s Party-state. It had big problems with things like the free flow of information, the way that the internet enables people to, at least digitally, have freedom of assembly. And so when it was building the internet [within China], very early in the process, it wanted to make sure it had a pathway to building the Locknet. And you see this in some of the early documents: they wanted to make sure: are we going to be able to get to where we want to go, where we can control the flow of information? Because that is, at least to them, a core value.</p>
  315. <p><strong>CDT: I think this is a good point to segue to the inevitable AI question. How is AI being used so far in the information control system, and what are the prospects for it in the future? Regarding your earlier point about China&#8217;s bureaucracy being big and slow, is AI going to help make it more flexible and easier to keep up? Another point I&#8217;ve been wondering about is that a lot of the time AI is substituting for human labor, which is not something that&#8217;s in short supply in China. So is it possible that, in the Chinese context, it&#8217;s actually not going to be such a big game-changer?</strong></p>
  316. <p><strong>JB:</strong> It&#8217;s important to to understand that there&#8217;s two sides to this coin—two ways in which AI is being used, one of which is to augment the human labor of the censors, to identify content that users have produced, and to identify it as problematic and help flag it in the system and get it down. And the other way is to produce content that is already censored [in the process of being generated]. Those are two different functions that AI systems are being used for, and it&#8217;s important to disaggregate those. I think in the first case, where they&#8217;re augmenting people, we&#8217;re already seeing that. But I don&#8217;t think there&#8217;s any point at which the human gets removed from the loop entirely.</p>
  317. <p><strong>LE:</strong> What gets censored isn&#8217;t fixed. New things are censored every day, and that means there&#8217;s always going to be an important role for humans to play in that system. But I do think that AI is going to make those humans more productive and … I don&#8217;t think it&#8217;s necessarily going to lower costs so much as it&#8217;s going to make it easier to keep up with the growth in content that gets generated.</p>
  318. <p><strong>JB:</strong> Chinese companies have this extremely awkward mission in terms of their content moderators, which is to get rid of things that the Chinese Party-state wants memory-holed. Therefore, they have to teach people this information which should not exist, so that they can then attempt to memory-hole it, and that is just an extremely awkward position for them to be in. AI doesn&#8217;t completely obviate that, but to the extent that you can program in some of that stuff—and that&#8217;s the stuff that&#8217;s most likely to be permanent, right? Like the Tiananmen Square Massacre—that does help you, because if you can get rid of 99.999% of that in your first-line AI review, you don&#8217;t have to educate actual humans on these things that you want memory-holed.</p>
  319. <p><strong>LE:</strong> Getting to the other question: in addition to using AI to execute censorship, AI results and responses are also going to be censored. I think the reason I find this so interesting is that it gets to this larger point that not all technologies are equally easy to censor.</p>
  320. <p>Let&#8217;s say I want to censor search results. There are times of the year where particular politicians&#8217; names are censored—you won&#8217;t see any results for them. At other times of year, you can search for those people and see results, so you can see that the censorship is taking place. That works for search results because I type in a search term, and I get back some results, and I can see that in this time period, I don&#8217;t get back any results, or I get back three, versus the rest of the year, when I get back 10 pages of results. </p>
  321. <p>However, what if, instead of consuming my news by going to a search engine and searching for terms, instead I&#8217;m consuming information in a content feed on a social media service? I don&#8217;t know what isn&#8217;t being upranked in my feed. I don&#8217;t know what isn&#8217;t being inserted there, because the particular way that that is assembled is hidden—not for any censorship reasons, that&#8217;s just the way that that technology is built. And this means that content feeds are easier to censor, and also that that censorship is always covert. </p>
  322. <p>Censorship of AI systems is also covert in this way. There&#8217;s all sorts of reasons that people like going to a chatbot and asking a question and getting an answer, as opposed to going to a search engine and giving a search term that&#8217;s relevant to their question, and then going and reading the answer … it&#8217;s just easier, right? […] And I&#8217;m sure it&#8217;s obvious why this is an easier surface to censor, and to censor covertly, because the model controls the fact-selection. </p>
  323. <p><strong>CDT: Were there particular misconceptions that you were aiming to correct with the report?</strong></p>
  324. <p><strong>JB:</strong> We didn&#8217;t come into it, I think, with a ton of things we were trying to correct, other than that the existing model was outdated and oversimplified—I credit Laura for this—because we were coming to it from first principles: what is this model? I actually think that was a much more useful way than probably what I would have personally done, coming to it with knowledge, thinking, &quot;Well, this is wrong, and we need to blow it up.&quot; Because we came from the ground up, only when we built up to a certain level did we then think, &quot;Aha! Now I see why this is incorrect, and we need to update understandings.&quot; But that happened more organically, if that makes sense.</p>
  325. <p><strong>LE:</strong> One of the most serious is that particularly inside the computer science community, we looked at the individual components [of the censorship system]. And when you look at any of those individual components, you might think, &quot;If you want to get around this, you can. If you put in the effort, you can get around this.&quot; And maybe you think that&#8217;s intentional; maybe you don&#8217;t. But I have come to think that this system is much, much more effective than perhaps the dominant narrative would suggest. And I think that change of perspective came because we did take this perspective of looking at the system as a whole.</p>
  326. <p><strong>CDT: And in terms of that effectiveness, the limitations and porosity of the system are a feature, not a bug, right? They&#8217;re what makes the system as a whole practical.</strong></p>
  327. <p><strong>LE:</strong> Yeah, they&#8217;re what makes it efficient. If you think: &quot;I have X number of yuan to spend on controlling the flow of information over the internet, how am I going to do it?&quot; What is the efficient way to spend those yuan? It&#8217;s to have systems that are each fairly … not minimal, but not overengineered, but to have a lot of them. That&#8217;s a really efficient, adaptable way of building a system, and it&#8217;s how we build other kinds of systems—that&#8217;s a very normal engineering approach to solving a problem.</p>
  328. <p><strong>JB:</strong> Another piece of this is understanding that just because there are gaps, that doesn&#8217;t mean the system as a whole is not effective. The human psychological component to this is that for most people, most of the time, as long as it&#8217;s inconvenient, that&#8217;s enough. Back in the day, people really did want to circumvent, because the outside internet was so much better. That&#8217;s not the case anymore: there&#8217;s a whole domestic ecosystem that&#8217;s really great for all sorts of things. It&#8217;s really important to keep this human component in mind. I speak for myself: humans are lazy. I don&#8217;t want to do more work than I have to do, and that&#8217;s all [the censors] have to do. Just make it good enough for enough of the time and enough of the people.</p>
  329. <p><strong>CDT: I often think about—nothing to do with censorship—studies about how every extra tenth of a second that it takes for a page to load will deter X percentage of users. The tiniest speed bump …</strong></p>
  330. <p><strong>JB:</strong> It can put people off. A huge part of this, actually, is literally just that the Chinese government has under-built the actual physical infrastructure that connects the Chinese internet with the outside internet, and so it is slower. A lot of times people will think, &quot;Oh, it&#8217;s because it&#8217;s being censored. That&#8217;s why it&#8217;s slow.&quot; And that&#8217;s not at all what&#8217;s happening, it&#8217;s literally just that the infrastructure sucks. And that is another one of these ways of introducing friction that has the effect of censorship without having to actually implement censorship. It&#8217;s very clever.</p>
  331. <p><strong>LE:</strong> I do think it&#8217;s worth saying, though, that the outside global internet remains very appealing to people inside China. And also worth remembering that the thing that is appealing is probably Netflix and gambling and pornography, not news in foreign languages. I think this is getting back to where the opportunities are: I think we should be building circumvention tools that work for that commercial market. Because when people go out to get their Netflix and their Marvel movies, keeping the door open for information and knowledge about what is going on outside China, that is still a good and important thing.</p>
  332. <p><strong>CDT: You talk in the report about a shift towards covert censorship. Traditionally, it&#8217;s been quite in your face: you know, the notices that say, &quot;In accordance with relevant rules and regulations, this content has been removed” or “can&#8217;t be viewed.&quot; And the overtness has been part of the system, in that it lets people know that things are off-limits. It helps them keep that in mind. But from what you write, the system seems to be moving away from that.</strong></p>
  333. <p><strong>JB:</strong> Yeah, some of this is what Laura already talked about, which is the nature of newer technologies themselves that are inherently more covert—the way feed algorithms work in social media, that&#8217;s happening already. </p>
  334. <p>But also, once Google was out of the picture, and more and more global companies were leaving China, there just wasn&#8217;t the same pressure to say that &quot;according to relevant regulations, this content can&#8217;t be shown.&quot; There was no one to push back. No one had any leverage to do so, and so they stopped doing it. As you said, there is a didactic function to overt censorship: you are teaching people what they should and shouldn&#8217;t do, and you are, by extension, encouraging self-censorship, and that is the cheapest and most effective method. You do lose that when you shift towards more covert methods. But overall, if you&#8217;re trying to shift the mental landscape of internet users, from a very long-term perspective, it&#8217;s helpful to you if they think that that&#8217;s organically happening, rather than that they&#8217;re constantly chafing against restrictions.</p>
  335. <p><strong>LE:</strong> The only thing I would add is that I have no idea what the full motivations were behind the real-name ID system. But certainly one of the benefits is that it creates a bit more of this overtness, the signaling to users of the fact that you&#8217;re being watched and that you should not violate the rules, because we will track you down. And I think this at least compensates for that loss of overt censorship.</p>
  336. <p><strong>CDT: You highlight the role of WeChat as a way of extending the censorship bubble to the diaspora. Do you have any policy prescriptions for ways to address that?</strong></p>
  337. <p><strong>JB:</strong> I think it&#8217;s the same thing we were saying earlier, which is transparency. If you are using an app in the United States, it should have to say to you that this is being censored. I&#8217;m personally not in the business of telling people that they can&#8217;t [use a platform like WeChat]. That&#8217;s the main way that people have to communicate with their families back home—there aren&#8217;t a lot of other options for them. So if you&#8217;re cutting them off from that, what does that do? That&#8217;s horrible. So this is a tough answer.</p>
  338. <p><strong>CDT: One of the strengths of the report is that it&#8217;s an amazing collection of links to source materials. Are there any that you found particularly valuable, or that you&#8217;d particularly like to highlight?</strong></p>
  339. <p><strong>JB:</strong> If you want to see how the system has changed since 2008, I recommend everyone to read <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/03/the-connection-has-been-reset/306650/">that James Fallows Atlantic article</a>. And anyone who is interested in how to write, because, God, that guy can write. That&#8217;s the first thing that comes to mind. But there&#8217;s so much more.</p>
  340. <p><strong>LE:</strong> There is <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11432-010-0014-z">an original paper by the father of the Chinese internet</a> that proposes a way to filter out information. I found that paper so illuminating, because it proposed that blocking be proportionate to the likelihood of harm. It proposed, &quot;We&#8217;re going to make a probability estimate of how likely this thing is to be bad, and then if it&#8217;s like 80% likely to be bad, then we&#8217;ll be 80% likely to block it.&quot; </p>
  341. <p>And the reason this is such an &quot;aha!&quot; moment to me is that, on a certain level, that is actually how this whole system functions. It&#8217;s not how any one component functions that we know of, but it&#8217;s very much how the system as a whole functions. It&#8217;s very efficient.</p>
  342. <p><strong>CDT: Laura, is there anything that you read about China that you found particularly illuminating?</strong></p>
  343. <p><strong>LE:</strong> Oh, there are so many good ones. I think that, to give a really boring answer, &quot;<a href="https://seagull.wwnorton.com/SearchforModernChina">The Search for Modern China</a>&quot; by Jonathan Spence was a very good ground-laying. </p>
  344. <p>Something that really helped me with thinking about a different framework of values and morals was [Jiwei Ci’s] &quot;<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/ca/universitypress/subjects/politics-international-relations/political-theory/moral-china-age-reform?format=AR&isbn=9781316056448">Moral China in the Age of Reform</a>.&quot;</p>
  345. <p>&quot;<a href="https://www.routledge.com/Chinas-Thought-Management/Brady/p/book/9781138017009">China’s Thought Management</a>&quot; [edited by Anne-Marie Brady] was also pretty helpful. That was a good one.</p>
  346. <p><strong>CDT: The foreign media presence in China has been decimated in the last few years. On every front, there&#8217;s less information getting out of China: fewer official statistics, less independent reporting inside China, less room for academic fieldwork, and so on. A related phenomenon that you write about is the growing difficulty of probing the censorship system from the outside, in terms of &quot;bidirectionality.&quot; Can you talk about that now?</strong></p>
  347. <p><strong>JB:</strong> Bidirectionality is absolutely crucial for us to understand how the system works. It&#8217;s extremely hard to set up a testing infrastructure inside China that accurately reflects what it&#8217;s like for a normal person to access the internet. The way we know what&#8217;s censored is by throwing packets, essentially, from outside, into China, and seeing what happens, and knowing that you&#8217;re getting the same results as if you were inside China. And if that goes away, if bidirectionality goes away, we will lose our technical capacity to monitor at a granular level how exactly these protocols are working, how they&#8217;re censoring things, and what is happening. You can lose bidirectionality on some protocols and not others—it&#8217;s not a fully binary thing—but it is a really scary thought and a really scary time. </p>
  348. <p>This is another one of these things that has been a bedrock, foundational assumption for decades, for people that have been studying the Chinese internet. I feel it speaks to what a moment of potential crisis that we could be in very soon, which I don&#8217;t think we&#8217;re prepared for.</p>
  349. <p><strong>LE:</strong> I think this actually highlights one of the one of the recommendations that&#8217;s normally in our recommendations pitch, but we didn&#8217;t mention here, and that is: we need more consistent monitoring of how this system works. Right now, one person will run a study; they&#8217;ll collect data for nine months to answer some specific question; and then when that&#8217;s over, the data collection is over, and there&#8217;ll be large gaps. And sometimes someone will discover something new, we don&#8217;t know when it started, and that is actually very important for us to understand, for us to understand how the system is evolving on a technical level, and even just things like what is being censored. That would be really, really useful to have a better view of.</p>
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  354. </item>
  355. <item>
  356. <title>Chongqing Slogan Protest: “Freedom Is Not Something Bestowed; We Must Fight to Reclaim It!”</title>
  357. <link>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/09/chongqing-slogan-protest-freedom-is-not-something-bestowed-we-must-fight-to-reclaim-it/</link>
  359. <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cindy Carter]]></dc:creator>
  360. <pubDate>Thu, 11 Sep 2025 20:41:42 +0000</pubDate>
  361. <category><![CDATA[CDT Highlights]]></category>
  362. <category><![CDATA[Law]]></category>
  363. <category><![CDATA[Level 2 Article]]></category>
  364. <category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
  365. <category><![CDATA[Sci-Tech]]></category>
  366. <category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
  367. <category><![CDATA[Translation]]></category>
  368. <category><![CDATA[activism]]></category>
  369. <category><![CDATA[activists]]></category>
  370. <category><![CDATA[CCP]]></category>
  371. <category><![CDATA[CCP legitimacy]]></category>
  372. <category><![CDATA[Chongqing]]></category>
  373. <category><![CDATA[communist party]]></category>
  374. <category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
  375. <category><![CDATA[democracy activist]]></category>
  376. <category><![CDATA[dictatorship]]></category>
  377. <category><![CDATA[dissent]]></category>
  378. <category><![CDATA[freedom of expression]]></category>
  379. <category><![CDATA[political reform]]></category>
  380. <category><![CDATA[political slogans]]></category>
  381. <category><![CDATA[political system]]></category>
  382. <category><![CDATA[protesters]]></category>
  383. <guid isPermaLink="false">https://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=704628</guid>
  384.  
  385. <description><![CDATA[On the evening of August 29, Chinese Valentine’s Day, passersby in Chongqing’s University Town neighborhood met with an astonishing sight: eye-catching political slogans – some inspired by Peng Lifa’s October 2022 Sitong Bridge Protest – were being projected on the exterior wall of a high-rise building. The slogans read as follows: “Only without the Communist [&#8230;]]]></description>
  386. <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On the evening of August 29, Chinese Valentine’s Day, passersby in Chongqing’s University Town neighborhood met with an astonishing sight: <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/09/06/qi-hong-china-chongqing-protest-fled-uk-military-parade/">eye-catching political slogans</a> – some inspired by Peng Lifa’s October 2022 Sitong Bridge Protest – were being projected on the exterior wall of a high-rise building. The slogans read as follows: “Only without the Communist Party will there be a New China.” “Freedom is not something bestowed; we must fight to reclaim it.” “Arise, those who do not wish to be slaves, and reclaim your rights.” “Down with Red fascism and Communist Party tyranny.” “We want truth, not lies; we want freedom, not slavery.” “The tyrannical Communist Party must step down.”</p>
  387. <p>A post shared on Teacher Li’s X account described the protest and included <a href="https://x.com/whyyoutouzhele/status/1961459295813312811">four images of the slogans</a> being projected on the building in Chongqing. The post generated widespread interest on X, and thus far has racked up 20 million views, 22,000 likes, 4,200 retweets, and 2,500 comments:</p>
  388. <p><img decoding="async" src="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/files/2025/09/image-1756725019015.png" alt="undefined" /></p>
  389. <p>The slogans call to mind a number of influences. “Only without the Communist Party will there be a New China” is a play on the CCP slogan “Without the Communist Party, there would be no New China.” The phrasing “Arise, those who do not wish to be slaves, and reclaim your rights” seems inspired by the Chinese lyrics of the Communist anthem &quot;The Internationale.&quot; And the words “We want truth, not lies; we want freedom, not slavery” closely resemble the slogans used by lone protester Peng Lifa in his influential <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/10/beijing-bridge-protest-scraped-from-web-as-censorship-tightens-before-party-congress/">October 2022 protest at Sitong Bridge in Beijing</a>—words that were echoed later that year by the White Paper protesters: “<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2023/10/a-year-after-sitong-bridge-protest-netizens-ask-where-is-peng-lifa/">We want freedom, not lockdowns; elections, not rulers. We want dignity, not lies. Be citizens, not slaves</a>.”</p>
  390. <p>The slogans in Chongqing remained visible for 50 minutes, before local police gained entry to a hotel room containing equipment that had been projecting the slogans on the side of the building. They also found a note, left for them by a man named Qi Hong, who had rented the hotel room, arranged the equipment, and set the protest in motion before leaving for the U.K. with his family. Another post from Teacher Li’s X account showed <a href="https://x.com/whyyoutouzhele/status/1961581948402635230">security camera footage</a> of five police officers (and another person who appears to be a hotel employee) entering the empty hotel room and finding the projection equipment.</p>
  391. <div style="width: 1210px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img decoding="async" src="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/files/2025/09/image-1756724973993.png" width="1200" height="752" class="size-full" /></p>
  392. <p class="wp-caption-text">Images of enormous slogans projected on the exterior walls of a building in Chongqing.</p>
  393. </div>
  394. <p>Qi Hong’s solitary, remotely executed protest is but the latest in a series of protests by individuals employing slogans, signboards, banners, or loudspeakers to express their dissatisfaction with repressive Party-state governance in China. Some trace their origin to Peng Lifa’s unfurling of banners with anti-lockdown and anti-Xi political slogans at Beijing&#8217;s Sitong Bridge in October of 2022. (Peng was detained immediately after the protest, and <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2024/10/on-second-anniversary-of-sitong-bridge-protest-lone-protester-peng-lifas-fate-remains-unknown/">his whereabouts are unknown</a>. His wife, daughters, and other family members remain under police surveillance.) In November and December of that year, during the White Paper protests that helped to bring an end to China’s draconian pandemic lockdowns, many young demonstrators shouted slogans inspired by Peng’s banner protest. </p>
  395. <p>Several other small-scale political protests have taken place this year. On August 9, a delivery driver at Suzhou’s MixC Mall carried a whiteboard proclaiming, &quot;Power is only accountable to its source. The Chinese people demand the right to vote.&quot; On August 7, a man stood outside of Kunming’s Anti-Japanese War Memorial Hall and displayed a banner reading &quot;Xi Jinping must go!&quot; This spring, on April 15, <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/05/the-chengdu-overpass-protest-and-its-antecedents-the-people-do-not-want-a-political-party-with-unchecked-power/">a man in Chengdu, Sichuan province, unfurled red and white banners from a pedestrian overpass</a>. The banners featured three political protest slogans: “There can be no &#8216;national rejuvenation&#8217; without systemic political reform,” “The People do not want a political party with unchecked power,” and “China does not need someone to ‘point the way forward.’ Democracy is the way forward.”</p>
  396. <p>In an <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ewm-LipWFJk&amp;ab_channel=%E4%B8%8D%E6%98%8E%E7%99%BD%E6%92%AD%E5%AE%A2">August 30 YouTube interview with Yuan Li</a>, host of the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@bumingbai">Bumingbai podcast</a>, Qi Hong (who did not appear onscreen, for his safety) explained a bit about his background and motivations for organizing the remote protest. He acknowledged drawing inspiration from Peng Lifa’s 2022 Sitong Bridge protest, as well as the February 2023 remotely executed slogan-projection protest at Wanda Plaza, a mall in the city of Jinan, Shandong province. The latter protest, which used a remotely operated projector to display the slogans &quot;<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/chinese-activist-projected-anti-xi-anti-communist-party-slogan-in-public-space/7465125.html">Overthrow the Communist Party. Overthrow Xi Jinping</a>,&quot; was timed to coincide with the start of the Second Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Two Sessions in Beijing. It was planned and executed by a 29-year-old man named Chai Song, who later fled to the U.S.</p>
  397. <p>In the interview with Yuan Li, Qi Hong described growing up in an impoverished mountain village near Chongqing, dropping out of school at 16, and working as a migrant in Beijing, where he was frequently the target of police brutality and even spent some time in a detention center. After 2006, his life began to improve: he earned enough as an e-commerce entrepreneur to purchase a house and a car, and he eventually married and had children. But in the years following 2019, his firsthand experience with political repression, food safety scandals, ultranationalist education, and pandemic lockdowns left him deeply disillusioned with Chinese society and politics. His goal in carrying out the Chongqing protest, he said, was not to pursue “violent revolution,” but to create a kind of performance art to express his inner feelings and <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/720858.html">perhaps “kindle a fire” in the hearts of young Chinese like himself</a>. As Qi Hong wrote in the note he left behind for the police, “We must wake up to the truth, for truth is truth. Just as clouds blocking the sun don&#8217;t mean the sun isn&#8217;t there, <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/720887.html">if everyone does their bit to resist, it means the bad guys won&#8217;t be able to act with impunity</a>.”</p>
  398. <p>Bumingbai’s full interview with Qi Hong is available in the embedded link below.<br />
  399. <iframe loading="lazy" title="不明白直播丨对话重庆反共标语事件当事人戚洪" width="1080" height="608" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/ewm-LipWFJk?feature=oembed" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe></p>
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  404. </item>
  405. <item>
  406. <title>LeBron Gives Chinese Basketball A Boost</title>
  407. <link>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/09/lebron-gives-chinese-basketball-a-boost/</link>
  409. <dc:creator><![CDATA[Arthur Kaufman]]></dc:creator>
  410. <pubDate>Thu, 11 Sep 2025 19:48:12 +0000</pubDate>
  411. <category><![CDATA[China & the World]]></category>
  412. <category><![CDATA[Culture & the Arts]]></category>
  413. <category><![CDATA[Economy]]></category>
  414. <category><![CDATA[Level 2 Article]]></category>
  415. <category><![CDATA[Recent News]]></category>
  416. <category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
  417. <category><![CDATA[basketball]]></category>
  418. <category><![CDATA[broadcasting]]></category>
  419. <category><![CDATA[celebrities]]></category>
  420. <category><![CDATA[celebrity culture]]></category>
  421. <category><![CDATA[china market]]></category>
  422. <category><![CDATA[cultural diplomacy]]></category>
  423. <category><![CDATA[domestic market]]></category>
  424. <category><![CDATA[market]]></category>
  425. <category><![CDATA[NBA]]></category>
  426. <category><![CDATA[NBA broadcast censorship]]></category>
  427. <category><![CDATA[nike]]></category>
  428. <category><![CDATA[people's daily]]></category>
  429. <category><![CDATA[rural areas]]></category>
  430. <category><![CDATA[rural China]]></category>
  431. <category><![CDATA[rural development]]></category>
  432. <category><![CDATA[rural growth]]></category>
  433. <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
  434. <category><![CDATA[U.S. citizen diplomacy]]></category>
  435. <category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
  436. <category><![CDATA[Zhejiang]]></category>
  437. <guid isPermaLink="false">https://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=704629</guid>
  438.  
  439. <description><![CDATA[Monday’s edition of the People’s Daily included a letter in the sports section that appeared to have been written by American basketball star Lebron James. Multiple news outlets initially reported that James had authored the piece, but closer examination revealed that a People’s Daily reporter had actually edited and assembled the piece based on comments [&#8230;]]]></description>
  440. <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Monday’s edition of the People’s Daily included a  letter in the sports section that <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/09/sport/basketball-nba-lebron-james-op-ed-chinese-state-media">appeared to have been written</a> by American basketball star Lebron James. Multiple news outlets <a href="https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/46206451/lebron-james-writes-op-ed-nba-aims-rebuild-china">initially reported</a> that James had authored the piece, but closer examination revealed that a People’s Daily reporter had <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/6613732/2025/09/09/lakers-lebron-james-chinese-paper-nba/">actually edited and assembled the piece</a> based on comments from group interviews James gave to several journalists while in China. This public relations coup has drawn attention to the rehabilitation of the NBA in China, the growing popularity of <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/basketball/">basketball</a> in the country, and the ways in which the sport is being used to improve U.S.-China relations, exploit Chinese markets, and shape young male audiences.</p>
  441. <p>According to the letter, “Basketball is not only a sport, but also a bridge that connects us.” It continued, “I also have three children and I know that basketball can inspire generations of people to pursue their dreams. Seeing so many young basketball lovers in China, I hope I can also contribute to the development of Chinese basketball.” This goodwill message resonated on Chinese social media, with one netizen commenting, “While we increasingly don’t see eye to eye with the US in more things, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3324768/nba-star-lebron-james-writes-basketball-us-china-bridge-rare-state-media-article">NBA seems to be one of the few things we love in common</a>.”</p>
  442. <p>The letter emerged right after James finished his 2025 China tour with stops in Shanghai and Chengdu, and shortly before the NBA is scheduled to play two preseason games in Macau as part of a new deal that returns it to good standing with Chinese regulators. The league was <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2019/10/netizen-voices-this-country-does-not-need-a-second-voice/">taken off Chinese broadcasts</a> in 2019 after then-general-manager of the Houston Rockets Daryl Morey <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2019/10/basketball-fans-in-china-and-the-u-s-angered-over-free-speech-controversy/">expressed support for protesters</a> in Hong Kong. (At the time, James criticized Morey as being “uneducated” about China.) RADII summarized the significance of James’ return to China: “In an era where American sports influence faces increasing competition globally, LeBron‘s return to China and his Forever King Tour with Nike represent something increasingly rare: <a href="https://radii.co/article/lebron-james-forever-king-tour-china-2025">cultural diplomacy that acknowledges past missteps</a> while building toward a more nuanced future.”</p>
  443. <p>Underpinning James’ <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2010/07/lebron-james-gets-china/">longstanding interest in China</a> is also in part its massive market. As Stu Woo reported for The Wall Street Journal last week, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/business/retail/the-rivalry-that-wont-quit-steph-and-lebron-take-the-sneaker-wars-to-china-e5360c98?mod=Searchresults&amp;pos=6&amp;page=1"><strong>James and NBA rival Stephen Curry are competing for lucrative brand recognition in China</strong></a>:</p>
  444. <blockquote>
  445. <p>For the first time since the 2019 political showdown that hamstrung the National Basketball Association’s aspirations in China, both of the league’s biggest stars returned to the basketball-crazy nation to plug their shoe brands.</p>
  446. <p>The stakes are huge: a growing Chinese sportswear market worth $60 billion annually, according to data-analytics company Euromonitor International, with footwear alone accounting for $33 billion.</p>
  447. <p>But American companies have been ceding slices of that pie to up-and-coming Chinese rivals.</p>
  448. <p>The return of basketball royalty to China is intended to reverse that trend.</p>
  449. <p>[&#8230;] “Shaking hands and meeting people face to face, it’s a strategy that’s worked very well for decades,” said [Mark Dreyer, the Beijing-based author of “Sporting Superpower,” about China’s sports industry], “which is why LeBron and Steph have made so many trips to China over the years.” [<a href="https://www.wsj.com/business/retail/the-rivalry-that-wont-quit-steph-and-lebron-take-the-sneaker-wars-to-china-e5360c98?mod=Searchresults&amp;pos=6&amp;page=1"><strong>Source</strong></a>]
  450. </p></blockquote>
  451. <p>Similarly, the influence of popular Chinese NBA players on the Chinese fanbase can unlock major profits. One example is 20-year-old rising star Yang Hansen, who earned a surprise <a href="https://www.scmp.com/sport/basketball/article/3315855/chinas-yang-hansen-taken-16th-overall-nba-draft-memphis-grizzlies">first-round pick</a> in the NBA draft this summer. Since the draft, retail sales for his team, the Portland Trail Blazers, have <a href="https://www.si.com/nba/trailblazers/news/blazers-retail-sales-have-increased-by-over-1000-percent-since-yang-hansen-draft-selection">increased 1,091 percent</a> compared with 2024, its TikTok account collected over 30 million views, and it gained nearly 900,000 followers on Weibo and Douyin. The Washington Post reported <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2025/07/20/yang-hansen-trail-blazers-nba/">other notable statistics</a>: “On Tencent’s paywalled service, one of Yang’s games drew 3.4 million viewers — 16 times the service’s average. And on China Central Television, Yang’s summer league games garnered larger average audiences than the national broadcast network’s telecasts of this year’s NBA playoffs.”</p>
  452. <p>The Chinese government has noticed this massive interest in basketball and tried to harness its economic potential. Last week, the State Council General Office issued a <a href="https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/202509/content_7039155.htm">new document</a> titled “Opinions on Further Promoting the High-Quality Development of the Sports Industry” with the goal of “unlocking the potential of sports consumption.” In a related development, Hong Kong’s legislature <a href="https://hongkongfp.com/2025/09/11/hong-kong-legislature-passes-bill-on-legalising-basketball-betting/">passed a bill this week legalizing basketball betting</a> and imposing a 50 percent duty on profits, which could harness the HK$90 billion market and potentially generate up to HK$2 billion in tax revenue. And another site where officials have promoted consumption through basketball is in <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3320442/passion-pride-and-live-pigs-inside-chinas-booming-local-basketball-league?module=perpetual_scroll_0&amp;pgtype=article"><strong>Zhejiang’s new basketball league, dubbed the “ZheBA,” which has gone viral by tapping into local pride and culture</strong></a>, as June Xia reported last month for the South China Morning Post: </p>
  453. <blockquote>
  454. <p>But for its legions of fans, [the ZheBA’s rugged aesthetics, compared to China’s national league, are] all part of its charm. “The ZheBA might not understand basketball, but it understands Zhejiang”, one user wrote on the social platform RedNote, in a post that received thousands of likes.</p>
  455. <p>The ZheBA is part of a broader movement in China towards embracing grass roots amateur sports, after years of growing frustration with the dysfunctional state of the nation’s professional leagues.</p>
  456. <p>[&#8230;] Despite being highly local, the ZheBA is also explicitly commercial. The games partly serve as platforms to promote the region’s local produce: teams exchange gifts from their cities before tip-off; the winners are presented with more signature local items, such as live fish or pigs, after the final buzzer.</p>
  457. <p>“Our team may not guarantee a win, but Pinghu watermelons guarantee sweetness”, read one banner at a recent event.</p>
  458. <p>Local authorities often organise live streaming sales events to promote the products spotlighted during the games, and hold night markets, music concerts, and other events near the venues to encourage spectators to splash more cash. [<a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3320442/passion-pride-and-live-pigs-inside-chinas-booming-local-basketball-league?module=perpetual_scroll_0&amp;pgtype=article"><strong>Source</strong></a>]
  459. </p></blockquote>
  460. <p>The ZheBA follows the success of the Village Basketball Association, or CunBA, a grassroots league of amateurs across rural China that has surged in popularity over the past couple years. Joel Wing-Lun <a href="https://madeinchinajournal.com/2024/10/29/the-viral-success-of-chinese-village-basketball/">wrote in the Made in China Journal</a> last year about this phenomenon and the various actors that benefit from the CunBA: online platforms capitalize on the millions of online spectators; the national government showcases rural revitalization and ethnic harmony; and local businesses and governments profit from record-breaking tourism. Writing about amateur rural basketball in the same journal last month, Selina Kötter and Gil Hizi described <a href="https://madeinchinajournal.com/2025/08/19/basketball-masculinities-in-chinese-television-dramas-and-rural-competitions/"><strong>how the CunBA also constructs youth identities and idealized forms of masculinity</strong></a>: </p>
  461. <blockquote><p>
  462. [T]his essay examines basketball as a site shaped by the media, viewers, fans, and players. We ask: Why and how does basketball become central to the image of competent youth masculinity, while simultaneously functioning as affective entertainment? How do basketball’s symbols, styles of play, and bodily aesthetics generate role models that reflect youth desires while aligning with hegemonic state ideologies?</p>
  463. <p>[&#8230;] We show how basketball imaginaries extend across social spheres, and how official media guides young people in navigating gendered expectations, personal development, and traditional values. We further argue that basketball—understood as an assemblage of practices, objects, and media representations—plays a key role in shaping gendered youth identities in China today, simultaneously fuelling market-driven aspirations and engaging with the disillusionment that increasingly defines young adulthood.</p>
  464. <p>[&#8230;] In this essay, we have discussed the centrality of basketball for the formation of an image of idealised masculinity in China today. Different characteristics of masculinity are emphasised across activities and entertainment products involving basketball. Youth drama portrays ideal masculinity through physical attractiveness, fitness, leadership, and the ability to raise female social status, whereas cunBA players and fans highlight moral character, local pride, and a never-give-up mentality. Along with the different depictions across different types of cultural products and events, basketball practices are themselves sites for negotiating different forms of masculine citizenship, incorporating popular desire and fantasies of personal development, on the one hand, and hegemonic official ideologies (‘rural revitalisation’ and pushback against ‘soft masculinity’), on the other. As a popular transnational sport, basketball accommodates both aspects of fandom and play by enthusiasts and is a site for conveying moral prescriptions that extend well beyond sport and leisure, including bodily aesthetics, gender roles, and rural–urban discrepancies. [<a href="https://madeinchinajournal.com/2025/08/19/basketball-masculinities-in-chinese-television-dramas-and-rural-competitions/"><strong>Source</strong></a>]
  465. </p></blockquote>
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  470. </item>
  471. <item>
  472. <title>Reuters – China faces pivotal welfare reform test as court ruling hits jobs, small firms</title>
  473. <link>https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/sustainable-finance-reporting/china-faces-pivotal-welfare-reform-test-court-ruling-hits-jobs-small-firms-2025-08-20/#new_tab</link>
  475. <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cindy Carter]]></dc:creator>
  476. <pubDate>Thu, 11 Sep 2025 05:39:00 +0000</pubDate>
  477. <category><![CDATA[CDT in the news]]></category>
  478. <guid isPermaLink="false">https://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=704632</guid>
  479.  
  480. <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
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  485. </item>
  486. <item>
  487. <title>The Ideas Letter – China’s Independent Media: One Wall, Two Worlds</title>
  488. <link>https://www.theideasletter.org/essay/chinas-independent-media/#new_tab</link>
  490. <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cindy Carter]]></dc:creator>
  491. <pubDate>Thu, 11 Sep 2025 05:29:39 +0000</pubDate>
  492. <category><![CDATA[CDT in the news]]></category>
  493. <guid isPermaLink="false">https://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=704630</guid>
  494.  
  495. <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
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  500. </item>
  501. <item>
  502. <title>U.S. Department of State – 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)</title>
  503. <link>https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/china/#new_tab</link>
  505. <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cindy Carter]]></dc:creator>
  506. <pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2025 20:08:58 +0000</pubDate>
  507. <category><![CDATA[CDT in the news]]></category>
  508. <guid isPermaLink="false">https://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=704626</guid>
  509.  
  510. <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
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  515. </item>
  516. <item>
  517. <title>Censorship Smothers Criticism of Military Parade</title>
  518. <link>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/09/censorship-smothers-criticism-of-military-parade/</link>
  520. <dc:creator><![CDATA[Arthur Kaufman]]></dc:creator>
  521. <pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2025 03:28:15 +0000</pubDate>
  522. <category><![CDATA[CDT Highlights]]></category>
  523. <category><![CDATA[China & the World]]></category>
  524. <category><![CDATA[Level 2 Article]]></category>
  525. <category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
  526. <category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
  527. <category><![CDATA[Translation]]></category>
  528. <category><![CDATA[broadcast censorship]]></category>
  529. <category><![CDATA[CCTV]]></category>
  530. <category><![CDATA[censors]]></category>
  531. <category><![CDATA[censorship]]></category>
  532. <category><![CDATA[CGTN]]></category>
  533. <category><![CDATA[detention]]></category>
  534. <category><![CDATA[discourse censorship]]></category>
  535. <category><![CDATA[exporting censorship]]></category>
  536. <category><![CDATA[fascism]]></category>
  537. <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
  538. <category><![CDATA[social media censorship]]></category>
  539. <category><![CDATA[translation excerpt]]></category>
  540. <category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
  541. <category><![CDATA[WeChat]]></category>
  542. <category><![CDATA[Weibo censorship]]></category>
  543. <category><![CDATA[Xi Jinping]]></category>
  544. <guid isPermaLink="false">https://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=704619</guid>
  545.  
  546. <description><![CDATA[A host of measures intended to stifle dissent allowed Beijing’s military parade last week to take place without any major disruptions. The following is a summary of some of these examples of censorship and control. Some of these measures were implemented before the parade began. A recent censorship directive, leaked online and later translated by [&#8230;]]]></description>
  547. <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A host of measures intended to stifle dissent allowed <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/09/xi-flexes-diplomatic-and-military-muscle-at-wwii-parade/">Beijing’s military parade</a> last week to take place without any major disruptions. The following is a summary of some of these examples of censorship and control.</p>
  548. <p>Some of these measures were implemented before the parade began. A recent <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/09/minitrue-chengdu-cybersecurity-corps-on-ideological-risks-during-third-quarter-2025/">censorship directive</a>, leaked online and later translated by CDT, advised cyber-regulators to remain vigilant against a long list of “ideological risks” related to the upcoming military parade and other events during the third quarter of the year. Last week, Laura Bicker at the BBC detailed <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn020wrnw78o"><strong>how Beijing tightened control in the lead-up to the parade</strong></a>:</p>
  549. <blockquote>
  550. <p>Airport security scanners have been installed in some office entrances. All drones are banned and international journalists have been visited at home, some on multiple occasions, to ensure they get the message.</p>
  551. <p>Guards have been stationed 24 hours a day at the entrances to overpasses and bridges to prevent any protests, some of them in army uniforms.</p>
  552. <p>[&#8230;] People living near Chang&#8217;an Avenue, which leads to Tiananmen square, were told to stay off their balconies to ensure the rehearsals could be held in secrecy. [<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn020wrnw78o"><strong>Source</strong></a>]
  553. </p></blockquote>
  554. <p>One notable target of censorship was a viral hot-mic moment between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin that was inadvertently livestreamed by CCTV. Extolling the potential of modern medicine, Putin said that continual organ transplants could help people achieve “immortality,” while Xi replied that some people may live to be 150 years old. (Both of these elderly autocrats have <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2023/03/censors-quash-discussion-of-xis-unanimous-re-election-as-president/">defied norms of political succession</a>.) After the parade, searches for the terms “150 years” and “immortality” were <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/09/04/putin-xi-hot-mic-immortality/">censored on Weibo</a>. CGTN also <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/721035.html">removed the video</a> of the conversation from its YouTube page. Later, CCTV <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/reuters-withdraws-xi-putin-longevity-video-after-china-state-tv-pulls-legal-2025-09-06/">withdrew Reuters’ legal permission</a> to use the video and demanded its removal. Complying, Reuters then issued a “kill” order to its more than 1,000 global clients that had received a video of the conversation.</p>
  555. <p>CDT Chinese compiled a list of incidents in which <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/720985.html"><strong>Chinese internet users were censored or even detained for criticizing the parade on social media</strong></a>: </p>
  556. <blockquote>
  557. <p>According to the X account “Teacher Li Is Not Your Teacher” [<a href="https://x.com/whyyoutouzhele">@whyyoutouzhele</a>], a WeChat user from Huaibei, Anhui province made a comment about the military parade in a WeChat group: “What era is it, when we’re still doing crap like this?” Within three hours, the commenter was arrested by the police and later given ten days of administrative detention.</p>
  558. <p>[&#8230;As reported in a post from Teacher Li on X,] a Weibo user who asked, “How come women in the PLA wear makeup, but men don’t?” was banned from the platform for seven days on the grounds of “spreading hatred.”</p>
  559. <p>[&#8230;] In a post on X, Jia Huigang said that after he posted a critical comment about the “September 3 military parade” under a WeChat video, WeChat banned him from posting comments or “bullet-screen” comments for 30 days.</p>
  560. <p>[&#8230;] According to internet police in Xiangyang, Hubei province, a local WeChat user made “slanderous, defamatory, and inappropriate remarks” in response to WeChat Moments’ content about the September 3 military parade. Public security authorities later placed the individual in administrative detention on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.” [<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/720985.html"><strong>Chinese</strong></a>]
  561. </p></blockquote>
  562. <p>Other notable content on Chinese social media was censored, as well. One article about “the allure of fascist aesthetics,” originally published by “Happiness Troupe” (幸福剧团, <em>Xìngfú jùtuán</em>) on an overseas blogging platform in July 2021, was reposted by several WeChat public accounts, two of which (“I Watched Him Build a Tall Pavilion” and “Yixuan Studio”) were subsequently blocked. Part of the article warned about how <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/720761.html"><strong>massive, militarized spectacles reinforce toxic in-group emotions</strong></a> and thereby replace ethical, critical thinking with blind obedience:</p>
  563. <blockquote>
  564. <p>The grand narratives of fascist aesthetics often seduce spectators into an inescapable frenzy of excitement and righteous indignation. In that moment, the collective is infinitely glorified, while the individual is correspondingly diminished. The individual feels an intense desire to belong. In the pursuit of collective approval, individuals are willing to abandon their sense of right and wrong, to swap their intellect for the comfort of belonging. Furthermore, as the book “The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind” (French: “Psychologie des Foules,” by Gustave Le Bon, pub. 1895) suggests, once an individual becomes part of the crowd, they no longer take responsibility for their actions, and instead reveal the unrestrained side of their nature. The crowd never seeks truth or rationality, but rather knows only the crudest, most extreme emotions: blind obedience, cruelty, prejudice, and fanaticism. Fascist aesthetics seek to unleash and harness this most harmful aspect of the collective unconscious. Therefore, whenever you find yourself mesmerized by the grandeur of certain artistic spectacles, you should pause and ask yourself what you are unwittingly losing in the process.</p>
  565. <p>[&#8230;] This collectivist aesthetic is also very common in some opening ceremonies: thousands of people forming a phalanx, creating an image, becoming a spectacle, marching with computer-like precision. Such a perfectly regimented scene demonstrates that the collective is the most beautiful, the collective is supreme, and only within the collective do you have value: without it, you are nothing. [<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/720761.html"><strong>Chinese</strong></a>]  </p>
  566. </blockquote>
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  571. </item>
  572. <item>
  573. <title>Two Major Leaks Illuminate Censorship and Surveillance Sales Into and From China</title>
  574. <link>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/09/two-major-leaks-illuminate-censorship-and-surveillance-sales-into-and-from-china/</link>
  576. <dc:creator><![CDATA[Samuel Wade]]></dc:creator>
  577. <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 22:21:36 +0000</pubDate>
  578. <category><![CDATA[China & the World]]></category>
  579. <category><![CDATA[Economy]]></category>
  580. <category><![CDATA[Level 2 Article]]></category>
  581. <category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
  582. <category><![CDATA[Recent News]]></category>
  583. <category><![CDATA[Sci-Tech]]></category>
  584. <category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
  585. <category><![CDATA[Amnesty International]]></category>
  586. <category><![CDATA[censorship]]></category>
  587. <category><![CDATA[exporting censorship]]></category>
  588. <category><![CDATA[Fang Binxing]]></category>
  589. <category><![CDATA[Great Firewall]]></category>
  590. <category><![CDATA[Myanmar]]></category>
  591. <category><![CDATA[Pakistan]]></category>
  592. <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
  593. <category><![CDATA[surveillance technology]]></category>
  594. <category><![CDATA[U.S. tech companies]]></category>
  595. <category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
  596. <guid isPermaLink="false">https://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=704613</guid>
  597.  
  598. <description><![CDATA[New reporting on two large collections of leaked documents sheds light on the trade of surveillance and censorship technology into and out of China. One, by Dake Kang and Yael Grauer for the Associated Press, builds on an initial collection of thousands of documents leaked from Chinese surveillance company Landasoft to demonstrate how &#34;partnership between [&#8230;]]]></description>
  599. <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>New reporting on two large collections of leaked documents sheds light on the trade of surveillance and censorship technology into and out of China. One, by Dake Kang and Yael Grauer for the Associated Press, builds on an initial collection of thousands of documents leaked from Chinese surveillance company Landasoft to demonstrate how &quot;<a href="https://apnews.com/article/chinese-surveillance-silicon-valley-uyghurs-tech-xinjiang-00bed6421ad8d2ccc6e69f104babe892">partnership between American firms and the Chinese police laid the groundwork</a> for China’s digital surveillance state as it exists today — the largest and most sophisticated on earth.&quot; The other, by a consortium including Amnesty International and The Globe and Mail, focuses on Geedge Networks, a Chinese technology firm co-founded by &quot;<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/space/Father_of_the_Great_Firewall">Father of the Great Firewall</a>&quot; Fang Binxing, and its <a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-leaked-files-show-a-chinese-company-is-exporting-the-great-firewalls/?intcmp=gift_share">sales of censorship and surveillance systems to countries including Kazakhstan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Myanmar</a>.</p>
  600. <p>The AP&#8217;s reporting includes <a href="https://apnews.com/article/chinese-surveillance-silicon-valley-uyghurs-tech-xinjiang-8e000601dadb6aea230f18170ed54e88">the report itself</a>, a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/chinese-surveillance-silicon-valley-uyghurs-tech-xinjiang-a80904158b771a14d5a734947f28d71b">collection of detailed findings</a>, an <a href="https://apnews.com/article/chinese-surveillance-silicon-valley-uyghurs-tech-xinjiang-00bed6421ad8d2ccc6e69f104babe892">account of the report&#8217;s creation</a>, a <a href="https://apnews.com/photo-essay/chinese-surveillance-silicon-valley-uyghurs-tech-xinjiang-photo-essay-2cf5cc7564b4dcab4eaca0bba7612f19">photo essay showing some of the systems&#8217; victims</a>, and the following short film and <strong><a href="https://apnews.com/article/chinese-surveillance-silicon-valley-uyghurs-tech-xinjiang-7ddfd2a3260a541fd9ffedddb44e34f4">summary of key points</a></strong>:</p>
  601. <blockquote>
  602. <p>Over the past quarter century, American tech companies to a large degree designed and built China’s surveillance state, playing a far greater role in enabling human rights abuses than previously known, an Associated Press investigation found. They sold billions of dollars of technology to the Chinese police, government and surveillance companies, despite repeated warnings from the U.S. Congress and in the media that such tools were being used to quash dissent, persecute religious sects and target minorities.</p>
  603. <p>[…] U.S. companies introduced systems that mine a vast array of information — texts, calls, payments, flights, video, DNA swabs, mail deliveries, the internet, even water and power use — to unearth individuals deemed suspicious and predict their movements. But this technology also allows Chinese police to threaten friends and family and preemptively detain people for crimes they have not even committed. The AP found a Chinese defense contractor, Huadi, worked with IBM in 2009 to design the main policing system for Beijing to censor the internet and crack down on alleged terrorists, the Falun Gong religious sect, and even villagers deemed troublesome. IBM referred to any possible relationship it may have had with Chinese government agencies as “old, stale interactions”: “ &#8230; If older systems are being abused today — and IBM has no knowledge that they are — the misuse is entirely outside of IBM’s control, was not contemplated by IBM decades ago, and in no way reflects on IBM today.” Huadi did not respond.</p>
  604. <p>[…] American surveillance technologies allowed a brutal mass detention campaign in the far west region of Xinjiang — targeting, tracking and grading virtually the entire native Uyghur population to forcibly assimilate and subdue them. IBM agents in China sold its i2 software to the Xinjiang police, China’s Ministry of State Security, and many other Chinese police units throughout the 2010s, leaked emails show. One agent, Landasoft, subsequently copied and deployed it as the basis for a predictive policing platform that tagged hundreds of thousands of people as potential terrorists. […] [<strong><a href="https://apnews.com/article/chinese-surveillance-silicon-valley-uyghurs-tech-xinjiang-7ddfd2a3260a541fd9ffedddb44e34f4">Source</a></strong>]
  605. </p></blockquote>
  606. <div class="su-youtube su-u-responsive-media-yes"><iframe loading="lazy" width="600" height="400" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/uo_-d0lShxo?" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen allow="autoplay; encrypted-media; picture-in-picture" title=""></iframe></div>
  607. <p>James Griffiths, meanwhile, described <strong><a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-leaked-files-show-a-chinese-company-is-exporting-the-great-firewalls/">the content and implications of the Geedge Networks leak</a></strong> at The Globe and Mail:</p>
  608. <blockquote>
  609. <p>In July, 2024, a group of Chinese technologists and researchers met at an office in Urumqi, capital of the Xinjiang region, to discuss efforts to stop internet users bypassing the Great Firewall, China’s vast online censorship and surveillance apparatus.</p>
  610. <p>Even by Chinese standards, internet controls in Xinjiang are intense, a legacy of a years-long crackdown by the authorities targeting Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. Preventing people from dodging these controls – to access banned websites or download secure messaging apps – was a key government priority, part of a “long-term struggle and technical confrontation” vital to nationwide “anti-terrorism” efforts, according to minutes of the 2024 meeting.</p>
  611. <p>That record, reviewed by The Globe and Mail, is contained in a leak of more than 100,000 internal documents linked to Geedge Networks, a little-known Chinese company that has quietly assumed a key role in developing the Great Firewall and providing similar censorship capabilities to governments around the world, including in Myanmar, Pakistan, Ethiopia and Kazakhstan.</p>
  612. <p>The Globe – along with researchers at InterSecLab, Amnesty International, Justice For Myanmar, the Tor Project and reporters at Paper Trail Media – has spent months combing through the leak. The files offer a key insight not only into how Geedge exports cutting-edge censorship technology to its authoritarian clients, giving them capabilities they might not otherwise have, but also into the evolution of the Great Firewall itself. [<strong><a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-leaked-files-show-a-chinese-company-is-exporting-the-great-firewalls/">Source</a></strong>]
  613. </p></blockquote>
  614. <blockquote class="bluesky-embed" data-bluesky-uri="at://did:plc:gxznrosgdodxufkm6mjfim56/app.bsky.feed.post/3lyezpatokc2j" data-bluesky-cid="bafyreif2imzdzxl4xgdzc5b2fkzirk5o6beh7arocwtptvtucvl6ibb7fq" data-bluesky-embed-color-mode="system">
  615. <p lang="en">This report focuses on a Chinese company, but worth noting the dangers the whole anti-censorship and outsourced-surveillance sector poses to the free and open internet. </p>
  616. <p>Just like the GFW itself, this sector was started by Western tech firms, who are now facing increased Chinese competition.</p>
  617. <p><a href="https://bsky.app/profile/did:plc:gxznrosgdodxufkm6mjfim56/post/3lyezpatokc2j?ref_src=embed">[image or embed]</a></p>
  618. <p>&mdash; James Griffiths (<a href="https://bsky.app/profile/did:plc:gxznrosgdodxufkm6mjfim56?ref_src=embed">@jamestgriffiths.com</a>) <a href="https://bsky.app/profile/did:plc:gxznrosgdodxufkm6mjfim56/post/3lyezpatokc2j?ref_src=embed">September 8, 2025 at 10:52 PM</a></p></blockquote>
  619. <p><script async src="https://embed.bsky.app/static/embed.js" charset="utf-8"></script></p>
  620. <blockquote class="bluesky-embed" data-bluesky-uri="at://did:plc:gxznrosgdodxufkm6mjfim56/app.bsky.feed.post/3lyezpatxdk2j" data-bluesky-cid="bafyreidwrxuadrni64owaew2nzrkrsgvqau4ekxz3llkpt25h7fjv5kzx4" data-bluesky-embed-color-mode="system">
  621. <p lang="en">Some Western firms have tried to argue (in private and public) that &quot;better us than them,&quot; but really if international community wants to target the spread of censorship and surveillance online, it should be cracking down on the whole sector and promoting the free and open internet.</p>
  622. <p>&mdash; James Griffiths (<a href="https://bsky.app/profile/did:plc:gxznrosgdodxufkm6mjfim56?ref_src=embed">@jamestgriffiths.com</a>) <a href="https://bsky.app/profile/did:plc:gxznrosgdodxufkm6mjfim56/post/3lyezpatxdk2j?ref_src=embed">September 8, 2025 at 10:52 PM</a></p></blockquote>
  623. <p><script async src="https://embed.bsky.app/static/embed.js" charset="utf-8"></script></p>
  624. <p>Content from other members of the consortium includes reports <strong><a href="https://interseclab.org/research/the-internet-coup/">from InterSecLab on the documents&#8217; technical content</a></strong>; from Amnesty International on <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/09/pakistan-mass-surveillance-and-censorship-machine-is-fueled-by-chinese-european-emirati-and-north-american-companies/"><strong>Geedge Networks&#8217; role (alongside several Western companies) in providing censorship and surveillance systems to Pakistan</strong></a>; and from Justice for Myanmar on Geedge&#8217;s provision of &quot;<strong><a href="https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/silk-road-of-surveillance">unprecedented capabilities to track down, arrest, torture and kill civilians</a></strong>&quot;:</p>
  625. <blockquote>
  626. <p>Based on analysis of a leak of more than 100,000 Geedge Networks documents that was shared with InterSecLab, this research sheds light on the features and capabilities of Geedge Networks’ systems, which include deep packet inspection, real-time monitoring of mobile subscribers, granular control over internet traffic, as well as censorship rules that can be tailored to each region. The leak also reveals information about Geedge Networks’ relationship with the academic entity, Mesalab, as well as their interactions with client governments. The implications for data sovereignty are significant, and our findings raise concerns about the commoditization of surveillance and information control technologies. [<strong><a href="https://interseclab.org/research/the-internet-coup/">Source</a></strong>]
  627. </p></blockquote>
  628. <blockquote>
  629. <p>Concerns around unlawful surveillance and online censorship in Pakistan are longstanding. Under an oppressive political landscape, [Pakistan]’s legal system offers no real protection against mass surveillance. Domestic laws lack safeguards and those that exist, such as warrant requirements under the Fair Trial Act, are often ignored, while authorities acquire ever more sophisticated surveillance and censorship tools from foreign companies. The purchase of these sophisticated technologies has amplified the country’s capacity to silence dissent, including by targeting journalists, civil society and the public. [<strong><a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/09/pakistan-mass-surveillance-and-censorship-machine-is-fueled-by-chinese-european-emirati-and-north-american-companies/">Source</a></strong>]
  630. </p></blockquote>
  631. <blockquote>
  632. <p>Geedge’s transfer of a commercialised version of China’s “Great Firewall” gives the junta unrestricted access to the online activities of 33.4 million internet users in Myanmar.</p>
  633. <p>Notably, Geedge systems enable the tracking of network traffic at the individual level and can identify the geographic location of mobile subscribers in real time by linking their activity to specific cell identifiers.</p>
  634. <p>By providing hardware, software, training and support to the illegal military junta, Geedge may be aiding and abetting in the commission of crimes against humanity, including the acts of torture and killing, carried out by the junta. [<strong><a href="https://www.justiceformyanmar.org/stories/silk-road-of-surveillance">Source</a></strong>]
  635. </p></blockquote>
  636. <p>Read <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/08/roundup-chinese-surveillance-tech-and-norms-spread-abroad/">more recent coverage of the global trade in surveillance technology and China&#8217;s key role in it</a> via CDT.</p>
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  641. </item>
  642. <item>
  643. <title>AI Assists Chinese External Propaganda</title>
  644. <link>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/09/ai-assists-chinese-external-propaganda/</link>
  646. <dc:creator><![CDATA[Arthur Kaufman]]></dc:creator>
  647. <pubDate>Mon, 08 Sep 2025 23:22:58 +0000</pubDate>
  648. <category><![CDATA[China & the World]]></category>
  649. <category><![CDATA[Level 2 Article]]></category>
  650. <category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
  651. <category><![CDATA[Recent News]]></category>
  652. <category><![CDATA[Sci-Tech]]></category>
  653. <category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
  654. <category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
  655. <category><![CDATA[China-centric narrative]]></category>
  656. <category><![CDATA[Chinese companies]]></category>
  657. <category><![CDATA[Costa Rica]]></category>
  658. <category><![CDATA[deepseek]]></category>
  659. <category><![CDATA[disinformation]]></category>
  660. <category><![CDATA[disinformation campaign]]></category>
  661. <category><![CDATA[external propaganda]]></category>
  662. <category><![CDATA[fake social media accounts]]></category>
  663. <category><![CDATA[global influence]]></category>
  664. <category><![CDATA[Global South]]></category>
  665. <category><![CDATA[government propaganda]]></category>
  666. <category><![CDATA[influence campaign]]></category>
  667. <category><![CDATA[information control]]></category>
  668. <category><![CDATA[information technology]]></category>
  669. <category><![CDATA[Latin America]]></category>
  670. <category><![CDATA[online propaganda]]></category>
  671. <category><![CDATA[Panama]]></category>
  672. <category><![CDATA[pro-CCP narratives]]></category>
  673. <category><![CDATA[propaganda]]></category>
  674. <category><![CDATA[social media]]></category>
  675. <category><![CDATA[social media profiles]]></category>
  676. <category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
  677. <guid isPermaLink="false">https://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=704592</guid>
  678.  
  679. <description><![CDATA[The Chinese government&#8217;s external-propaganda efforts are receiving a boost from AI. A report published by Graphika last month analyzed what it described as a China-based network of domains and social media accounts using AI tools to “launder” Chinese state-media content and disseminate it in different languages. Here are the report’s key findings: Graphika identified a [&#8230;]]]></description>
  680. <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Chinese government&#8217;s <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/external-propaganda/">external-propaganda</a> efforts are receiving a boost from <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/artificial-intelligence/">AI</a>. A report published by Graphika last month analyzed what it described as a China-based network of domains and social media accounts <a href="https://graphika.com/reports/falsos-amigos"><strong>using AI tools to “launder” Chinese state-media content and disseminate it in different languages</strong></a>. Here are the report’s key findings: </p>
  681. <blockquote>
  682. <p>Graphika identified a network of 11 domains and 16 companion social media accounts that laundered exclusively English-language articles originally published by the Chinese state media outlet CGTN. The identified accounts are active on Facebook, Instagram, Mastodon, Threads, and X.</p>
  683. <p>The assets almost certainly used AI tools to translate and summarize articles from CGTN, likely in an attempt to disguise the content&#8217;s origin.</p>
  684. <p>The network assets disseminated primarily pro-China, anti-West content in English, French, Spanish, and Vietnamese. They also utilized AI tools to generate logos and text specifically designed to target different audiences, including young audiences in Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Europe.</p>
  685. <p>The network’s social media accounts failed to receive any organic traction. On Facebook, we identified pages that are part of the network and ran ads to promote their content and increase their visibility. On X, posts from the associated accounts appeared in top search results for some topics.</p>
  686. <p>We could not attribute these domains and their related accounts to a specific actor(s) based on open-source information. We assess that the actor(s) behind the activity are very likely located in China based on the technical indicators of the domains and social media accounts. [<a href="https://graphika.com/reports/falsos-amigos"><strong>Source</strong></a>]
  687. </p></blockquote>
  688. <p>(In our <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2024/11/cdt-report-borrowed-boats-the-prcs-embedded-propaganda-in-local-african-media/">Borrowed Boats report</a> from last year, CDT tracked similar phenomena of “embedded propaganda,” or Chinese state-media content reproduced in African media outlets, which at times appeared without proper attribution to the original source.)</p>
  689. <p>These sort of campaigns of inauthentic activity are regularly removed from Western social media platforms. According to its <a href="https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/tag-bulletin-q2-2025/">most recent update</a>, in the second quarter of this year, Google’s Threat Analysis Group removed over 7,700 YouTube channels and other accounts that were part of coordinated influence operations linked to the PRC. The accounts shared content in English and Chinese that discussed U.S. foreign affairs, promoted Xi Jinping and China, and criticized the Philippines. This follows similar account removals implemented over the past few years by tech companies such as <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2024/10/microsoft-report-highlights-influence-efforts-from-china-and-others-ahead-of-u-s-election/">Microsoft</a>, <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2022/09/new-reports-detail-chinese-influence-operations-in-foreign-media/">Meta</a>, and <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2020/09/facebook-shuts-down-chinese-influence-operation-targeted-at-philippines-u-s/">Facebook</a> in order to counter Chinese online <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/influence-campaign/">influence operations</a>. </p>
  690. <p>Now, with the help of AI, these influence operations are becoming more complex, effective, and difficult to combat. In February, OpenAI reported that a Chinese-origin network used its ChatGPT AI chatbot to build a tool for <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/02/chinese-and-other-actors-leverage-ai-for-censorship-surveillance-propaganda/">compiling and analyzing overseas social media content</a> about sensitive issues and marketing it to Chinese authorities. Last month, The New York Times and researchers from Vanderbilt University reported that the Chinese government is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/05/opinion/china-ai-propaganda.html">working with Chinese AI companies to monitor and manipulate public opinion</a> both at home and abroad. Internal documents from one such company showed that it had collected data on 117 members of the U.S. Congress and over 2,000 American political figures and thought leaders, and undertaken influence campaigns in Hong Kong and Taiwan. The company, GoLaxy, was founded in 2010 by a research institute at the state-controlled Chinese Academy of Sciences and has worked with top-level Chinese intelligence and military bodies. NYT’s Julian E. Barnes provided more detail on <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/06/us/politics/china-artificial-intelligence-information-warfare.html"><strong>how GoLaxy uses AI for “information warfare”</strong></a>:</p>
  691. <blockquote>
  692. <p>A new technology can track public debates of interest to the Chinese government, offering the ability to monitor individuals and their arguments as well as broader public sentiment. The technology also has the promise of mass-producing propaganda that can counter shifts in public opinion at home and overseas.</p>
  693. <p>[&#8230;] The new technology allows the Chinese company GoLaxy to go beyond the election influence campaigns undertaken by Russia in recent years, according to the documents.</p>
  694. <p>[&#8230;] After being contacted by The Times, GoLaxy began altering its website, removing references to its national security work on behalf of the Chinese government.</p>
  695. <p>[&#8230;] Publicly, GoLaxy advertises itself as a firm that gathers data and analyzes public sentiment for Chinese companies and the government. But in the documents, which were reviewed by The Times, the company privately claims that it can use a new technology to reshape and influence public opinion on behalf of the Chinese government.</p>
  696. <p>[&#8230;] GoLaxy’s public-facing platform, according to its website, has begun using DeepSeek, an advanced artificial intelligence model developed by a Chinese company. GoLaxy can quickly craft responses that reinforce the Chinese government’s views and counter opposing arguments. Once put into use, such posts could drown out organic debate with propaganda. [<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/06/us/politics/china-artificial-intelligence-information-warfare.html"><strong>Source</strong></a>]
  697. </p></blockquote>
  698. <p>General Paul Nakasone, the former head of the U.S. National Security Agency, recently said that while China has lagged behind Russia in influence operations against the U.S., AI tools may radically change its ability, adding “<a href="https://www.theregister.com/2025/08/08/golaxy_ai_influence">I do see this as being really the next generation</a> of what we&#8217;re going to see in gray zone conflict in the future.” Indeed, the U.S. government is itself reportedly planning to <a href="https://theintercept.com/2025/08/25/pentagon-military-ai-propaganda-influence/">purchase AI tools that create and distribute propaganda overseas</a> in a bid to “influence foreign target audiences,” “suppress dissenting arguments,” and “increase the scale of influence operations.” </p>
  699. <p>The competition over online narratives has spread to many different regions around the world. Earlier this year, the Central American think tank Expediente Abierto and the Latin American digital research media outlet ProBox published a <a href="https://proboxve.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Narrativas-Digitales-PB-EA.pdf">report in Spanish on Chinese digital propaganda in Central America</a>. The report identified influential pro-China narratives in Panama, El Salvador, and Costa Rica, and mapped key actors involved in their dissemination. Global Voices translated an <a href="https://globalvoices.org/2025/07/28/chinese-digital-propaganda-in-central-america/"><strong>introduction to the report in July</strong></a>, which included the following findings: </p>
  700. <blockquote>
  701. <p>China’s soft power in the [Central American] region is no longer limited to cultural or educational expressions. It now operates as a key geopolitical tool in the battle over narratives. Through targeted campaigns, partnerships with local actors, and digital diplomacy, China seeks to shape the Central American information ecosystem to reinforce its legitimacy and counter the influence of rival powers, especially that of the United States. This phenomenon poses concrete challenges for the democratic health of the countries in the region, where freedom of expression and information pluralism are under increasing pressure.</p>
  702. <p>[&#8230;] The study shows that China does not apply a one-size-fits-all strategy but rather, adapts its narratives to the political, economic, and cultural context of each country. In all cases, pro-China narratives are primarily promoted by Chinese embassies and diplomats active on social media, Chinese state media like Xinhua and CGTN en Español, local media outlets that uncritically replicate this content, and academic, government, or pro-establishment actors in each country.</p>
  703. <p>The Chinese digital strategy not only seeks to reinforce a positive presence but also to minimize criticism of its authoritarian model, obscure human rights violations, and present its political system as a successful alternative to Western liberalism. This is framed as a form of “unconditional cooperation,” which resonates strongly in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian contexts. [<a href="https://globalvoices.org/2025/07/28/chinese-digital-propaganda-in-central-america/"><strong>Source</strong></a>]
  704. </p></blockquote>
  705. <p>AI tools complement other forms of influence operations carried out by the Chinese government. Reports have shown that Chinese consulates in New York and other American cities engage in <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2024/11/prcs-new-york-consulate-under-scrutiny-over-influence-efforts/">gray-zone intelligence operations</a> to influence local politics. This week, The New York Times published an investigation into <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/25/nyregion/china-consulate-new-york-elections.html">how the Chinese Consulate in New York influences the city’s elections</a>. </p>
  706. <p>On the domestic front, AI has been instrumentalized for various propaganda purposes and other ends to enhance government control. Zhang Wenjun, a deputy director at Beijing’s Party School, recently argued that <a href="https://linguasinica.substack.com/p/_china_chatbot_27">generative AI can play a key role</a> in getting individuals to follow Party ideology, as Lingua Sinica’s latest China Chatbot column noted. And Chinese authorities have already used AI to help <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/06/powered-by-ai-strict-censorship-on-36th-anniversary-of-tiananmen-massacre/">censor commemorations of the Tiananmen Massacre</a>, <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/04/translations-deepseeks-outstanding-results-in-the-field-of-public-security/">monitor public opinion online</a>, and <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/05/henan-develops-its-own-regional-great-firewall-adding-layers-to-chinas-censorship/">surveil users of Telegram and VPN services</a>.</p>
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  711. </item>
  712. <item>
  713. <title>Minitrue: Chengdu Cybersecurity Corps on “Ideological Risks During Third Quarter 2025”</title>
  714. <link>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/09/minitrue-chengdu-cybersecurity-corps-on-ideological-risks-during-third-quarter-2025/</link>
  716. <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cindy Carter]]></dc:creator>
  717. <pubDate>Fri, 05 Sep 2025 07:14:10 +0000</pubDate>
  718. <category><![CDATA[CDT Highlights]]></category>
  719. <category><![CDATA[China & the World]]></category>
  720. <category><![CDATA[Culture & the Arts]]></category>
  721. <category><![CDATA[Law]]></category>
  722. <category><![CDATA[Level 2 Article]]></category>
  723. <category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
  724. <category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
  725. <category><![CDATA[Translation]]></category>
  726. <category><![CDATA[anniversaries]]></category>
  727. <category><![CDATA[anti-Japan]]></category>
  728. <category><![CDATA[Beijing]]></category>
  729. <category><![CDATA[CCP history]]></category>
  730. <category><![CDATA[CDT translation]]></category>
  731. <category><![CDATA[censorship documents]]></category>
  732. <category><![CDATA[censorship methods]]></category>
  733. <category><![CDATA[Chengdu]]></category>
  734. <category><![CDATA[Chinese history]]></category>
  735. <category><![CDATA[cyber police]]></category>
  736. <category><![CDATA[Cyberspace Administration of China]]></category>
  737. <category><![CDATA[Dalai Lama]]></category>
  738. <category><![CDATA[Directives from the Ministry of Truth]]></category>
  739. <category><![CDATA[discourse censorship]]></category>
  740. <category><![CDATA[discourse power]]></category>
  741. <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
  742. <category><![CDATA[Falun Gong]]></category>
  743. <category><![CDATA[film]]></category>
  744. <category><![CDATA[film festival]]></category>
  745. <category><![CDATA[foreign hostile forces]]></category>
  746. <category><![CDATA[games]]></category>
  747. <category><![CDATA[historical nihilism]]></category>
  748. <category><![CDATA[ideology]]></category>
  749. <category><![CDATA[information control]]></category>
  750. <category><![CDATA[Japan relations]]></category>
  751. <category><![CDATA[LGBT rights]]></category>
  752. <category><![CDATA[LGBTQ+]]></category>
  753. <category><![CDATA[local government]]></category>
  754. <category><![CDATA[local officials]]></category>
  755. <category><![CDATA[manipulation of public opinion]]></category>
  756. <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
  757. <category><![CDATA[nationalism]]></category>
  758. <category><![CDATA[online censorship]]></category>
  759. <category><![CDATA[online public opinion]]></category>
  760. <category><![CDATA[pandas]]></category>
  761. <category><![CDATA[People's Liberation Army]]></category>
  762. <category><![CDATA[political instability]]></category>
  763. <category><![CDATA[PRC history]]></category>
  764. <category><![CDATA[public opinion guidance]]></category>
  765. <category><![CDATA[religion]]></category>
  766. <category><![CDATA[religious freedom]]></category>
  767. <category><![CDATA[religious persecution]]></category>
  768. <category><![CDATA[rumors]]></category>
  769. <category><![CDATA[schools]]></category>
  770. <category><![CDATA[Sichuan]]></category>
  771. <category><![CDATA[social media censorship]]></category>
  772. <category><![CDATA[social stability]]></category>
  773. <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
  774. <category><![CDATA[stability maintenance]]></category>
  775. <category><![CDATA[students]]></category>
  776. <category><![CDATA[teachers]]></category>
  777. <category><![CDATA[Tibet]]></category>
  778. <category><![CDATA[Tibet history]]></category>
  779. <category><![CDATA[Tibetans]]></category>
  780. <category><![CDATA[U.S. relations]]></category>
  781. <category><![CDATA[veterans]]></category>
  782. <category><![CDATA[World War II]]></category>
  783. <guid isPermaLink="false">https://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=704591</guid>
  784.  
  785. <description><![CDATA[The following censorship instructions, issued by government authorities, have been leaked and distributed online. (Black text boxes &#9608;&#9608; indicate words that were intentionally blacked out in the leaked images.) Briefing on Ideological Risks During the Third Quarter of 2025 I. Major Events (1) September 3 marks the 80th anniversary of China&#8217;s victory in the War [&#8230;]]]></description>
  786. <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The following censorship instructions, issued by government authorities, have been leaked and distributed online. (Black text boxes &#9608;&#9608; indicate words that were intentionally blacked out in the leaked images.)</em></p>
  787. <blockquote>
  788. <p><strong>Briefing on Ideological Risks During the Third Quarter of 2025</strong></p>
  789. <p><strong>I. Major Events</strong></p>
  790. <p><strong>(1)</strong> September 3 marks the 80th anniversary of China&#8217;s victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the global war against fascism. Exercise vigilance against the propagation of erroneous historical views about World War II that distort or negate the righteousness of the global victory against fascism, or that belittle China&#8217;s major contributions to the World War II victory. Be particularly vigilant about American and Western anti-China forces intensifying their competition with us for discourse power over the history of the war, launching &quot;cognitive warfare&quot; and &quot;public opinion warfare&quot; operations against us, or engaging in speculation that denigrates China’s commemorative activities.</p>
  791. <p><strong>(2)</strong> The 12th World Games will be held from August 7-17 in Chengdu. Be on guard against individuals with ulterior motives who might [use the occasion to] take inappropriate actions or express political demands. Guard against the use of Wi-Fi hotspots and similar means to create a nuisance by spreading counter-propaganda or harmful political messages. Guard against the occurrence of accidents or mass incidents that might inflame public opinion and spill over into the ideological realm. </p>
  792. <p>Remain vigilant against negative hype from foreign NGOs, hostile media websites, foreign journalists, and others regarding event scheduling, venue facilities and services, referees’ decisions, and foreign athletes&#8217; activities off the field. These entities may even attempt to meddle by rehashing controversial societal topics in order to smear China’s national image. </p>
  793. <p>Be aware that various online platforms, “self-published” media, &quot;Big V&quot; online opinion leaders, and others might seek to drum up online traffic by sensationalizing topics such as ticket sales, management of volunteers, copyright infringement of souvenir merchandise, the safety of food and medications provided to athletes, etc. Some may attempt to take advantage of the opportunity to draw unfavorable comparisons or cast aspersions, in order to create an uproar and poison public opinion about the Games.</p>
  794. <p>Also be alert to the possibility of foreign-intelligence-affiliated media agencies and anti-China hacker groups attacking the World Games&#8217; information systems, tampering with data, stealing sensitive information, and endangering ideological security.</p>
  795. <p><strong>(3)</strong> The second edition of the <a href="https://filmfreeway.com/goldenpanda-awards">Golden Panda Awards</a> will be held from September 12-14 in Chengdu. It is essential to be on guard against fans of stars from &#9608;&#9608; territory carrying out online support campaigns, vote solicitation, or slanderous attacks that might exacerbate “fandom” conflict. Be on guard against unorthodox interpretations of nominated works, so as not to highlight sensitive and controversial topics or stir up undue hype. Be vigilant against domestic or foreign hostile forces that might use this major international event to stir up trouble by fabricating negative reports or concocting rumors.</p>
  796. <p><strong>(4)</strong> The third <a href="https://news.cgtn.com/news/2025-08-19/The-third-National-Park-Forum-opens-in-SW-China-1FXKHz0tZV6/p.html">National Park Forum</a> will be held in mid-August in Chengdu. Given that this forum relates to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giant_Panda_National_Park">Giant Panda National Park</a> construction and panda conservation work and research, it is likely to attract attention from some of the more &quot;extremist” panda fans. Exercise vigilance against rumors and inflammatory statements regarding the &quot;scientific nature and rationality of Giant Panda National Park construction&quot; and &quot;panda rewilding and release&quot; efforts. Offline security work must be properly managed to prevent any extremist panda fans from organizing offline gatherings or sit-ins, displaying banners, or shouting slogans that might generate controversial public opinion. Exercise strict precautions against individuals with ulterior motives deliberately stirring up hype about matters pertaining to &quot;pandas being sent abroad or returned to China&quot; that might damage our international relations.</p>
  797. <p><strong>(5)</strong> Be on guard against LGBT groups that might leverage &#9608;&#9608; major sporting events, music festivals, or concerts in the third quarter to organize online public-opinion campaigns, hold offline gatherings to create a disturbance, or even use public spaces to express demands for so-called &quot;equal rights,” in a bid to attract more public attention. Strengthen controls against dangerous behavior by LGBT groups, continue to exercise vigilance against rumors that defame or stigmatize Chengdu, and take prompt action to manage unsuitable information and block the spread of harmful LGBT content.</p>
  798. <p>Exercise vigilance toward attempts by consulates in Chengdu and Chongqing, foreign NGOs, and similar entities to organize film screenings, literary events, academic research, and collection of sensitive data in our region. These activities may provide cover for outside entities to cultivate agents from within LGBT and other groups and to expand their efforts at ideological infiltration.</p>
  799. <p><strong>II. Sensitive Dates</strong></p>
  800. <p><strong>(6)</strong> In the context of Sino-American geostrategic competition, exercise vigilance against hostile forces using the fifth anniversary of the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/world/asia/china-us-consulate-chengdu.html">closure of the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu</a> to spread malicious rumors about Sino-American relations or speculate about topics such as &quot;the reopening of the Chengdu U.S. Consulate&quot; or &quot;the infiltration of Chengdu by foreign forces.&quot; Also beware of extreme nationalists spreading radical anti-American rhetoric or engaging in extreme behavior.</p>
  801. <p><strong>(7)</strong> Exercise vigilance against cultist forces using the 26th anniversary of the ban on Falun Gong to intensify their disruptive counter-propaganda efforts, incite and manipulate the &#9608;&#9608; masses into taking part in harmful cult activities, viciously attack and defame our political system and leaders, and hype false claims that Falun Gong adherents are being &quot;sentenced and imprisoned&quot; or &quot;tortured and persecuted.&quot;</p>
  802. <p><strong>(8)</strong> Around PLA Day on August 1, be on guard against hostile public opinion and exaggerated rumors about China&#8217;s &quot;military threat,&quot; &quot;military corruption,&quot; or &quot;miserable conditions&quot; for retired or disabled veterans. Beware of veterans using online platforms to voice personal complaints about unfair treatment or remuneration. Some may even link up with those from other communities and regions, and band together to exert pressure [on the authorities] via petitions, large-scale gatherings, and extreme rights-defense tactics, thus posing a threat to political and social stability.</p>
  803. <p><strong>(9)</strong> July 7 marks the 88th anniversary of the full-scale outbreak of the Chinese People&#8217;s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression; August 15, the 80th anniversary of Japan&#8217;s unconditional surrender; and September 3, the 80th anniversary of the victory in World War II. Exercise vigilance against the dredging up of erroneous arguments that promote historical nihilism or deny the Chinese Communist Party&#8217;s role as the backbone of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. Also remain vigilant against opportunistic attempts by “self-published” media to manipulate or monetize patriotic topics, to hype the topic of <a href="https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_27117118">Sichuanese troops&#8217; role in the war</a>, or to inflame extreme nationalist, populist, or anti-Japanese sentiments.</p>
  804. <p>&#9608;&#9608; must not organize any [war anniversary-]themed commemorations, exhibitions, displays, or events without prior review and approval. Any planned “mass publicity and education campaigns” must first be reported to the District Party Committee Propaganda Department for approval. Without approval, no such campaigns may be held, nor publicized or reported on. [&#8230;] </p>
  805. <p><strong>(34)</strong> With the start of the school year in September, there may arise certain situations that could easily stir up public opinion or exacerbate “school-related stress.” These might include the start of classes being delayed due to heat waves, concerns about students’ safety during basic military-training courses, incidents of campus bullying, concerns about [cafeteria] food safety, arbitrary or excessive school fees, or the &quot;back-to-school blues.&quot;</p>
  806. <p><strong>(35)</strong> September 10 is the 41st annual Teachers&#8217; Day. It is possible that the appearance of online reports might heat up discussion of certain topics, such as problems with teachers’ conduct and ethics, disparities in teachers’ employment contracts and compensation, the onerous burden of tasks unrelated to teaching, the difficulties faced by younger teachers, etc.</p>
  807. <p><strong>VIII. Ethnic and Religious Aspects</strong></p>
  808. <p><strong>(36)</strong> The 14th Dalai Lama will be 90 years old this year. Anti-China and Tibetan-independence forces are planning activities around this &quot;birthday celebration&quot; and making concerted efforts to produce various harmful audio-visual works and publications and to disseminate them within our borders. Be wary of monks in &#9608;&#9608; Tibetan areas using social-media platforms to post veiled messages about the Dalai Lama or Tibetan independence as a way of offering him birthday wishes and prayers. Take precautions to prevent religious believers from being duped into joining unlawful gatherings, or worse, participating in extreme incidents such as displaying [prohibited] flags or portraits [of the Dalai Lama], or committing self-immolation.</p>
  809. <p><strong>(37)</strong> Beware of some religious groups organizing &quot;meditation camps&quot; and similar courses targeted at young people. Particular vigilance is required against foreign-affiliated activities that pose risks of ideological infiltration.</p>
  810. <p><strong>(38)</strong> September 9 marks the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Exercise vigilance against anti-China and Tibetan-independence forces colluding to foment social unrest or attempting to disrupt, discredit, or sabotage our policies on the governance of Tibet, our ethnic and religious policies, our developmental achievements in Tibetan areas, and the like. [<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/720794.html"><strong>Chinese</strong></a>]
  811. </p></blockquote>
  812. <p>The above censorship directive first appeared in <a href="https://x.com/whyyoutouzhele/status/1960915248346517723">an August 27 post on X</a> from Teacher Li (<a href="https://x.com/whyyoutouzhele">@whyyoutouzhele</a>) in the form of four images of printed documents. The leaked documents appear to be a portion of a long list of instructions from the Chengdu Cybersecurity Corps on potential “ideological risks” during the third quarter of 2025. Some identifying information has been blacked out in the leaked documents. (In the CDT Chinese transcript of the directive, these elisions are indicated by “xx,” and in the CDT English translation of the directive, they are indicated by black text boxes.) </p>
  813. <p>The range of “ideological risks” covered is extensive. These include Beijing’s blockbuster <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/09/xi-flexes-diplomatic-and-military-muscle-at-wwii-parade/">September 3 military parade</a> marking the eightieth anniversary of the end of World War II, and three international events held in Chengdu: the World Games, the Golden Panda [Film] Awards, and the National Park Forum. The directive also includes detailed instructions for the following sensitive dates and anniversaries: the fifth anniversary of the closure of the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu, the 26th anniversary of the ban on the religious movement Falun Gong, the 90th birthday of the 14th Dalai Lama, PLA Day on August 1, and of course the various World War II commemorations in August and September. Throughout the text of the directive are copious warnings against infiltration by hostile “foreign forces,” overseas NGOs, Tibetan-independence activists, and others. There are exhortations to tamp down on online “rumors” and “hype” concerning various societal hot-button issues. <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/lgbtq/">LGBTQ+ groups</a> and online content are singled out for particular scrutiny. Most notable, perhaps, is the focus on combatting “<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/historical-nihilism/">historical nihilism</a>” and promoting “<a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/08/fight-over-correct-historical-memory-permeates-chinas-war-anniversary-commemorations/">correct historical memory</a>,” particularly as it pertains to the Chinese Communist Party’s role in combating the Japanese occupation of China during World War II.</p>
  814. <p><a href="http://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/%E7%9C%9F1.png" data-slb-group="192542_192513_192159_179641" data-slb-active="1" data-slb-internal="0" data-slb-asset="1961382593"><img decoding="async" class="alignleft wp-image-179018" src="http://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/%E7%9C%9F1-150x150.png" alt="真" width="106" height="103" data-pin-nopin="true" /></a><em>Since directives are sometimes communicated orally to journalists and editors, who then leak them online, the wording published here may not be exact. Some instructions are issued by local authorities or to specific sectors, and may not apply universally across China. The date given may indicate when the directive was leaked, rather than when it was issued. CDT does its utmost to verify dates and wording, but also takes precautions to protect the source. See <a href="http://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth/">CDT’s collection of Directives from the Ministry of Truth</a> since 2011.</em></p>
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  819. </item>
  820. <item>
  821. <title>Xi Flexes Diplomatic and Military Muscle at WWII Parade</title>
  822. <link>https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/09/xi-flexes-diplomatic-and-military-muscle-at-wwii-parade/</link>
  824. <dc:creator><![CDATA[Arthur Kaufman]]></dc:creator>
  825. <pubDate>Fri, 05 Sep 2025 04:18:58 +0000</pubDate>
  826. <category><![CDATA[China & the World]]></category>
  827. <category><![CDATA[Level 2 Article]]></category>
  828. <category><![CDATA[Politics]]></category>
  829. <category><![CDATA[Recent News]]></category>
  830. <category><![CDATA[Sci-Tech]]></category>
  831. <category><![CDATA[Society]]></category>
  832. <category><![CDATA[censorship]]></category>
  833. <category><![CDATA[global influence]]></category>
  834. <category><![CDATA[Global South]]></category>
  835. <category><![CDATA[international relations]]></category>
  836. <category><![CDATA[Kim Jong Un]]></category>
  837. <category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
  838. <category><![CDATA[military spending]]></category>
  839. <category><![CDATA[missiles]]></category>
  840. <category><![CDATA[North Korea]]></category>
  841. <category><![CDATA[online censorship]]></category>
  842. <category><![CDATA[online public opinion]]></category>
  843. <category><![CDATA[power]]></category>
  844. <category><![CDATA[regional power]]></category>
  845. <category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
  846. <category><![CDATA[Russia relations]]></category>
  847. <category><![CDATA[social media censorship]]></category>
  848. <category><![CDATA[superpower]]></category>
  849. <category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
  850. <category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
  851. <category><![CDATA[Weibo censorship]]></category>
  852. <category><![CDATA[world power]]></category>
  853. <category><![CDATA[World War II]]></category>
  854. <category><![CDATA[Xi Jinping]]></category>
  855. <category><![CDATA[Xi Jinping image]]></category>
  856. <guid isPermaLink="false">https://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=704588</guid>
  857.  
  858. <description><![CDATA[On Tuesday, Xi Jinping presided over a major military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II and China’s “War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.” The carefully choreographed 90-minute spectacle showcased autonomous military hardware, nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and a finale featuring the release of 80,000 doves and balloons. Joining Xi in [&#8230;]]]></description>
  859. <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On Tuesday, Xi Jinping presided over a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-military-parade-world-war-xi-jinping-ed1f7b3e245882dd91b597df24eafbea">major military parade</a> marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II and China’s “War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.” The carefully choreographed 90-minute spectacle showcased autonomous military hardware, nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and a finale featuring the release of 80,000 doves and balloons. Joining Xi in front of the 50,000 spectators in Tiananmen Square were over 25 heads of state, including Russia’s Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un. What was on its face a commemoration of the past was interpreted by many observers as a display of China’s present power on the international stage. Xi declared, “<a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202509/03/content_WS68b7d6c9c6d0868f4e8f54d9.html">The rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is unstoppable</a>.” David Pierson from The New York Times, who was told to be in position at 2:45 a.m. along with other journalists covering the parade, reported on <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/02/world/asia/xi-putin-kim-parade.html"><strong>the symbolism and significance of the event</strong></a>:</p>
  860. <blockquote>
  861. <p>The parade was the highlight of a weekslong campaign by the ruling Communist Party to stoke nationalism, recast China’s role in World War II and project the party as the nation’s savior against a foreign aggressor, Imperial Japan. The evoking of wartime memories serves to rally domestic Chinese support in the face of economic uncertainty and tensions with the United States, which Mr. Xi has accused of trying to contain and suppress China.  </p>
  862. <p>“The Chinese nation is a great nation that fears no tyranny and stands firm on its own feet,” Mr. Xi declared from the rostrum of Tiananmen Gate, above a large portrait of Mao Zedong.</p>
  863. <p>He drew a direct line between the sacrifices of World War II and the challenges that China says it faces today.</p>
  864. <p>“When faced in the past with a life-and-death struggle between justice and evil, light and darkness, progress and reaction, the Chinese people united in hatred of the enemy and rose up in resistance,” he said. He cast today’s tensions as another fateful choice, between peace or war, dialogue or confrontation, and said China would side with progress. [<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/02/world/asia/xi-putin-kim-parade.html"><strong>Source</strong></a>]
  865. </p></blockquote>
  866. <p>The event generated a lot of attention on Chinese social media. Manya Koetse from What’s On Weibo wrote that leading up to the parade there were <a href="https://www.whatsonweibo.com/the-final-countdown-chinas-military-parade-on-social-media/">about 225 different popular hashtags</a> on social-media platforms Weibo, Douyin, and Kuaishou related to the parade and its preparations, with most of them (“about 60%”) related to military themes, followed by the parade’s international significance (“18%”). In a viral Zhihu post about what people looked forward to most about the parade, one respondent said: “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/xi-flaunt-chinas-vision-new-global-order-military-parade-2025-09-02/">I hope they&#8217;ll spend less money</a> and use it towards improving people&#8217;s livelihoods.” Taiwanese officials estimated that Beijing <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-flags-huge-cost-chinas-military-parade-growing-war-words-2025-09-01/">spent $5 billion</a>, or two percent of China’s annual defense budget, on the parade. Comparing Xi’s parade to Donald Trump’s controversial military parade in June, one Weibo user wrote, “<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/03/china/china-military-parade-authoritarian-leaders-intl-hnk">China’s military parade: A showcase of national power</a>. US military parade: A showcase of relaxation.” </p>
  867. <p>Chinese internet users were also <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/720926.html">intrigued</a> by the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/03/world/europe/putin-xi-immortality-organ-transplants.html">hot-mic moment</a> between Xi and Putin about extending longevity, in which Putin said that continually transplanting organs could allow people to achieve “immortality.” Some wondered whether Xi’s response about people potentially living for 150 years may have been a reference to the 981 Project, a Chinese project for top CCP leaders with the explicit goal of extending their lifespans to 150 years of age. An ad for the project was previously <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2019/09/translation-deleted-ad-reveals-death-defying-health-plan-for-officials/">blocked on WeChat</a> in 2019. After the parade, searches for “150 years” were <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/09/04/putin-xi-hot-mic-immortality/">censored on Weibo</a>. </p>
  868. <p>A recent censorship directive, leaked online and later translated by CDT, advised cyber-regulators to “[e]xercise vigilance against the propagation of erroneous historical views about World War II that distort or negate the righteousness of the global victory against fascism, or <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2025/09/minitrue-chengdu-cybersecurity-corps-on-ideological-risks-during-third-quarter-2025/">that belittle China&#8217;s major contributions to the World War II victory</a>.” It also warned against “American and Western anti-China forces intensifying their competition with us for discourse power over the history of the war.” </p>
  869. <p>Perhaps the most notable image from the event was a “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-parade-xi-putin-kim-photo-3d34709b05b096138b5f013a0343049b">symbolic walk of solidarity</a>” and “show of strength” by Xi, Putin, and Kim, who had never before appeared together in public (it was also the first time that Kim had attended a major multilateral event). For Wen-ti Sung, a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, this showed that “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/03/military-reveals-and-bold-messaging-five-key-takeaways-from-chinas-big-parade">China is unafraid to stand by its friends</a> and be their literal fellow traveller, even and perhaps especially when they are pariahs in the court of international public opinion.” Among some of the Chinese comments on X <a href="https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/720911.html">reacting to the three leaders’ joint appearance</a> were: “All three countries have leaders for life, cut from the same cloth,” and “The grandson is in the middle, the father is on the left, and the son is on the right.”</p>
  870. <p>Analysts widely agreed that the purpose of the event was to project strength, particularly for domestic audiences. Jennifer Parker, an adjunct fellow in naval studies at UNSW Canberra, said: “You don’t do a parade like this to commemorate the end of world war two. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/03/china-military-parade-xi-jinping-appears-with-vladimir-putin-kim-jong-un">You do a parade like this to show force</a>.” “For the domestic audience <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-military-parade-message-ff1a13ef?mod=china_news_article_pos1">the goal is to rally national pride</a>, present the [Communist Party] as the guardian of China’s sovereignty, and flaunt the military that Xi has invested so heavily in,” said Daniel Russel, a former senior State Department official, now at the Asia Society Policy Institute. Kerry Brown, professor of Chinese studies at King’s College London, said the parade was “a <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fa6920ef-d731-47dc-ad52-7d66d9ace256">great assertion of China’s prowess and advancement and strength</a>, so it’s great for domestic propaganda.”</p>
  871. <p>As the South China Morning Post described, the event “was also an attempt by Beijing to <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3324135/5-key-takeaways-chinas-victory-day-military-parade?module=flexi_unit-focus&amp;pgtype=homepage">cement its global leadership status</a> and to show its rising diplomatic clout.” A Le Monde editorial stated that it “placed [Xi] at the center of the world stage and <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2025/09/03/xi-jinping-at-the-center-of-his-world_6745001_23.html">promoted his vision of rebalancing the international order</a> in the face of the US, an increasingly unpredictable superpower.” Jeff Kingston, a professor of Asian studies at Temple University Japan, said that the parade “showcases the ascendancy of China propelled by Trump’s inept diplomacy and President Xi’s astute statecraft,” adding, “The Washington consensus has unraveled, and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-russia-north-korea-xi-putin-kim-f61a537a3b9ebf4e8d496dee7bc875ac">Xi is rallying support for an alternative</a>.” Chun Han Wong at The Wall Street Journal wrote about how Xi&#8217;s victory celebration this week is part of a broader <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-xi-world-war-ii-536daeca?mod=china_news_article_pos4"><strong>goal of recasting the history of World War II to boost Beijing’s global standing in its rivalry with the U.S.</strong></a>:</p>
  872. <blockquote>
  873. <p>“Xi Jinping is rewriting the history of the Second World War” to serve his political interests, said Hans van de Ven, a professor of modern Chinese history at Cambridge University.</p>
  874. <p>[&#8230;] Abroad, Chinese diplomats have stressed that China helped defeat the Axis powers and build an international order centered on the United Nations—a multilateral system that Beijing accuses President Trump of trying to dismantle to advance his “America First” agenda.</p>
  875. <p>In its place, Beijing has cast itself as a force for global stability.</p>
  876. <p>China’s Communist Party, by stressing its role in World War II, is seeking “co-ownership of the postwar international order,” said Rana Mitter, a China historian at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. The goal is to cast Beijing as a rule-maker in global governance, not a revisionist power trying to rewrite the rules, Mitter said. [<a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-xi-world-war-ii-536daeca?mod=china_news_article_pos4"><strong>Source</strong></a>]
  877. </p></blockquote>
  878. <p>The triumphalism of the parade built on momentum from the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Tianjin on Sunday. At the summit, Xi held <a href="https://trackingpeoplesdaily.substack.com/p/outcomes-from-xis-bilateral-meetings">bilateral meetings</a> with over a dozen other leaders, including Putin, who said that China-Russia relations “are at an <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cr4e4ngvvnro">unprecedentedly high level</a>.” Xi also announced a <a href="https://www.ecns.cn/news/politics/2025-09-01/detail-iheuvwza4996314.shtml">series of new measures</a> to advance the China-led regional organization, including a new development bank; $280 million in aid and $1.4 billion in loans to member states; and coordination platforms for cooperation on energy, sustainable industry, and digital trade. Most notably, Xi introduced the “Global Governance Initiative” (GGI), the fourth of China’s global initiatives following the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative. According to <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/wjbxw/202509/t20250901_11699912.html">an official concept paper</a>, the GGI rests on five pillars: sovereign equality, international rule of law, multilateralism, a “people-centered” approach, and real results. Eric Olander of the China-Global South Project argued that the SCO summit and GGI are the latest examples of <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7368458085696208896/"><strong>Xi’s successful attempts to rally the Global South around a Chinese-led alternative</strong></a> to much of the U.S.-led global instability:</p>
  879. <blockquote>
  880. <p>There was a noticeable difference in the mood and the atmosphere at the summit, particularly among the big powers, that one wouldn&#8217;t have expected given the challenges that India, Russia, and China are facing from the U.S. Clearly, the likes of Xi and Putin feel that momentum is on their side in their confrontation with a West that is now so divided, it&#8217;s hard to even say what the &quot;West&quot; is anymore.  </p>
  881. <p>[&#8230;] Finally, Xi is trying to mainstream his Community for Common Destiny (CCD) policy framework with the introduction of the new Global Governance Initiative (GGI)[&#8230;]   </p>
  882. <p>With the GGI, Xi is basically saying the quiet part out loud, that China is seeking to create a parallel global governance system outside of the U.S. and European-led order, something that would have been inconceivable a decade ago, but now very much feels possible given the plummeting levels of trust in U.S. global leadership and the demand from Global South countries for a greater say in international affairs. [<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7368458085696208896/"><strong>Source</strong></a>]  </p>
  883. </blockquote>
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